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        Abstract 
This thesis analyses the construction of the modern national identity in Poland following the 
state’s creation in 1918. Its central aim is to argue that although much of Poland’s national 
identity was, in fact, the product of the revolutionary eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,  in 
the twentieth century, ethnocultural foundations proved essential in the process of nation 
building. In order to offer a novel approach to this issue this thesis will evaluate the 
programmes of the émigré organizations and political parties to demonstrate the role of the 
two national currents: ethnic/organic and civic/territorial, which developed during the 
nineteenth century and shaped competing definitions of Polish nation. Furthermore, this 
study will analyse the role of the pre-modern and early modern symbols in shaping the 
political currents in modern Poland. Locating and examining elements central to the definition 
of the nation will allow demonstration of how the distinctive national programmes were 
defined under successive administrations. This research argues that the rise of competing 
national identities in East-Central Europe, at the turn of the century, accelerated the 
dissolution of the common trait or national identity, shared by the elites across the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. Deprived of legitimacy the authorities were unable to maintain 
the democratic system, gradually introducing authoritarianism, and by the late 1930s 
replacing the inclusive state model with the organic definition of the nation. This exclusive 
programme resurfaced following the Second World War and became a justification for the 
construction of an ethnically homogenous Poland. The Communist regime aimed to eradicate 
the pillars of national identity and to diminish the role of society in the state’s functioning; 
however, the nucleus of civil society which survived the period of persecution continued to 
grow in strength outside of the official channels. Effectively, this created a popular definition 
of the Polish nation in opposition to that of the regime. The competition between the 
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ethnocultural and political definition of the nation remained a central issue over more than 
two decades following the collapse of the Communist regime.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The discussion surrounding the process of nation building in East-Central Europe 
predates the construction of the majority of the contemporary states in the region. 
National identity in Poland, which is the centre of this study, is a subject which has 
puzzled historians and political scientists. The post-Communist state, which was 
inarguably shaped by distressing experiences, attracted wide attention in the late 
twentieth century. Contemporary Poland is a member of various supranational 
organisations such as the European Union (EU) leading to an assumption that the 
state departed from the organic and exclusive definition of the national community 
and moved towards the civic national model which became possible with the 
adoption of inclusive legislature such as the 1997 constitution or the acts regulating 
the laws and responsibilities of the ethnic and national minorities. This assumption 
would initiate the process of redefining the role of the “traditional institutions” such 
as the Roman Catholic Church on the Polish citizens.   
 The idea of the Commonwealth is to this day recognised in Poland as the 
foundation of post-1918 and post-1989 Poland. The idea of continuity remained not 
only essential to the post-Communist authorities but played an important role in 
bolstering the relationship between the authorities and the population within the 
fluctuating borders of Poland. This research has analysed the role various 
ethnocultural elements which preserved the distinctive character of “the Old Poland”. 
Roman Catholicism and the cultural heritage (literary tradition and distinctive 
political culture) which carried these elements of ethnic consciousness through the 
early-modern period effectively became the pillars of national identity following the 
state’s partitioning in 1795. Moreover, these and other elements identified and 
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analysed in this research as crucial for Polish national identity led to the shaping of 
the divergent interpretations of Polishness. Although the dismantling of the major 
European empires became a reality in 1918, effectively allowing the reconstruction of 
the Polish state, the national “identity” of modern Poland was unlike that shared by 
the nobility in the early-modern Commonwealth. The inability to find a consensus on 
the direction of the future Poland and the arrangement of inter-group relations in a 
society comprising of numerous ethnic and national groups effectively led to the de 
facto implosion of the polyethnic national model proposed by the Socialists mid-
1930s.  
This study sets out to analyse the process in which the two competing strands 
of national identity, namely the political/territorial and the ethnic/organic models, 
were constructed, and which of the particular aspects of these currents provided 
them with the durability and the appeal among the Polish population. Moreover, this 
study will analyse the definitions of the Polish nation and its citizenry as proposed by 
the nineteenth-century émigré societies, political parties, and programmes, proposed 
following Poland’s independence in 1918. This research further discussed the 
transformation of definitions and ethnocultural elements in the programmes of the 
interwar political parties in Poland.  
In order to assess whether the nation in Poland was reconstructed on the 
foundation of an early-modern realm or rather constructed upon the traditions 
forged by the nationalists this study analyses key approaches to the study of 
nationalism namely primordialism, perennialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism. 
Furthermore, this study identified ethnosymbolism as the ideal theoretical framework 
for the examination of the construction of national identity in Poland. Thorough 
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investigation into the literature discussing the process of nation building in Poland 
revealed lack of resources discussing continuity of the distinctive ethnocultural 
strands existing in different periods of Polish statehood and during the lengthy period 
of partitions (1795-1918). These particular elements, such as religion and linguistic 
affiliation, discussed further by the proponents of ethnosymbolism, played a crucial 
role in the preservation of this unique “national” heritage and dissemination of myths, 
symbols, and traditions. This theoretical framework, drafted by Anthony D. Smith, 
requires analysis of a wide body of literature discussing nation-building and 
nationalism.  
Examination of the construction of national identity in Poland through the 
prism of the key theories of nationalism and research of the Polish history led to 
shaping of the core research questions. In the first instance, this study provided 
analysis of the leading theories of nationalism in order to demonstrate whether 
Poland was a purely modern state, or whether modern national identity contained 
elements derived from the early-modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
(destroyed in 1795). Secondly, this thesis assessed the extent to which the national 
authorities and the political parties perceived the foundations of post-1918 Poland as 
an ethnic-organic or a civic-territorial1 state. Lastly, this thesis identified and studied 
the impact of the role of the ethnic cores2 on shaping the nation in different periods. 
This set of core questions provided the analytical basis for the discussion of the 
construction of national identity in modern Poland by driving the focus towards the 
role of the ethnocultural elements and their influence on the way in which the 
political parties and the society addressed the issue of national identity. 
                                                          
1 State constructed through bureaucratic incorporation and founded on the basis of shared territory of 
the inhabitants 
2 Bearers of the distinctive ethnic culture 
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Following the identification of the theoretical underpinning and outlining of 
the central research questions, this study applied the qualitative methodological 
framing. This particular method of inquiry involved analysis of a wide range of 
sources, which offered an understanding of the process of shaping of national identity 
in Poland. Through the framework proposed by ethnosymbolism, this thesis 
examined ‘why’ and ‘how’ the distinctive national character was crystallised and 
preserved in the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Addressing the core questions 
required, aside from the official documents, newspapers, and interviews, application 
of evaluation of empirical evidence such as population censuses. 
Maps I, II, and III 
As the maps (Map I, II, and III) have shown, borders of Poland have changed 
dramatically following the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 
1795. Significant border shifts in interwar Poland (Map II) and following the Second 
World War (Map III) had a great impact on shaping of the ethnic and national identity 
in East-Central Europe. These maps allow visualising the extent of the frontier shifts 
in different periods of Polish history. Maps I, II, and III are necessary to demonstrate 
the extent of territorial changes and population shifts which followed as a 
consequence of these alterations. The substantive chapters of this research will 
further address each of these periods.  
Furthermore, prior to the construction of the nation state in 1918 the frontiers 
of Poland did not resemble the boundaries of a single ethnic community. The 
ancestral predecessors to the modern Polish state included populations of divergent 
religious and linguistic provenance. The Polish nation in the Communist period 
(1945-1989; Map III) which became congruent with the state borders, was a unique 
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phenomenon in Polish history, and although it had been long envisioned by some 
nationalist agitators appeared unattainable prior to the end of war in 1945.  
 The wider area of East-Central Europe is a patchwork of communities which 
were formed through centuries of cultural borrowing and exchange of ideas. 
Similarly the Polish nation and the non-ethnic Poles inhabiting the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth which ceased to exist in 1795 (Map I) and the Second Republic of 
Poland (1918-1939; Map II) were shaped in the process which was initiated prior to 
the outburst of the ideas which surrounded the French Revolution (1789-1799). 
Although in the dynastic realms preceding the construction of modern Poland, 
national identity remained narrowly defined and confined to a small percentage of 
the elites. The binding symbols such as shared political tradition on the one hand and 
the myths of common descent and shared destiny of the peoples on the other were 
assumed by the peasantry and the bourgeoisie. As was argued by the proponents of 
modernism, the nation succeeded the great empires ruled by a fraction of the 
population.  
 
1.1 Structure of Research 
The Literature Review examines the collection of works which became central to 
the research. This section includes a review of theoretical works underpinning this 
research as well as literature offering a wider understanding of the last two centuries 
of Poland’s history. This part of the study also explains three main aspects of the 
study. Firstly, it demonstrates the role of ethnosymbolism, the main theoretical 
framework, in this thesis and compares it with other leading theories of nationalism. 
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The framework applied in the research is discussed in detail and compared with 
other theories in order to demonstrate its advantages.  
Furthermore, the review analyses the data and sources employed in order to 
support the central argument of this study. Study of the key sources allows the 
progression in the field to be traced thus demonstrating how the debate on national 
identity was transformed. The final section of this chapter discusses the utilisation of 
ethnosymbolism in each of the contextual chapters of this study.  
The Methods and Strategies chapter discusses the role of the analysis of the 
theories of nationalism within this research. This section outlines the application of 
ethnosymbolism to this study allowing a thorough examination of the elements 
central to the process of shaping modern national identity in Poland within the 
context of East-Central Europe. This chapter provides detail of primary resources, 
archives and interviewees identified as essential to this study. Finally, this section 
offers the research a wider array of questions which are both chapter specific and 
address the wider issue of national identity in Poland. Through a systematic 
application of detailed questions, this study is able to discuss the evolution of 
national identity in Poland. 
The Shaping of National Identity locates the (ideological) centres of ethnic identity 
in partitioned Poland. This section of the study demonstrates which of the regional 
ethnocultural elements were employed by nationalists in order create a wider 
association and notion of belonging among the Polish speaking and Catholic 
populations of East-Central Europe. This section of the study traces the process of 
crystallisation of two distinct political cultures at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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Furthermore, through demonstration of the divergent interpretations of which of the 
social and ethnic groups were hypothetically incorporated into the Polish nation. 
Nation and Nationality in Post-1918 Poland sets out to clarify the role of the two 
leading political camps in the moulding of modern national identity in Poland. This 
segment of the study analyses the two visions presented by the opposing political 
camps. Through analysis of the indicators of national identity, this study offers 
distinct definitions of Polish nation and nationality, together with scrutiny of the 
specific elements of ethnic identity, utilised in the process of nation building.  
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the shift towards the ethnic model of the 
nation in the late 1930s and the adoption of a comparable model by the Soviet 
sponsored regime in the mid-1940s. The section of this chapter, discussing the post-
war Poland, demonstrates the inability of the ruling Communist party to address the 
needs of the diverse population of Poland. The alienation of the citizenry from the 
political elites resulted in a shift from the widely accepted ethno-cultural definition of 
the nation and recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity in Poland. This lengthy 
chapter highlights of the role of authoritarian regimes in shaping a rigid and exclusive 
definition of the Polish nation. The latter part of this chapter discusses the evolution 
of an underground society and shaping of the nation in opposition to the regime.  
National Identity in Post-Communist Poland exhibits the competition for national 
identity which had continued into the liberal-democratic state. This chapter traces 
elements of continuity discussed in previous chapters demonstrating their role in the 
shaping of the nation in post-Communist Poland. This chapter further discusses 
attempts made by the political parties to create a definition of nation which would 
appeal to all Polish citizens. This section of the study demonstrates how the 
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expanding definition of Polishness was approached by the post-1989 political parties. 
Moreover, it also analyses the extent to which the ethnic/organic and civic/territorial 
were assumed by the competing strands in Poland following the post-Communist 
transition.  
The Conclusion offers a broader outlook on the entire thesis. It reiterates the central 
arguments suggesting answers to the research questions posed in the introduction. 
Furthermore, it discusses the role of each segment of this research in conjunction 
with the main findings from the entire study, outlining its pivotal points. Lastly, it 
discusses national identity in contemporary Poland. Based on the data analysed in 
this research, the final segment of the study proposes the future course of 
development of the national community in Poland. It examines whether in the 
twenty-first century it is by either ethnocultural or territorial nationalism. The 
Conclusion also offers analysis of the contemporary political and social issues in 
Poland through the application of ethnosymbolism. This study argues that in modern 
Poland national identity is a combination of elements which are simultaneously new 
and old. Moreover, although on the surface, elements of national identity derived 
from different periods, appear ancient, they were in fact granted a new meaning 
under each consecutive leadership. The application of ethnosymbolism to this study 
offers a method of understanding the functioning of these pre-modern ethnocultural 
elements and their particular role in shaping the modern nation. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
This chapter will discuss the role of nationalism in the construction of modern 
national states in East-Central Europe, with particular emphasis on the Polish case. It 
will also outline and compare the leading theories of nationalism discussing some of 
the most influential works and ideas. Furthermore, comparison of these theories will 
not only offer contrasting definitions of the Polish nationals in different periods of 
history.  
The contextual chapters of this research outlining the central texts dedicated 
to understanding the modern Polish nation and national identity will also be 
discussed as will some of the themes regarding the construction of national identity 
and the reframing of the symbols identified in different generations. This section is 
divided into chronological and thematic segments focusing on some of the topics 
analysed in the contextual chapters of this research. 
 
2.1 What is a Nation? 
On 11 March  1882 Ernest Renan presented his famous paper ‘Que’est-ce qu’une 
nation?’ in an attempt to assemble and formulate the ideas that described the concept 
of a nation. He outlined concepts surrounding this unprecedented principle, 
presenting it as a collective effort of peoples sharing a mass sentiment towards past 
and present of their community and giving it a distinctive meaning. He argued that 
only those belonging to a particular group are able to comprehend its true spirit, 
finding unity in the moments of joy and an even greater bond in collective defeat and 
mass suffering. Renan wrote: “a great aggregation of men, with a healthy spirit and 
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warmth of heart, creates a moral conscience which is called a nation (…)” (Renan, 
[1882]1992). His theory posed a number of questions that demanded resolution. The 
shared past, the people or the language were among some of the binding 
characteristics of ethnic groups which were stateless at the turn of the century. He 
acknowledged that there was an ongoing process which was leading to further 
fragmentation of existing states along lines which had not been a factor of great 
significance prior to the French Revolution (1789-1799) or The Springtime of 
Nations (1848).  
Renan acknowledged that the masses which were previously excluded from 
the body of the citizenry were becoming aware of their rights and national identity. 
He observed that “nations arise from the solidarity of the people sharing a given 
territory and bonded by a past suffering and sacrifice which influenced successive 
generations” (Renan, [1882], 1992:10). Renan’s work gained prominence as it offered 
the first such critical and elaborate evaluation of the trend later known as 
primordialism, popularised by the seventeenth and eighteenth century German 
speaking philospohers. Figures such as Johann Gottfried Herder, Immanuel Kant and 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte in their philospohical treaties argued for  fragmentation of the 
polyethnic realms and the construction of national states based on clearly defined 
ethnocultural characteristics of the nationals. Renan’s paper confronted the approach 
of Herder who claimed that nations as defined by him and his acolytes formed a part 
of the natural order: 
It [nature] has wonderfully separated nations, not only by woods and mountains, seas 
and deserts, rivers and climates, but more particularly by languages, inclinations and 
characters (Herder, [1784-1791] 1968:78) 
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Renan saw the construction of nations upon the principle of ethnicity as illusionary 
and conflicting with the history of the European migrations. According to the author 
of ‘Que’est-ce qu’une nation?’, the greatest mistake committed is confusion of “the idea 
of the race with that of the nation and attributes to ethnographic, or rather linguistic 
(…)” (Renan, [1882] 1992:1). The ideas put forward by Ernest Renan continued to 
influence researchers attempting to understand the ambiguity of the nation and 
national identity for over a century.  
According to more recent definitions as expounded by the proponents of 
ethnosymbolism ‘nation’ “is a named human population sharing an historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy 
and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991:14). Furthermore, 
national identity requires a set of features which are necessary in order for an ethnic 
community to form a nation. These traits include: an historic territory, or homeland, 
common myths and historical memories, a common, mass public culture, common 
legal rights and duties for all members a common economy with territorial mobility 
for members (Smith:1991:14). These features outlined by Smith undermine some of 
the ethnic groups which point to their origins in antiquity or even before the 
recorded history. Such types of nationalism are known as primordialism and 
perennialism and will be discussed in the next section of the thesis.  
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2.1.1 Primordialism and Perennialism 
Research into the process of nation building in East-Central Europe indicates that 
kinship3 was the central element in the construction of modern nations. This 
particular vision of national roots conforms to the category of primordialism and is 
associated with Johann Gottfried Herder (Kedourie, 1961:54, Conversi: 2006:15).  
According to one of the most prominent scholars of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith, 
primordialism rests upon myths of common descent and ancestry that are buttressed 
by an enormous family tree that supports the unity and loyalty of people to a series of 
“natural laws” (Smith, 1991:13; 2008:35). Although proponents of modernism deny 
the role of primordialism in construction of nations (Connor, 1994, 2000), Smith 
argues that these ‘super families’ were founded upon “mythical ties of filiation and 
ancestry”, granting ethnicity the central role in the construction of modern nations 
(Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1991:22). These elements which allow connection between 
antiquity and the modern are described as primordial ties and are considered 
necessary in forging a bond between nationals: according to this approach ethnicity 
is predetermined (Smith, 1999:3). Furthermore, according to Smith, primordialism 
appeals to the emotions bridging modernity and the remote, frequently inaccessible, 
periods in history. Moreover, it assumes that nations, rather than construction of the 
post-revolutionary Europe, are in fact integral to the natural order. According to 
Herder, nations which disappeared of the map, may remain in a state of hibernation 
until they are reconstructed, as nations always existed while states were constructed 
(Herder, [1774] 2004:24). 
 Furthermore, Johan Gottfried Herder in Reflections on the Philosophy of the 
History of Mankind (1791), argued:  
                                                          
3 The familial ties  
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For every nation is one people, having its own natural form, as well as its own 
language (…) and originality of [national] characters extends to families (Herder, 
[1791]1968:7) 
 
It was clear to Herder that existence of different nations was natural and 
introduced by God himself rather than any other force. Humanity developed from 
simpler forms of organization and effectively created nations. This was progress was, 
according to the philosopher, part of evolution. Herder, through his research of 
ancient civilisations, came to the conclusion that it was through “tradition” which 
each human being is born into that the seeds of nations are preserved in each 
successive generation (Kohn, 1965:31).  
Magicians, shamans, priests, they were born and brought up amid the imaginations of 
their own tribes, (…) tribes older then themselves (…) (Herder, [1791] 1968:47-48)   
 
Herder made an equation between natural order and history. According to his 
writings, God influenced the development of civilisations. Herder understood 
belonging to a nationality as a concept involving spirituality and morality. 
Primordialism perceived nations and their identity as shaped by the achievements of 
the previous generations requiring continuing nurturing (Herder, [1774] 2004:20).  
Perennialism, unlike primordialism, claims that nations stem from the times 
immemorial. Proponents of perennialism base the contemporary life of the nation on 
the myths of foundation recorded in oral histories passed from generation to 
generation (Hastings, 1997, 1999). Unlike primordialism, the theory of perennialism 
theory argues that the nations “do not belong to the natural order,” rather “they 
emerge and dissolve, only to reappear continually in different periods” (Smith, 
1999:5). According to Adrian Hastings (1997), nations are formed from oral 
traditions and the dissemination of the written vernacular. Perennialism stands in 
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contrast to the claims of the purely modern nature of nations. Both perennialism and 
primordialism focus on a people’s past and the bonds that have crystallized through 
centuries of collective development. There are two currents of perennialism outlined 
by Anthony D. Smith (Smith, 1999: 34-40): continuous perennialism and recurrent 
perennialism. The former assumes that certain nations have existed over the course 
of centuries if not longer; according to the latter, nations may disappear from the 
political map only to reappear in different periods. Adrian Hastings (1997, 1999) 
argues that nations existed prior to the French Revolution (1789-1799) and some 
traces of national identity stem from periods far earlier than the eighteenth century 
(Smith, 1999: 36).  
 
2.1.2 Modernism 
Proponents of modernism perceive nations as purely modern phenomena dating back 
only as far as the French Revolution (1789-1799). According to modernists all 
features demonstrated by the nineteenth-century nationalists as elements allegedly 
“traditional” to the ethnic culture, are in fact, modern concepts. Modernist 
philosophers argue that there are other factors at play, whether it was the industrial 
revolution or weakening of the dynastic realms which effectively led to construction 
of modern nations. Modernists agree that all nations date from the late eighteenth 
century while other scholars claim that nations may have only appeared in the late 
nineteenth or even early twentieth centuries. Walker Connor (Connor, 1993; 2000), 
in his historical inquiry into the construction of modern nations, denies antiquity any 
role in the process. Other modernists outline distinct elements (such as vernacular 
mobilization) which, although may seem ancient on the surface, were in fact 
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constructed in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century (Gellner, [1964] 1994; 
Hobsbawm, 1992; Kedourie, [1960] 1993).  
Every nationality is destined through its peculiar organisation and its place in the 
world to represent a certain side of the divine image (…), for it is God who directly 
assigns to each nationality its definite task on Earth (Kedourie, 1993:51) 
 
According to Elie Kedourie (1960) German philosophy with its impact on the 
unification of the German state fractured the contemporary political systems leading 
to the final destruction of the polyethnic realms in East-Central Europe. In effect the 
novel state model based upon ethnicity and not religious-dynastic realms became 
dominant (Anderson, 2006:21-22).  According to the Kantian school, discussed in 
Kedourie’s Nationalism, self-determination was a virtue, demanding from the 
populace stubbornness and sacrifice, as “a good man is an autonomous man and for 
him to realize his autonomy, he must be free” (Kedourie, 1993:20). Kedourie 
concludes his interpretation of German philosophy by demonstrating its powerful 
links with religion and nationalism in the philosophy of Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
Kedourie’s analysis of German philosophy defines nationalism as a doctrine of the 
collective will and a quest for unattainable perfection (Kedourie, 1961:87).  Kedourie, 
claims that nationalism was a nineteenth century invention and “it pretends to supply 
a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a 
government exclusively its own” (Kedourie, 1961:9). Moreover, according to 
Kedourie, the nationalists created a new frame of perceiving the world, in the 
categories of competing nations. In the ethnonationalist sense, once an ethnic group 
was able to distinguish its specific characteristics from those traits of the “others” it 
was able to create a more organised unit (Kohn, 1965). In order to make this 
cohesion, the nationalists required a common language.  According to Benedict 
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Anderson (1983) “the new intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite masses into 
history (…), the invitation card had to be written in the language they all understood 
(Anderson, 1983:80) 
Although it was claimed that philosophy had an impact on the construction 
and shaping of national identity, it was argued that without means of mass 
communication and social preconditions nationalism could not reach a wider 
audience and spread rapidly across the continent (Anderson, 1983, Connor, 1993, 
Hroch, 1985). The rise of newspapers with their articles on international affairs, 
collections of pamphlets, songs, romantic poetry, etc. facilitated vernacular 
mobilization and the new ideas for national homogeneity through identity, based on a 
common language. Growing literacy and the standardisation of the written 
vernacular allowed a wider communication between the cultural centres and the 
remote areas which only had a limited access to information. Communication with 
regions operating in the same language allowed broadening of the appeal put 
forward by nationalist agitators (Anderson, 1983, Hroch, 1985). These developments 
became in effect responsible for merging small communities into a population with 
shared myths, memories and goals.  
Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that any connection with ancient realms is 
merely a forgery which came into being with the introduction of national vernaculars. 
Anderson deconstructs the programmes of alleged “national revival” stressing the 
role of the decline of the dynastic realms in founding a new state model rather than 
the persisting existence of national identity. Furthermore, the author of Imagined 
Communities claims that “(…) nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not 
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with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that 
produced it” (Anderson, 1999:12).  
Ernest Gellner (1964, 1983), on the other hand, argues that the ideas put 
forward by Kedourie (1960) did not fully explain the depth of nationalism and its 
appeal to modern societies. According to Gellner, the main strength of nationalism 
came from the evolution of agrarian societies and dawn of the industrial era. The 
transition from feudalism and the migration of the population in larger urban areas 
led to the expansion of the educated middle class, which in return became more 
passionate about nationalism. Gellner (1983) claims that nationalism is “indeed an 
effect of industrial social organisation, it is not the only effect of the imposition of this 
new social form, and hence it is necessary to disentangle it from those other 
developments” (Gellner, 1983:40)  
Furthermore, industrialisation led to the construction of modern nations 
through the demand for development of relations within these novel communities. 
An extension of the sphere of economic interests was followed by the spreading of 
high culture, previously available only to the elites, shared identity, and national 
languages. These interactions between populations from the remote areas required 
from the nationalists construction of and ideology which would allow widening the 
diverse population’s allegiance to a particular state (Conversi, 2006:19; Brubaker, 
1994:4).   
Modernism offered a critique of myths and traditions constituting the 
foundations of the contemporary national states in East-Central Europe (Kedourie, 
1961:16). Furthermore, it posed important questions regarding the age of nations, 
analysing elements which led to the construction of modern national identity. 
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Proponents of modernism allowed researchers to deconstruct some of the key aspects 
constituting the backbone of modern states. According to Smith, modernism and its 
proponents redefined the outlook on history and nationalism itself. However they did 
not however fully explain the wide appeal of nationalism to the disparate ethnic 
groups across the globe. Moreover, Kedourie or Gellner, according to the proponents 
of ethnosymbolism did not demonstrate the depth of the sentiments embedded within 
ethnic identity (Smith, 1991:20; 1999). 
(…) Nations must have a measure of common culture and civic ideology, a set of 
common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the 
population together in their homeland. (…) Historic-territory, legal-political 
community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and 
ideology: these are the components of the standard, Western model of the nation 
(Smith, 1991:11)  
 
 
2.1.3 Ethnosymbolism 
An inability of the proponents of modernism to fully explain the role of 
sentimentalism and ethnocultural traits in shaping the modern nations influenced 
some scholars to question whether nations were entirely the products of 
industrialization and the vernacular mobilization of the late eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries (Kohn, 1961:46). In fact, the leading proponents of 
ethnosymbolism Anthony D. Smith (1986, 1991) and John Hutchinson (1994) argue 
that although nations appear as may appear as constructs of modernity, without 
ethnic foundations such as ethnocultural past and shared myths of descent they 
would not survive.  Where modernists denied any influence of the past on modern 
communities, scholars of ethnosymbolism found traits of modern nationalism in the 
pre-revolutionary eighteenth century.  Here, the focus is not exclusively on language 
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and culture but there is an emphasis the significance of ethnic cores4 or cores of 
communities which role was to ensure that the traditions5 of the community were 
preserved in the oral histories, songs of the people, or in script. Ethnosymbolism 
displays ties between the glorified past of the suppressed communities and their 
striving for independence. It focuses on a number of aspects influencing either the 
revival of communities or their vanishing in the wake of other powerful outside 
influences such as politicization of ethnicity (Smith, 1981; 1991, 2008; Hutchinson, 
1987, 1994). Ethnocultural elements such as shared memory of the antiquity of the 
ethnic group allowed also creating a programme for the purification and rejuvenation 
of the shared identity.  
In his research, Anthony D. Smith, argues that pre-modern properties exist in 
many modern nations across the globe. These attributes frequently predate the 
conquest of the great dynastic realms by the more powerful realms. Smith underlines 
the role of a particular social class which is not exclusive to the upper strata but 
rather to the “group of individuals exposed to some form of superior education” 
(Conversi, 2006:22) in the preservation of the distinctive communal identity or the 
ethnie.6 He argues that these ethnic cores became the guardians of the traditions and 
myths effectively influencing the construction of the modern national identity. 
Equally the ethnicists recognised the role of ethnic symbols in state building and the 
influence it had on shaping of the modern national identities (Smith, 1991:38, 
Conversi, 2006:22). 
                                                          
4
 Fairly cohesive and self-consciously distinctive ethnies which form the kernel and basis of states and 
kingdoms (Smith, 1991:38-39) 
5
 “traditions” in this sense were understood as ethnic traits carried from generation to generation 
6
 Anthony D. Smith and other ethnosymbolists refer to pre-national communities as ethnies rather than 
nations as to avoid the terminological confusion.  
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(…) It is through such unifying and embracing mechanisms that what we may term 
‘ethnic cores’ are gradually built up. These are fairly cohesive and self-consciously 
distinctive ethnies which form the kernel and the basis of states and kingdoms such as 
the barbarian regna of the early medieval era (Smith, 1991: 38) 
 
 Similarly, John Hutchinson (1987, 1994) continues to question the purely 
modern character of the nation. Hutchinson who analysed divergent social identities 
claims that the modern nation is a cultural project with roots in pre-modern and 
early modern periods (Hutchinson, 1994:40). Both Smith and Hutchinson argue that 
“deep ethnic foundation is a prerequisite to the survival of modern nations” 
(Conversi, 2006:22-23). Hutchinson, in his work, puts particular emphasis on the role 
of the distinctive culture which influenced preservation of distinctive ethnies which 
effectively laid the foundations for national identity in different states. This approach, 
although accepting elements of modernism, argues that “formation of modern nations 
needs to be examined in la longue durée7” (Hutchinson, 1994:7).  
 Analysis of the national histories through the prism of la longue durée can 
usefully be applied to the case of Poland. Although the patterns proposed by the 
modernists could be applied to explain the developments leading to the construction 
of modern Poland in 1918, some such as the industrialisation, which took place more 
slowly in Poland than in Western Europe. However the increase in the  number and 
the role of the middle classes in urban centres such as Lwow, Warsaw, or Krakow 
continued to gradually erode the influence of the nobility in the state. This process of 
nation-building was interrupted with the third and final partition of the 
Commonwealth in 1795. Continuing industrialisation influenced the rapid growth of 
                                                          
7
 An approach to the study of history granting supreme role to the evolution of historical structures 
rather than particular historical events 
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awareness connected to linguistic, religious, and territorial affiliation of the 
peasantry and the urban populations divided between three realms.   
 With regards to the case of Poland there are more issues which require 
addressing, and which are better explained by the theoretical framework proposed 
by Smith and Hutchinson. Analysis of Polish history and especially the period 
following the French Revolution (1789-1799) demonstrates the role of the 
ethnocultural past, the traditions preserved by Catholicism in the Commonwealth, 
and the shared myths of descent. These elements effectively allowed the freezing of 
the distinctive traditions coded in different periods by the ethnic cores and when 
modern Poland was constructed in 1918 it was in fact reconstructed upon these 
ethnocultural elements which remained dormant until the socio-political climate 
demanded their return.  
 
2.2 National Identity in East-Central Europe 
Another important aspect in the study of nation building is related to the problematic 
relationship between the newly constructed states and the identity of its citizens. 
Nationalism, according to the proponents of ethnosymbolism, is a dogma that trumps 
all other longings. Modern nationalism is an attempt to create a single dominant 
culture in order to combat regional identities with their separate cultures, dialects, 
and/or religious minorities. Unlike in the civic/territorial definition of nation, which 
assumes different religious and linguistic affiliations, creating an environment in 
which the population accepts the overriding political form of nationalism, ethnic 
nationalism perceives nation as a holy communion based on shared ethnic, linguistic, 
and/or religious features (Kohn, 1965:45).  According Hans Kohn (1965), there are 
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two distinct types of nationalism: Western and Eastern. Western type of nationalism 
is characterised by the bureaucratic incorporation which influenced the construction 
of political communities’. Nationalism of the eastern type is described by Kohn as 
organic and ethnic. Kohn claims that “blood” played a central role in shaping of the 
national communities in Eastern Europe as it was perceived as holy and connected 
with the sacrifice of the peoples’ who originally inhabited East-Central Europe. 
Furthermore, according to the organic model of nationalism continuity of blood was 
crucial as it preserved the traditions of the nation for the generations to come.  
In East-Central Europe where borders continued to fluctuate over the course 
of the centuries, determining the ethnicity of population on any other basis than 
religion or linguistic affiliation posed an obstacle to territorial consolidation and 
construction of a single nation. An ethnic patchwork existed across the polyethnic 
territories of the Habsburg Empire and by the late nineteenth century the ties with 
the early-modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s traditions loosened. Nation 
building, which followed the collapse of the empires, resulted in the rise of organic 
nationalism and the growth of antagonism between different ethnic groups sharing 
territory. Moreover, the attempts to create nation-states across East-Central Europe 
faced various obstacles. Paradoxically, the main hurdles for the nationalists 
attempting to build nation-states were the elements which allowed ethnies (such as 
the Poles) to prevail rather than become consumed by a more potent nationalist 
movement. Cultural borrowing which the nationalist elites perceived as a factor 
weakening the ‘nation’ was, in fact, an essential element which led to the rejuvenation 
of the ethnie. According to Smith (1991) “external cultural stimuli and contacts have 
renewed the sense of ethnic identity through selective cultural appropriation” (Smith, 
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1991:36), without such impulse the ethnie would become lethargic and unable to 
reinvent the distinctive character in the successive generations. 
Furthermore, religious identities are, according to Smith (1991), often closely 
related to their ethnic counterparts. This particular aspect of identity discussed by 
modernists and ethnosymbolists alike became essential in the construction of the 
nations of the organic type (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1999). Nationalism and religion 
combined fill any human void for belonging as they “provide peoples with necessary 
protection and superiority to those who refuse to assimilate to the dominant ethnic 
group” (Smith 1991:24). In the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, ethnic 
provenance became considered to be a given, demanding protection from external 
influences and interference. The construction of identity of the “revived” nations 
allowed justification of oppressions and expulsions of ethnic and religious minorities. 
Prior to the Second World War, minorities became widely perceived as a threat to the 
integrity of the modern states.  
 
2.3 (Re-) Construction of Poland 
Following the defeat of the Détente powers in 1918 the independence of Poland 
became a fact. Nationalism and the desire for self-determination as encapsulated in 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points became an issue particularly in regions where a 
variety of cultures shared the same territory. This desire for the construction of 
states according to ethnography and historical affiliations created a stir among the 
populations of different provenance sharing the same territories. Two of the Fourteen 
Points (1918) presented by the American President gave a boost to a number of 
agitators attempting to “revive” Poland after more than a century of constituting an 
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integral element of three divergent realms. Wilson’s points indeed strengthened 
claims for the construction of national states:  
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development. 
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a 
free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence 
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant (Levin, 
1968:18) 
 
These points assumed the existence of a Polish nation with claim to a specific 
territory. They also concluded that a substantial majority of the inhabitants of the 
drafted state shared the will to take an active part in the life of this state. Following 
the line of inquiry proposed by the ethnosymbolists it is necessary to find an answer 
to the question when the Polish nation comes into existence. Analysis of the post 
1795 Polish history will allow us to establish at what point modern Polish national 
consciousness began to permeate the whole of the targeted society. The analysis of 
nation building process will facilitate an insight into the construction of the modern 
Polish state and the “re-construction” or rather redefinition of the nation from the 
nineteenth century onwards. It will also make clear the role of the aspects which had 
an impact on the shaping of national identity in the twentieth century.  There are 
elements of Polish national identity such as language, religion and culture which 
became influential in preservation of the distinctive character of the population. The 
destruction of the Kingdom of Poland in 1795 halted the progress aiming at widening 
the Polish nation to social groups other than the nobility. The attempt to enfranchise 
a wider spectrum of the Kingdom’s inhabitants was brought to a halt leaving the 
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upper strata (6-8 per cent of population) disconnected from the majority of the 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth (Brykczynski, 2010:650).  
 The French Revolution altered the status quo and influenced widening of the 
definition of nation. This novel idea resonated across Europe leading to reassessing 
what it meant to belong to a particular nation. The population of the former Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth although holding the largest body of citizens (nobility) in 
comparison with other European states retained a high level of social inequality and 
serfdom (Brykczynski, 2010:651). The population inhabiting the Commonwealth 
(before and post partitions) was largely unable to comprehend the proposed 
elevation to the status of Polish nationals as this category seemed exclusive. The 
revolutionary ideas stemming from France influenced discussions on the widening 
definition of the nation. Expansion of citizenship beyond the body of the nobility 
became a goal for the Polish parliament (Sejm) while passing the modern constitution 
of 1791. These late measures proved insufficient and not progressive enough to lead 
to a socio-political revolution in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth capable of 
widening the support for the Polish forces against the advancing Russian troops 
(Bendyk, 2014). 
In a deteriorating international situation, Tadeusz Kościuszko signed the 
Proclamation of Połaniec (Uniwersał Połaniecki, 1794) which granted the equal role to 
preserve Rzeczpospolita8 the previously disenfranchised peasantry and other social 
strata omitted from the life of the state9. Although this act did not gain wide support 
from the peasantry it became the first such document creating the foundations of the 
modern Polish nation. The idea of the nation evolved over the course of the 
                                                          
8 Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (from Polish): Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, from 1792 known 
as Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland) 
9Kościuszko. T. Uniwersał Połaniecki Rada Naywyzsza Narodowa (1794) 
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nineteenth century following the destruction of the Kingdom. Neal Pease (2009) 
argues that inability to shape national identity through the bureaucratic 
incorporation rather than vernacular mobilisation, similarly to the states in Western 
Europe, in absence of the official state institutions granted the nation-defining role to 
the nobility (szlachta) and the Church.  These institutions, which continued to exist 
through different periods of statehood and following the destruction of the Kingdom 
of Poland, operated as ethnic cores  preserving symbols and traditions which would 
serve to bind populations in the twentieth century. Andrzej Walicki (1982), Janusz 
Tazbir (1986), and Paul Brykczynski (2010), outline some of the main ethnocultural 
elements which were formed prior to the eighteenth century and played a central 
role in shaping modern Poland. According to Neal Pease (2009) and Norman Davies 
(2005) these traditional traits allowed ethnic Poles to associate with each other, 
while at the same time they detached other ethnicities and religious groups from 
voluntary participation in nation-building strategies in post-1918 Poland. This study 
argues that a distinctive Polish identity existed before “independence” in 1918 and 
even before the French Revolution. The question posed in this section is to what 
extent was this identity “national”. This study argues that the ethnocultural traits 
preserved in pre-modern and early modern traditions of the ethnies were not 
“national” according to the modernist definition of the term “nation”. Ethnosymbolism 
argues that there is a relationship between the ancient ethnies and the modern 
nations.  
Furthermore, John Hutchinson (2005) argues that ethnic formation is a 
recurring phenomenon in history, “ethnic communities have been enduring cultural 
and political actors in the pre-modern period, assuming forms often comparable to 
the modern nation (…) and, though nations have novel features, they are products of 
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factors cutting across the pre-modern–modern divide, and earlier ethnic identities 
may have a directive effect on nation-formation” (Hutchinson, 2005:10). Through the 
ethnosymbolist lens, the traditions developed in the early-modern realm should be 
considered as “national” traditions rather than as a set of values appropriated in the 
nineteenth century.  It was the definition of the Polish nation which was altered to 
include a wider population.  
 Preservation of the high culture shaped by consecutive generations of the 
nobility remained a central element in the preservation of the distinctive traditions 
and shaping a distinctive Polish identity in the nineteenth century. The idea of the 
nation-state or another Commonwealth developed in different directions. The 
writings of Prince Adam Czartoryski (1847) and Hugo Kollataj (1844) evidenced the 
evolving definition of the Polish nation. The crushed uprising of 1830, led by the 
szlachta, proved that without the support of the peasantry Poland could not regain its 
independence. The masses not only did not participate in the campaigns led by the 
nobility but also violently opposed them. A further example of this opposition was the 
uprising of 1846 in which the Galician peasantry launched attacks on the Polish 
landlords. Patrice Dabrowski (2001) and Timothy Snyder (2003) argue that the 
process of construction of modern national identity was not initiated until the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century. The expansion of ideas motivated by the 
growing economic links between the remote areas alongside the development of 
modern communication allowed the National League (established in 1893) to 
promote organic work10 among ethnic Poles which would ultimately lead to Polish 
                                                          
10 A movement which lasted from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth century; it perceived 
the nation as a living organism. According to the positivists only through grass-root work and 
cooperation of all the elements of this organic nation would society become aware of its potential and 
gain independence.   
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independence (Friszke, 1989). Roman Dmowski (1893, 1903, 1908), Zygmunt Balicki 
(1903) and Jan Ludwik Poplawski (1910) shaped the national movement and some of 
the organisations which became influential in crystallising the direction of modern 
nationalism in Poland. Their works propagated the creation of a Poland where the 
nation would become congruent with the state borders. In this philosophy, all minor 
ethnic groups would become incorporated and assimilated to the more potent Polish 
nationalism. Without their works many educated young people inhabiting cities and 
the rural areas alike would not have been able to gain a wider understanding of their 
national affiliation. Dmowski’s Thoughts of a Modern Pole (1903) became essential in 
establishing the frontiers of the “Polish civilisation”.  Brian Porter (1992, 2000) and 
Janusz Terej (1983) who analysed the programme proposed by the National 
Democrats argue that endecja (National Democracy, narodowcy) not only created 
links with the mythologised state but also outlined the future direction of the nation 
and the programme for assimilation of the non-ethnic Poles, some of whom (Jews or 
Germans) were perceived as a threat to Polish national identity. Analysis of the works 
produced by the National Democrats (and their critics) through the prism of 
ethnosymbolism allows us to approach their arguments from an as yet unexplored 
perspective. Endecja offered a novel vision of Poland which was uncharted until the 
late nineteenth century. This form of cultural rejuvenation was, in fact, necessary in 
order to attract the wider population to the national project. The peasantry 
remaining disconnected from the urban areas and frequently illiterate became 
involved in this novel project which (in theory)  involved every Polish speaker and 
every Catholic. National identity “can be combined with other types of identity- class, 
religious or ethnic — but also for the chameleon-like permutations of nationalism, 
the ideology, with other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism” (Smith, 
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1991:14) is multi-dimensional. This versatility became the focal point of the 
programme of National Democracy at the turn of the twentieth century.   
 The Socialists created an alternative programme for gaining national 
independence. Unlike the National movement, they argued that ethnic Poles should 
not become dominant in determining the future of Poland. Henryk Zieliński (1983) 
and Paweł Zaremba (1981) discuss the state model proposed by the Socialists. Their 
analysis draws a comparison between the envisioned nation-state and the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth constructed by the Jagiellon royal family. The Polish 
Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) led by Józef Piłsudski recognised 
the role of divergent communities in creating the strength of the Polish nation. The 
PPS recognised that the construction of a single national identity was a delicate and 
complicated process. W. Paruch (1997) and Aneta Michilic (2006) argue that Poland 
could not form a nation state after its independence in 1918 as ethnic Poles 
constituted only about three-quarters of the total population of Poland.  
 
2.4 From Independence to the Second World War 
National identity remained an issue for the authorities following the proclamation of 
independence. The state, the borders of which continued to fluctuate until 1921, 
remained divided along ethnic and regional boundaries. Neal Pease (2009) and Brian 
Porter-Szucs (2011) examine the complicated role of religion in independent Poland. 
While according to Pease and Porter-Szucs, Nationalists identified religion as a 
necessary element of tradition, they also argued that it is only one of the tools 
necessary to build a strong Poland. This research argues that Dmowski and Balicki 
were skilful in understanding how to connect the rural and the urban population with 
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one another and construct an organized meaning from previously detached 
ethnocultural elements. This study argues that endecja found new meaning in the 
late-nineteenth-century organic work, in striving to improve the livelihood of the 
Polish speakers. Polish speakers were identified as the bearers of traditions passed 
from generation to generation and were not fully aware of their national identity. In 
order to widen the appeal of the Polish ethnocultural tradition, previously shared by 
the elites, to the remote villages and the pockets of the Polish speakers across East-
Central Europe, National Democracy applied a wide range of conflicting “traditional” 
elements which would facilitate a wide-ranging appeal of the national programme. 
However, this expansion of the Polish nation to include the lower strata had a catch 
because, although it included more people into this imagined community, it excluded 
others who did not match the criteria.  
The Socialists, on the other hand, acknowledged its role during the era of 
partitions while at the same time they were reluctant in granting Roman Catholicism 
with any special place in shaping national identity in a polyethnic Poland. While 
endecja was prepared to utilise the Church in bolstering the role of ethnic Poles in 
Poland, the PPS saw the possible downsides of collaboration between the “Polish 
religion” and the country in which ethnic-Poles would constitute only one of many 
ethnic groups. Rafal Pankowski (2010) argues that Piłsudski “rejected the 
exclusionary idea of unity of Church and nation (…), and [Piłsudski] remained a pre-
modern politician, with some anachronistic ideas (Pankowski, 2010:17) 
Nevertheless, the ideas of the PPS were considered to be out-dated and did not 
offer reinvigoration to the national model in the era of ethnonationalism. Ideas of 
nationalism constructed upon civic-territorial traditions were lost to a vigorous 
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programme proposed by the National Democrats. Rafal Pankowski (2010) argues 
that the ideologies stemming from Italy and Germany had an influence on 
contemporary politicians in Poland. With the signing of the Treaty of Riga in 1921 the 
federal model of state championed by Józef Piłsudski took a blow. This defeat led to 
the resurfacing of ethnic nationalisms in Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania which would 
continue to undermine the polyethnic state model.  
Analysis of the official data undertaken by various academics allowed this 
study to trace the changes of regimes in post-1918 Poland. Various domestic and 
international factors, such as the rise of fascism in Italy and the global economic 
crisis, created a climate of disillusion with the independent state and the democratic 
system. An inability to find the consensus between ethnic-Poles and ethnic minorities 
led to animosities, assassinations, and persecution. This study also argues that from 
the early stages of independence, the Second Polish Republic faced the distrust of the 
population towards the authorities perceived by the mass population as the 
dominant upper strata. The problem of legitimacy of the democratic authorities 
combined with the previous experiences with authoritarianism granted Piłsudski the 
prerogative to overthrow the democratically elected authorities in 1926, effectively 
ending the brief democratic experiment.  
Furthermore, Waldemar Paruch (1997) and Władyslaw Kulesza (1985) in 
their works, discuss the growing aimlessness of the parliamentary system in Poland 
following the 1926 coup. The lack of experience with the democratic process pushed 
the political elites into the hands of the undemocratic means to achieve their goals. 
Both the Socialists and the National Democrats became involved in violent agitation, 
and even undemocratic persecutions of their political opponents further 
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undermining the democratic state. Moreover, with the waning influence of the 
political elites in Warsaw, the disconnected minorities plunged into the hands of the 
competing nationalist movements. The desperate national authorities unable to halt 
the decline of their influence resorted to force to stem the outbursts of 
dissatisfaction. “Pacifications”, persecutions of the civilian populations, and 
persecution of Unitarian Church, accused of supporting the Ukrainian separatists, led 
to distrust and collapse of the democracy in the Second Republic.  The political nation 
envisioned by the Socialists never materialised. In 1939, the attack on Poland from 
both Germany and Soviet Russia not only destroyed Polish statehood but also further 
divided the populations inhabiting East-Central Europe. The domestic animosities 
between different ethnic groups within Poland, which remained clandestine until the 
German invasion, were unleashed and led to a bloody civil war which tore apart the 
communities of the defunct Second Polish Republic.  
 
2.5 Authoritarian Continuity 
 
Analysis of the period leading to the Second World War demonstrates the destruction 
of the territorial model of the nation proposed by the Socialists. With the approval of 
Piłsudski, disenchanted with the sluggish democratic progress, the political elites 
granted the dominant role to the executive branch which made the parliament 
obsolete (Davies, 2005). Nation construction in Poland entered the ethnic path with 
the Polish language, the Church and Polish culture gaining primacy (Pease, 2009). 
The political programme of the leading National Unity Camp (OZN) formed in the late 
1930s claimed that Poland could only be preserved by the ethnic Poles 
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The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 was rapid and denied 
any possibility of significant response from the Polish forces. Ultimately the 
destruction of The Second Republic came on September 17, 1939 when the Soviet 
Union invaded Poland from the East. Poland became divided between the two powers 
which further supported the process of fragmentation of ethnic communities 
(Sullivan, 2000:24).  
The programme of Aryanization, implemented in the German General 
Gubernia, led to national verification and classification according to usefulness to the 
new regime. The German National List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL) fractured the 
relationship among communities inhabiting the polyethnic areas of interwar Poland 
changing the ethnographic map of Poland. Following the segregation expulsions and 
exterminations commenced. Tens of thousands of people were transferred to 
concentration camps from which they never returned. Karl Cordell (2000; 2005), 
Joanna Michilic (2006), and Timothy Snyder (2003; 2010) argue that the Second 
World War and its immediate aftermath changed East- Central Europe entirely. While 
most of the Jewish population was either exterminated or fled many other 
inhabitants were displaced or sent to concentration camps across the occupied 
territories.  
Michael Fleming (2010), John J. Kulczycki (2001), Piotr Madajczyk (1998) and 
Philipp Ther (1996) in their works demonstrate how the Polish nation and the 
national identity were redefined by the authorities after 1945. The Soviet-sponsored 
regime adopted a core of the programme outlined National Democracy (updated and 
radicalized by the nationalist organizations in the late 1930s), in order to legitimise 
the westward shift of the Polish borders and expulsion of the non-ethnic Poles from 
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Poland’s territory. Their central goal was to create a homogenous Poland, free of 
national minorities, who were identified as being an obstacle in shaping the nation-
state. The segregation of the population in East-Central Europe, as applied by the 
Nazis and their DVL, was later utilised by the Communist authorities. The new regime 
aimed to construct a nation which would be congruent with the state borders created 
in the wake of the Second World War. Those who did not conform to the norms set 
out by the authorities was expelled, sent to camps in Soviet Russia, or imprisoned in 
Poland. Utilising the ethnosymbolist framework in this study, along with the research 
of Phillip Ther (1994) and Piotr Madajczyk (1998), we can see  that the expulsion of 
ethnic minorities and the de facto construction of the Polish nation-state by 1950 
required addressing and modification of a programme outlined by the nationalist 
parties in the inter-war era. Furthermore, during Stalinism the Polish nation lost the 
ability to rejuvenate. Instead, the authorities had to resort to the pursuit of external 
enemies of the Polish nation in order to preserve the ethnic model Poland they had in 
fact created.  
Completion of the expulsions programme in 1950 required formulating a new 
Nationality Law which was ultimately passed in 1951. People who wished to remain 
in Poland were forced to conform to legal requirements which were designed to lead 
to the ultimate consolidation of the state authorities and the population. Although in 
the post-war state the authorities declared their support for the surviving Jewish 
population in re-establishing their livelihoods in Poland, the reluctance by ethnic 
Poles to accept the Holocaust survivors in post-war Poland resulted in animosities 
fuelled further by the the growing competition within the Communist leadership 
(Madajczyk, 1998; Pankowski, 2010). Utilising analysis of the official documents, 
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census data, and research led by different researchers, this research demonstrates 
the impact of the expulsions on shaping national identity in post-1945 Poland.  
From 1950, the United Polish Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza, PZPR) continued to strengthen its authority over the Church. Michael 
Fleming (2010) and Marian Mazgaj (2010) discuss the power struggle between the 
Holy See and the Communist government. The turn towards structural rather than 
subjective violence resulted in either barring or creating obstacles for non-
governmental organisations. The Church which was forced to accept the curbing of its 
influence on Polish citizens following the Agreement of 1950 remained an important 
counterbalance to the control imposed by the authorities (Mazgaj, 2010:35-38). 
Furthermore, through the Communist period the Church, which in the interwar 
period was one of the tools of the nationalist right, became an institution seeking and 
promoting a dialogue beyond ethnic divisions. This position of the Church allowed it 
to become an ambassador of the Polish nation in the struggle against the oppressive 
system. The employment of ethnosymbolism has allowed us to demonstrate the role 
of Roman Catholicism in preserving the traditional elements of national identity. 
Following the communist takeover, the preservation of ethnocultural traits 
transmitted from generation to generation was assumed by the Church. Abroad, this 
role was assumed by the émigré societies which Poland were able to construct the 
foundations of the envisioned democratic Poland. A genuine debate on the future of 
Poland in Kultura Paryska created a counterbalance to the exclusive 
ethnonationalism of the Communist Poland.   
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2.6 The Alternative Vision of Poland and the Democratic State 
The research of Anna Wolff-Poweska (1990), Iwona Hofman (2007), Mikolaj Tyrchan 
(2011) discuss the role of the diaspora organisations, such as Kultura, in the 
strenuous process of shaping a draft of Poland founded upon the polyethnic 
traditions and democratic model.  
 Through the atomization of Polish society, the authorities were able to weaken 
any form of protest. This study argues that the émigré organizations and the Catholic 
Church aided the process of consolidation between detached sections of the Polish 
society. Moreover, Tadeusz Lepkowski (1983), David Ost (1990) and Jerzy Eisler 
(1991) argue that although the Communist regime was able to temporarily fracture 
the ties between the various groups within Polish society over time the working 
classes and the intellectuals recognised the role of cooperation beyond class 
divisions. Through the establishment of state affiliated organisations, the authorities 
were aiming to undermine the influence of the Church and the trade unions. The 
Communist regime was determined to dismantle any alternative programme of 
development.  
The establishment of Solidarność, a mass movement representing a wide 
Polish population, offered an alternative definition of the nation to that proposed by 
the authoritarian regime.  Memoirs of Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1982, 2012) and Lech 
Wałęsa (1990), leading actors in the Solidarność movement, demonstrate the role of 
the trade unions in becoming the common denominator for the Polish workers and 
intelligentsia following the decades of the state-sponsored atomization of the 
national values. The idea of pluralism remained strong in Poland despite the long 
tradition of authoritarianism. The Church was able to redefine its role in the 
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preservation of the national character during the Communist era. Following the 
election of Karol Wojtyła for the Papacy it gained a central role in bonding the divided 
nation. The overthrowing of the alien regime allowed the construction of a 
democratic state. Polish citizens were granted the right to determine their future. 
This privilege had been thwarted by authoritarianism which had taken different 
forms since the military coup of 1926 preventing Polish citizens from deciding on the 
future direction of their state.  
 The fractures within the Solidarność programme, which became clear 
following the first semi-democratic elections of 1989, led to the collapse of the mass 
movement and the resurfacing of competing definitions of Polishness. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki (2012) discussed the complex process of national consolidation in the 
first years of the Third Polish Republic. Fragmentation of the political scene led to the 
creation of  opposing blocs. Andrzej Antoszewski (2000), Peter D. Stachura (1999), 
and George Sanford (2002) are some of the authors who discuss the process of the 
shaping of national identity in the post-1989 era of transition. The debate 
surrounding the character of the Polish nation became prominent in the 1990s and 
demonstrated deep divisions between the “western” territorial nationalism and 
organic definitions of the Polish nation In order to become a member of international 
institutions the authorities became dedicated to the expansion of equal rights to all 
inhabitants of Poland.  
Jack Bielasiak (2010), Genavive Zubrzycki (2006) and Elzbieta Stadtmüller 
(2000) observe that the competition between the organic and territorial nationalism 
in Poland remained influential through the 1990s and in the twenty-first century. 
Competition between these two models led to a number of high profile 
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demonstrations contesting “westernisation” and secularisation of Poland. The debate 
surrounding the 1997 constitution revealed the competition for the elements 
considered as central to the Polish national identity.  
The costly transition process became influential in further polarisation of the 
Polish population. The traditional Left-Right cleavage was replaced by the 
competition between the forces supporting either globalisation or traditionalism. 
According to Gavin Rae (2007), Alex Szczerbiak (2013), and Jacek Kochanowicz 
(2007) strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) polarised the Polish 
population. The programmes of the leading political parties became a reflection of the 
lingering division between the two models of Poland.  
 For their part, Peter Vermeersh (2012), Tomasz Kamusella (2009), and Rafal 
Pankowski (2010) argue that despite the continuing pro-Western course of Poland 
including expansion of civil rights to national and ethnic minorities, identity shaped 
upon foundations recognised as traditional remains an important aspect of the 
national character. Ethnocultural elements such as language and Roman Catholicism 
became essential in tracing the roots of modern national identity in Poland. 
Ethnosymbolists claim that the ethnic cores and political traditions from interwar 
Poland or pre-partition Poland were preserved by the émigré cultural centres and 
the. Moreover, this research demonstrates that the conflicting definitions of Poland 
and Polish national consciousness remained an element of the political scene in the 
post-Communist state.  
  
39 
 
Chapter 3: Methods and Strategies 
This research traces the construction of modern Polish national identity through an 
analysis of a large body of literature discussing nation-building and nationalism in 
Europe. This study has identified ethnosymbolism as opposed to primordialism and 
modernism as the most appropriate method of discussing the dissemination of a 
distinctive national identity in modern Poland.   Moreover, this study discusses the 
role of the peculiar ethnocultural elements and the role of the ethnic cores in 
bolstering the process described as “national revival” in East-Central Europe. The 
examination of archival materials, governmental documents, and a body historical 
research in conjunction with the application of ethnosymbolism allows an insight into 
the process of shaping of national and regional identities in modern Poland. Unlike 
modernism which disputes any role of pre-modern identities in shaping modern 
nations, ethnosymbolism accepts the role of pre-modern identities or ethnies in laying 
the foundations for nations in East-Central Europe.  
This thesis, above all, seeks to identify when the modern Polish nation came 
into existence, what foundations was it formed on, and which elements of the modern 
nation predate its “revival”. Moreover, it demonstrates the process of expansion of 
Polish national identity following the final partition of Poland in 1795. Locating of the 
myths and ethnocultural elements responsible for the shaping of modern national 
identity allows this study to explain which of these distinctive aspects of identity 
endured as essential to defining the national character.  
Furthermore, this research has analysed the national revival and nation 
building in Poland through the prism of different elements perceived as ethnic cores 
or as the ethnocultural foundations of the national identity in Poland. It has 
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predominantly concentrated on two distinct currents perceiving Polish nation as 
either an ethnic or a civic-territorial community. Analysis of the wide range of tools 
applied by nationalists such as the juxtaposition of religion and national symbolism 
allowed this research to present the process of shaping the national movement and 
widening the appeal of myths previously shared by the upper strata  across the 
nineteenth century East-Central Europe.  Revisiting and acknowledging the 
nationalist modus operandi facilitates an understanding of the complex path towards 
self-determination in the region (Taras, 1998; Snyder, 2003). 
 
3.1 Modern Nationalism in East-Central Europe 
Ethnosymbolism study provides a structured framework within which some of the 
central questions in the study of the modern ethnic groups and nations (outlined in 
chapter 1) may be critically evaluated.  
 According to Stephen Van Evera (1997), “(…) a good theory explains 
important phenomena: it answers questions that matter to the wider world, or it 
helps answer such questions” (Van Evera, 1997:19). Furthermore, Van Evera claims 
that a solid theoretical framework contains a large explanatory power allowing wider 
understanding of the subject matter (1997:19-20). Therefore, evaluation and 
application of the writings of some of the most influential scholars engaged in the 
study of nations and nationalism became the underpinning of this study. The 
considerations of ethnosymbolist and, to a smaller extent, modernist interpretations 
as expounded by Anthony D. Smith (1976, 1981, 2008), John Hutchinson (1994, 
2005), Benedict Anderson (1983), Elie Kedourie (1960), Miroslav Hroch (1985, 
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2007), Walker Connor (1984) and Ernest Gellner (1983, 1987, 1994) shaped the 
foundations of this thesis.   
 The application of appropriate methods and strategies is essential as they 
determine the categorization of information and effectively outcome of the entire 
research.  Accurate organisation of information facilitated the structuring of this 
study into segments, based on periods and themes, allowing categorisation of 
distinctive policies in shaping the modern Polish nation as an ethnic/organic or 
political/territorial community. In order to demonstrate how national identity was 
defined in post-1918 Poland, this research applied the paradigms proposed by 
ethnosymbolists.  
Furthermore, this study analysed data from the different regions of Poland in 
different periods. It is necessary to keep in mind that post-1918 Poland was 
comprised of regions constituting integral parts of different realms for over a 
century. Moreover, many of the pre-partition territories were not connected to 
Poland following the military campaign of 1918-1921. Also, a substantial part of the 
population within the borders the reconstructed Poland had developed distinctive 
identities, separate from the cultural traditions and political programme proposed by 
the Polish Socialists and the National Democrats.  
Furthermore, through the development of chapter-specific research questions 
(discussed in the following sections) it became possible to form hypotheses. 
Systematic categorisation of particular sets of information underpins the theoretical 
foundations of this study. According to Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and 
Zig Layton-Henry (2004), research in politics requires definition of the key concepts 
in order to develop a clear and logical framework (2004:33-35). 
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3.2 Nationalism and Modern Nations 
This study examines the process of nation building and the construction of national 
identity in Poland predominantly through the prism of ethnosymbolism. It also 
acknowledges the role of primordialism and perennialism in shaping of nation-states 
at the turn of the twentieth century. According to Hans Kohn (1965) until the late 
eighteenth century the idea of the nation did not have any substantial influence on 
the lives of the mass population. The French Revolution which influenced the 
“awakening” of the peoples and formation of national sentiment had an impact on the 
expansion of the idea of citizenship and the role of divergent elements such as 
religion and language on the construction of modern national identity (Kohn, 
1965:17-18).  
Modernism and ethno-symbolism allow an inspection of specific ethnic 
elements explaining their appeal in the process of “national revival” across East-
Central Europe (Hroch, 1985). Although the proponents of modernism claim that 
elements described as “traditional” and “ancient” in modern national setting are 
merely a forgery these elements were central in shaping of the modern states 
providing the populace with a sense of continuity and the state with legitimacy 
(Hutchinson, 2005:11; Misztal; 2003:104-105).    
The main difference between the proponents of primordialism, modernism and 
ethnosymbolism lies in what would be most accurately described as  “periodization” 
of national elements. Ethnosymbolism seeks to comprehend and categorise 
formation of the modern East-Central European states in early-modern and pre-
modern periods. Analysis of the ethnocultural elements distinguishing ethnic groups 
and nations across East-Central Europe allows to tracing the ethnic origins of modern 
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nations. Unlike the modernists, claiming the distinctive ethnocultural elements and 
traditions as nothing more than fraudulent interpretations of pre-modern history, 
ethnosymbolists without myths and memories of the nations the “revival” could not 
take place.  
Moreover, with regards to the Polish case the destruction of the early-modern 
realm occurred whilst the elites proposed a new model of the Commonwealth, taking 
the first steps towards expansion of the definition of nationality and citizenship. This 
evidence suggests that there are enduring ethnocultural elements of the Polish past 
which existed prior to the final partition of the state in 1795 and acted as significant 
components in the preservation of a distinct territorial identity. This research argues 
that particular ethnocultural aspects responsible for preservation of a distinctive 
ethnie such as shared myths of origin, cultural exchange, religious reform, and a 
distinct political tradition were the bedrock of modern Poland and its national 
identity. . Anthony D. Smith (1991, 1999) argues that the ethnic ties and pre-existing 
cultures are a solid explanation of the “popular roots and widespread appeal of 
nationalism” (Smith, 1999:9). Furthermore, according to the proponents of 
ethnosymbolism, national identity is constantly reconstructed, as frequently as each 
generation in order to ensure the longevity and vitality of the national identity.  
Nationalism, according to the proponents of ethnosymbolism, consists and 
relies on modern and ancient elements.  The construction of nation-states in the 
region required initiators of nationalism who would propagate the idea among their 
social group. These ethnic cores acted as  the guardians of the distinctive culture and 
traditions. In the nineteenth century, these cores held a dual role, firstly as they 
legitimised the national (re-) construction of particular states and secondly they 
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served a powerful link between dispersed groups sharing similar traits. These 
“conveyors of ideas” were able to disseminate the cluster of ethnocultural content in 
the period when the peasantry and workers were becoming more aware of their role 
in the society.   
Priests, scribes and bards, often organized into guilds and castes, who recount, re-
enact, and codify the traditions. Often as the only literate strata, and being necessary 
for intercession with divine forces, priests, scribes and bards achieve considerable 
influence and prestige in many communities (…) (Smith, 1991:38)   
Establishment of legal institutions, guilds, and other organisations shaped the 
foundations for the future revival of nations. Ethnosymbolists and modernists offered 
explanations as to the process of the shaping of multiple identities. The 
aforementioned ‘ethnic cores’ preserved a sense of common historic identity within 
nations states, “this leads [ethnicists] to contextualize the emergence of nations 
within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity which shaped them.” (Hutchinson, 1994:7; 
Conversi, 2006:22).  
National identity created “a sense of common history and way of life, and 
particular ideas of space, that endows its members with identity and purpose” 
(Hutchinson,1994:7).  This study argues that although the idea of the nation existed 
in early modern Poland this definition remained narrow until the late nineteenth 
century. Despite this argument, the construction of a modern Poland should be 
perceived through the prism of la longue durée (Smith, 1999:10), rather than as a 
fraudulent interpretation and appropriation of history of an unrelated realm in the 
modern era.  
This particular idea presents the ethnies embedded into national history not as 
individuals but rather as a group sharing a common purpose. Collective identities are 
formed and gain greater depth as myths and religious and cultural heritage form the 
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bonds within the ethnic group. The mass appeal of ethnonationalism is only possible 
with “the longevity of nations,” which is expressed according to Smith as “the 
continuing power of myths, symbols and memories of ethnic chosenness (…)” (Smith, 
1999:19).  
 
3.3 The Application of Ethno-Symbolism to this Study 
As mentioned in the Introduction, use of appropriate theory is significant to the 
outcome of the project. With regard to the construction of national identity in modern 
Poland, the case is complex and requires an analytical approach discussing elements 
stemming from the pre-modern and early modern periods which shaped the modern 
character of the Polish nation. There is a need for a thorough examination of the 
foundations of the multiple identities crystallizing throughout the turbulent eras 
from the destruction of the Kingdom of Poland in 1795 until the accession of the 
European and global institutions.  
Historical analysis utilised by the ethnosymbolists as one of the central 
approaches to studying nations and nationalisms can be used to show how particular 
characteristics were preserved by institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church 
(Pease, 2009) or political tradition from the early-modern era (Tazbir, 1986). 
Analysis of the process of the creation and the reframing of the role of such 
institutions explains their impact on the divergent elements of the revival of 
nationalism in East-Central Europe. Identifying these variables through the prism of 
ethnosymbolist theories allows this research to explain how “nationalism became a 
vehicle for rapid social change, for mobilizing people, for claiming a ‘homeland’ by 
redrawing the map and for destroying local and regional ties (…)” (Smith, 1999: 61).  
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Strategies proposed by the proponents of ethnosymbolism allow explanation of 
the role of the myths in the foundation of national identity. Moreover, this particular 
theoretical framework allows wider understanding of socio-political transitions. 
Application of ethno-symbolism as the theoretical framework of this study provides a 
platform from which to expound and contextualise the shaping of the modern Polish 
society. Furthermore, it investigates matters such as the evolving definition of the 
Polish nation through the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Through the 
analysis of historical accounts, this study demonstrates the contrast between the 
official national agenda and the minorities incorporated into modern Poland in 1918.  
Theories of nationalism proposed by the ethnosymbolists shape the 
methodology and strategies of this research. The ability to recognise the main agents 
behind the process of polonization or re-polonization of ethnicminorities allows this 
research to assess other such developments in nation states across East-Central 
Europe. It also attempts to explain to a wider audience the contemporary revival of 
identities previously invisible to the successive national governments. This research 
attempts to explain how the contemporary Polish nation was shaped and the role of 
national minorities in the construction of the modern national identity in Poland.  
 
3.4 Strategies and Methodology 
In order to analyse the process of the shaping of the contemporary national and 
ethnic identities in modern 1918 Poland, this research selected a qualitative form of 
inquiry necessary for a thorough analysis of distinctive national programmes, 
parliamentary acts, newspaper articles, interviews and journals. Furthermore, 
analysis of the national programmes proposed by competing strands in interwar 
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Poland (1918-1939) discussed in depth the future of Poland and its inhabitants 
allowing an insight into the contemporary definitions of the Polish nation. This study 
analysed the developing interpretation of Poland through the prism of shared 
territory, as proposed by the Socialists and Poland as a primordial nation bound by 
blood ties.   
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was destroyed in 1795 (Map I) and the 
Second Polish Republic ceased to exist in 1939 (Map II), subsequently reappearing on 
the map of East-Central Europe within different borders (Map III) and with different 
population. This fluid state of Poland and its inhabitants constitutes a challenge to 
those aiming to categorise the Polish nation at the turn of the twentieth century. 
These difficulties in capturing and defining the dominant identity in Poland were 
shared by National Democracy and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Conflicting 
programmes and state models founded the competition which would outlive the 
interwar Poland and shape national consciousness after 1945. Comprehension of 
these changes required analysis of predominantly qualitative resources such as party 
programmes and interviews discussing the envisioned ideal model of Poland and the 
Polish nation. However, in order to demonstrate the actual identification of the 
population of Poland (within the borders presented in Map I, II, and III) this research 
applied empirical evidence collected by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) 
from 1921 and 1931 in order to evaluate the claims of the politicians, political 
parties, and governments. However, without the qualitative research and the 
theoretical framework (ethnosymbolism) this empirical data could only provide 
numbers and raw categories such as language, religion, and location rather than 
national identity of the population. Analysis of the theories outlined by Anthony D. 
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Smith and John Hutchinson offered a set of tools allowing categorisation of these 
detached figures provided in censuses.  
Moreover, the analysis of different national programmes, through the 
theoretical framework outlined in the previous sections, allows this research to 
discuss the cooperation and conflict among ethnic and national groups inhabiting 
modern Poland. Ascertaining the current situation of ethnic minorities and national 
minorities in Poland requires an exhaustive analysis of primary and secondary 
sources such as the censuses of the population, official parliamentary documents, and 
interviews with specialists, discussing the process of shaping of a modern national 
identity in Poland.  
The aim of this research is to provide conclusions which demonstrate a 
pattern of political and social behaviour in contemporary Poland. Its role is also to 
demonstrate the means through which the definition of the Polish nation was 
reframed in different periods. Through the use of ethnosymbolism this study 
discusses the role of ethnocultural elements, such as republican tradition shared by 
the early-modern szlachta, and their role in the preservation of the distinctive 
character 
The more cases or examples that are studied, the more likely that common causes can 
be found and generalizations made. Political events are often clarified and 
illuminated by comparison with similar events and processes in other contexts 
(Burnham, Gilland, Grant, Leyton-Henry, 2004:55) 
 
  
Inquiry into the construction or rather expansion of modern national identity 
in Poland through the prism of ethnosymbolism requires analysis of Poland through 
the prism of la longe duree, periodisation, and analysis of the modern history through 
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the analysis of the identified ethnic cores. This research will analyse the role of the 
politically active upper strata szlachta, following partitioning of the First 
Rzeczpospolita. Another ethnocultural element identified as central to securing of the 
distinctive identity is the Church. Following the hypothesis put forward by Anthony 
D. Smith this study argues that religious reform and redefinition of the role of the 
Church in partitioned Poland allowed the institution to survive and to preserve the 
ethnocultural traits of the Commonwealth’s identity into the modern era. The 
religious customs which existed in the pre-partition Poland, and the role which the 
Roman Catholicism played in the life of the peasantry (and to a limited extent in the 
lives of the elites) gave it a pivotal role in expansion of Polish nationalism to the 
lower strata (Tazbir, 1986, Pease, 2009),  Through application of the process tracing 
technique this research was able to:  
(…) Explore the chain of events or the decision-making processes by which initial 
case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects 
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then 
the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.  Process predictions are 
often unique- no other theories predict the same pattern of events or the same actor 
testimony on their motives- it offers strong tests of a theory (Van Evera, 1997:64)  
 
Moreover, comparison of the aforementioned nationalist theories allows this 
research to prove the influence of the antiquity on shaping of the contemporary state. 
In the case of the Church and the nationalist right, there are figures and events from 
the nineteenth and the twentieth century of national politics which allow 
comparisons with other periods. Process tracing demonstrates how the role of 
religion changed in Poland from the early modern era where “Catholicism served as a 
salient indicator of Polish identity, but not as an element of great political significance 
or priority in statecraft” (Pease, 2009:5). Analysis of the role of both religion and 
cultural traditions allows this research to discuss the role of nationalism in post-1918 
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Poland, when the national authorities were competing for symbols capable of 
unifying the nation (Pease, 2009:2; Pankowski, 2010).  
 
3.5 Field Trips and Primary Sources  
This study gathered sources from institutes located in different areas of Poland. 
Analysis of journals, census data, and other documents gathered during extensive 
field trips created solid foundations for subsequent interviews with academics and 
politicians.  This wide research allowed gathering information discussing the role of 
ethnic cores in expansion of the modern national identity. Extensive field trips 
allowed gathering information regarding the partitioned Commonwealth, the 
interwar Poland and the post-1945 state.   
The main institutions have archives, national and local libraries, museums and 
galleries. Resources and data gathered from the Biblioteka Narodowa in Warsaw 
(National Library), Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich in Wrocław (public and private 
national archival collections), the University of Wrocław (UWr), and the Central 
Archives of the Polish Parliament in Warsaw among others shaped the foundation of 
the project and offered a primary perspective on the issues raised by the theories 
nationalism.  
Other organisations with useful resources include: the Institute of National 
Remembrance (Instytut Pamieci Narodowej, IPN), The Institute for Rembrance and 
Future (Osrodek Pamiec i Przyszlosc, Wrocław) the Jewish Cultural Centre and the 
Jewish Museum “Galicia” (Krakow).  These institutions provide an insight into the 
past and attempt to create a pattern of future cooperation between different 
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minorities living in Poland and the Polish state. This research also discusses the 
evolving definition of Polish nation and nationality through the prism of the official 
documents and parliamentary acts which were accessible in the archives of the Polish 
parliament (Sejm). 
Furthermore, this study researches the complex minority issues and regional 
disputes in post-1918 Poland. It assesses territorial disputes between Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Germany after the First World War and the Second World War. 
In order to acquire the information about the contested regions after the “national 
revival” in East-Central Europe and the collection of documents transferred to 
Wrocław from Lwow (Ukraine) after 1945 provided this study with useful data. 
 These steps were complemented by interviews with academics, politicians, 
and the representatives of minority groups, who offered their interpretation of 
distinctive events and particular acts implemented by the consecutive 
administrations. Professionals from various institutions discussing the situation of 
ethnic minorities in Poland became crucial to this study. Academics such as Professor 
Andrzej Winnincki from the University of Wrocław (UWr) and Professor Maria 
Szmeja from Akademia Gorniczo Hutnicza (AGH) in Krakow, researching the role of 
national and ethnic identities in the construction of modern Poland supported this 
research in its  discussion of the process of the shaping of the contemporary Polish 
nation. Dr Larysa Leszczenko provided this research with information on the 
evolution of Ukrainian nationalism and the changing relationship between ethnic-
Poles and ethnic-Ukrainians in the interwar period (1918-1939) and after 1945.  
 With regard to the relationship between Poles and the German minority, 
interviews with the leader of the German Minority Electoral Committee (Mniejszość 
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Niemiecka Komitet Wyborczy)  and parliamentarian Ryszard Galla from Opole and 
German Minority Electoral Committee candidates for the regional authorities, 
Damian Hutsch provided this research with valuable information on the changing 
situation of the German minority in Poland since 1945. Interviews with the film 
director Paweł Sieger regarding the situation of ethnic and national minorities 
following the Second World War forwarded the discussion on the expanding role of 
revisionism of the most recent Polish history.  
 Discussions with academics and politicians are fundamental to the 
understanding of the character of the contemporary Polish nation and the evolving 
political sphere in Poland following the collapse of the authoritarianism in 1989. Dr 
Tomasz Szyszlak (UWr) provided this research with information on contemporary 
self-definitions of ethnic-Poles and minorities inhabiting Poland. Professor Andrzej 
Wiszniowski was a key source of information regarding the changing political space 
in Poland post 1989 and the polarisation of the political sphere in the modern state. 
Interviews with politicians from different political parties demonstrate the role of the 
traditional cleavage in the shaping of political competition in contemporary Poland.  
An interview with Professor Robert Wiszniowski (University of Wrocław, UWr) 
researching the contemporary political system in Poland, provided the final section of 
this research with ideas regarding the evolution of the Polish society and political 
parties.  
 Interviews with members of non-governmental organisations influencing the 
contemporary Polish population provided this research with information on the 
present conflict between territorial and organic visions of Poland.  Moreover, this 
research also analysed newspapers and magazines in order to provide a 
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contemporary outlook on the Polish society. Critical analysis of articles from Polityka, 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Wprost, Rzeczpospolita, Newsweek Polska, Do Rzeczy, and others 
reveal the present state of Polish society and the issues which continue to shape the 
contemporary national identity.  
 
3.6 Research Questions 
The Methods and Strategies presented in the previous paragraphs of this study were 
applied in order to answer some key research questions:  
1) What was the role of religion in preserving the Polish cultural identity under 
the partitions and how was the Roman Catholic Church responsible for the 
national “mobilisations against hegemonic states, elites and minorities” 
(Cordell, 1999:21)? What was the role of religion in the “resurrected” 1918 
Polish state? Why did Marshal Piłsudski avoid the alliance with the Catholic 
Church in Poland after the state’s inception in 1918? What were the links 
between the Polish Right and Roman Catholic Church in Poland between 1918 
and 1939? How influential was the Church following the Second World War? 
What is the role of the Church in the era of West European civic nationalism? 
(Snyder, 2003; Pease, 2009; Pankowski, 2010) 
Establishing the role of the Church in the preservation of national 
consciousness on the part of the Polish ethnie and in the process of nation 
building will allow determining the influence of the early-modern ethnocultural 
elements on post-1918 Poland. Multi-level analysis of the period and form in 
which modern Poland was constructed allows this study to demonstrate the 
Polish “national revival” in the wider East-Central European context. These 
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questions discussing the role of the Church in Polish history allow further 
reconstruction of social attitudes as well as the role of official policies in the 
construction of modern national identity in Poland. These research questions also 
demonstrate the patterns and generalisations about the national politics and 
attitudes which survived the partitions (nineteenth century), occupation (1939-
1945), and the era of Socialism. Another set of questions helps this study to 
establish the approach of successive governments towards ethnic and religious 
minorities inhabiting the territory of Poland after 1918. The key questions here 
are: 
2) What were the methods of successive Polish governments used to suppress 
regional separatism in across post-1918 Poland? What was the situation of 
non-ethnic Poles before 1939 and after the Second World War? How did the 
German minority inhabiting post-1918 and post-1945 Polish state become the 
victim of its heritage? (Cordell, 2000; Smith, 2008; Snyder, 2005). 
 
  The penultimate set of questions discusses the contemporary society 
and politics in post-1989 Poland. This part of the study discusses how the 
ethnocultural elements and the ethnic cores discussed in previous chapters of this 
study were defined by the competing political strands in Poland. Analysis of 
distinctive party programmes from the 1990s and 2000s demonstrates the 
changing attitude towards the construction of Poland upon cultural and not ethnic 
nationalism, mirroring Western nationalism shaped in the process of bureaucratic 
incorporation. . Through analysis of the central aims of Polish governments since 
1989 this research demonstrates whether accession to supranational institutions 
and organizations  such as NATO (1999) and to the European Union (2004)  led to 
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strengthening of either the territorial or the organic model of Poland. 
Furthermore, the analysis of documents such as the 1997 constitution and the Act 
on National Minorities (2005) offered evidence of the preferred direction in 
shaping of modern national identity by the successive Polish administrations.  
3) The final set of questions concerns themes such as: What was the impact of the 
authoritarian regime on shaping national identity in the post-Communist 
Poland? How Polish national identity become more inclusive? How did the 
programmes of political parties in post-Communist Poland approach the 
question of national identity? How successful was the transformation and 
what impact did it have on shaping the modern Polish society? What was the 
role of international institutions in opening the debate on national identity in 
Poland? Why do elements of ethnonationalism feature in political campaigns? 
What was the role of the Church in post-Communist Poland?  
 
An analytical presentation of these policies allows this study to demonstrate 
the construction and shaping of national identity in East-Central Europe. With the use 
of ethnosymbolism this research demonstrates not only the continuity between the 
early-modern realm and the post-1918 Poland but also to assess the role of 
distinctive ethnocultural in shaping the contemporary national consciousness. This 
study tests the application of ethnosymbolism to the study of nationalism in modern 
Poland. This is achieved through the analysis of history with a particular focus on the 
competing Polish nationalist movements which swept through the region following 
the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the final partition of Poland in 1795. Analysis 
of the nationalist rhetoric and programmes proposed in the nineteenth century with 
the use of this theoretical framework allowed determining to what extent 
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ethnocultural elements of national consciousness were redesigned in order to expand 
the definition of the Polish nation. The use of the ethnosymbolist analytical framework 
allows the demonstration of the distinctive ethnocultural elements within the 
programmes proposed by the National Democrats and the Socialists when designing 
post-1918 Poland.  
Moreover, this study claims that without the ethnocultural elements and 
specific institutions, which carried the distinctive characteristics of the Polish ethnie 
since the pre-modern, and the early-modern eras, the national consolidation and the 
construction of modern Polish state would have been unattainable. This study applies 
ethnosymbolism in order to discuss the role of religious reform, cultural borrowing, 
popular participation (Smith, 1991:36) in the expansion of a shared identity 
previously exclusive to the upper strata to the mass population. This thesis 
hypothesises that although the ethnic cores carried the distinctive consciousness from 
generation to generation it was not until the late nineteenth century when the lower 
strata became aware of their disparate identity and became included into the nation 
building project. This study also analyses the particular definitions of the modern 
Polish nation which crystallised in the nineteenth century and their durability in 
post-1918 Poland.   
By employing categorizations and generalizations, this study describes the criteria 
under which shaping of national consciousness operated in different periods.  This 
analysis approaches Polish history as a case-study illustrative of a wider 
phenomenon of ethnonationalism and its outcomes thus providing the modern study 
of nationalities with a useful pattern for the future understanding of various 
processes shaping identities in East-Central Europe.  
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Chapter 4: The Shaping of National Identity  
Mieczysław Biskupski (2000) following theories put forward by modernists, argues 
that Poland which appeared in 1918 was an entirely modern construct that bore no 
resemblance to the early-modern state. Biskupski, in his analysis, claims that not only 
did institutions which functioned in the Polish state before the third partition (1795) 
fail to preserve a significant degree of continuity but also failed to incorporate the 
original republican traditions of Rzeczpospolita (Biskupski, 2000:14). According to 
modernists, Benedict Anderson (1983) and Elie Kedourie (1966) the creation of an 
imaginary bond was crucial in “national revival” within the desired borders. 
Nationalist elites were responsible for finding links between the pre-modern states 
and their hypothesised successor states. This argument would present post-1918 
Poland as a modern realm which was constructed by nationalist agitators who 
propagated imaginary links with an ancient realm. This realm, according to the 
modernists, was long gone and the states which came to existence following the 
French Revolution (1789-1799) merely forged their traditions in order to gain 
legitimacy.   
The birth of nationalist ideology in nineteenth-century Europe irreversibly 
impacted upon the wider understanding of the modern nation and its evolution into 
the nation state. It is argued by Ernest Gellner (1994 [1964]) that nationalism was 
not only an “effect of industrial social organisation” (1994:40) but it also took over 
the role of religion in establishing a new secular order based on distinctive language 
and culture (Gellner, 1994). The secularisation of Europe progressed through the 
weakening of dynastic realms as well as through the industrial revolution of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The circulation of modern ideologies in the form 
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of print language allowed nationalist intelligentsias to introduce the masses to the 
concept of nation and the role designed for them within this pioneer construct 
(Anderson, 1983:80). Such ideas became the foundation for those Polish émigré 
politicians who either believed that there was a need to break away from the burden 
of past inequalities and create an entirely new society without the rule of the szlachta 
(Walicki, 1982:34-35) or those who believed that reconstruction of a modern Polish 
state required the creation of an influential bourgeoisie capable of leading of social 
groups in the hypothesised state (Prazmowska, 2010:5; Snyder, 2003:4-5).  
 Proponents of modernism argue that without institutions binding peoples 
within a unified state it is difficult, if not impossible, to talk about continuity of those 
states for generations and forming integral parts of different empires. Institutions 
such as a recognized government and/or a parliament passing official legislation 
without external interference are some of the main pointers of self-determination 
necessary for a state’s survival. Modernists claim that without this crucial link 
between different periods in a state’s history the dominant realms absorbed 
weakening regional affiliations. Conversely, successive generations without a crucial 
link to the lost body politic developed a distinct identity based on criteria specific to 
their contemporary condition. The difference between the pre-modern and modern 
political situation of Poland is frequently seen as that of two different constructs 
(Biskupski, 2000). In 1795 with the third and final partition of the state, centuries of 
political development necessary for maintaining the statehood came to an end. 
Following this period all of the remaining lands formerly constituting Rzeczpospolita 
along with its population were incorporated into the Russian, Prussian, and Habsburg 
Empires. Following the partition of the Commonwealth its distinctive ethnocultural 
characteristics were safeguarded by the szlachta and the clergy. This study identified 
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these two well-educated social groups as capable of preserving the distinctive 
elements shared by the Polish nation11 through periods of political turmoil or even 
statelessness. This ability to guard the myths of origin, literary, and political 
traditions allow identifying these two groups as ethnic cores.  
Institutions and elements crucial to the revival of modern states are 
recognized as strategic in shaping and forming the modern state and the links that 
these modern states share with their predecessors. Smith also claims that:  
(…) Locating such ethnic cores tells us a good deal about the subsequent shape and 
character of nations if (and when) such nations emerge. It helps us to answer in large 
part the question: who is the nation? and to some extent: where is the nation? (Smith, 
1991: 38)  
 
 
Construction of modern Poland and continuing process of shaping a single 
national identity on the foundations derived from the early-modern Commonwealth 
required combining of the pre-1795 republican traditions with the modern state 
model (Brykczynski, 2010, Snyder, 2005). Much of post-1795 Polish history would 
allow this conclusion yet there are peculiar ethnocultural elements of the Polish past 
which demand further explanation and periodization. The role of the Church, unique 
customs preserved by the szlachta and the distinctive cultural (and linguistic) 
traditions derived from the pre-partition Poland, appear central to the process of 
shaping modern national identity in the Second Republic of Poland (1918-1939). The 
following sections of this study will analyse when and how these pre-partition 
identities were disseminated. Analysis of population censuses allows assessment of 
the process of national consolidation at the turn of the twentieth century. With the 
                                                          
11 Pre-1791 nation consisting only of the upper strata 
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application of ethnosymbolism allowing wider analysis of ethnic cores and 
ethnocultural elements transmitted from the early-modern realm it becomes possible 
to demonstrate societal links which continued to function following the ultimate 
partition of the Commonwealth. Indeed, inquiry into these associations and the social 
preconditions existing in the region offers a more thorough understanding of the 
wider nation building process in east Central Europe.  
 
 4.1 The Role of “Ethnic Cores” in Shaping Modern Poland 
The collapse of the Polish Republic (1792-1795) did not lead to a single programme 
of state reconstruction but rather a disagreement among the elites over the 
envisioned future model of Poland. Between the drafting of the constitution of 3 May 
(1791) and the final partition of 1795 the main idea of the defenders of the “Old 
Republic” was that of gradual and moderate expansion of the nation (Lukowski, 
1994:84). Their inability to prevent the imminent third partition (1795) led to a 
revision of the Rzeczpospolita’s political impotence and a thorough analysis of the 
ailments which led to the gradual deterioration of the Commonwealth and the 
ultimate loss of sovereignty.  
Expansion of the “nation” was deemed necessary by the nationalist elites. This 
designation [of nation], previously enjoyed exclusively by the upper strata, had to 
become more inclusive in order to ensure the reconstruction of Poland.  The 
revolutionary ideas of the eighteenth century France and North America were echoed 
by the constitution of 1791, insurrection of 1794, and by szlachta following the third 
61 
 
partition of Rzeczpospolita12 in 1795. The idea of universal suffrage which would 
reinvigorate of the state was pioneered in Poland by the veteran of revolutionary 
struggle in North America, Tadeusz Kościuszko. In The Proclamation of Polaniec13 
(Manifest Polaniecki, 1794) Kościuszko acknowledged the need for expansion of 
Polish citizenship to include the population drawn from the lower strata. Similar 
enlightened ideas began to circulate following the establishment of the Sejm 
Czteroletni (Great Sejm, 1788-1792) as well as the constitution of 3 May (1791) 
(Davies, 1981:539; Lukowski, 1994:78).  These historic events became important in 
shaping the national myths in the late nineteenth century. Patrice M. Dabrowski 
(2004) claims that “the events of the final years of independent statehood became the 
cornerstone for the late-nineteenth-century Polish optimism about the future” 
(Dabrowski, 2004:102).  
The key obstacles to introducing significant changes to the structure of the 
state were (aside from the international constrains14) linked to the enormous social 
divisions. The ruling szlachta included only around 6-8 per cent of the population, 
which although high in contemporary Europe, left the majority of the remaining 
population in a terrible situation (Brykczynski, 2010:650). Peasants operated 
according to the feudal principles and virtually belonged to the landowners 
(Lukowski, 1994:78-79). The nation which both the nobility and Kościuszko saw as 
their fatherland was seen by peasants as a construct to which they did not belong 
(1994:79; Davies, 2005). Another issue slowing down the development of the state 
                                                          
12Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (from Polish): Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, from 1792 known 
as Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland) 
13 The Proclamation of Połaniec (Uniwersał Połaniecki)(1794) Act signed by Tadeusz Kościuszko 
dedicated to emancipation of peasantry and improvement of their financial situation. It was aimed to 
allow peasants to become citizens in order to take part in the insurrectionary war against Russia 
(1794).  
14 Poland became a patronage of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century and required 
permission for alterations in different areas of domestic politics.  
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was the lack of the middle classes with rights equal to those of the landowners. This 
anachronistic system preserved national identity exclusively to the upper strata 
slowing down the creation of a bourgeoisie conscious of a shared territorial identity 
(Davies, 2005:9; Brykczynski, 2010:650).  
The problem of participation in Kościuszko’s insurrection of 1794 became one 
of the themes in the rhetoric of émigré thinkers such as Prince Adam Czartoryski 
through the first half of the nineteenth century. This issue would reappear in the 
writings of political philosophers and artists throughout the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. Works discussing the question of nation and citizenship in the 
works of Joachim Lelewel, Maurycy Mochnacki, Roman Dmowski and others had an 
impact on the understanding of Polish nationality especially among those peoples 
previously excluded from participation in the political life of the state. 
Furthermore, historical events such as Sejm Czteroletni15, 1791 constitution, 
and the insurrection of 1794, were used to incorporate the masses into the 
previously exclusive Polish nation in the late nineteenth century. These 
achievements, along with the commemoration of historic battles, such as the 
bicentennial of The Relief of Vienna in 1883, became essential in imagining the Polish 
nation as consisting of the entire population (Dabrowski, 2004:103), beyond 
religious, linguistic, or ethnic boundaries, which gained prominence in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  
 
 
                                                          
15 Sejm Czteroletni (Great Sejm; 6.10.1788-29.5.1792) was, among others, devoted to preservation of 
Polish independence and introduction of revolutionary socio-political reforms aiming to modernize 
the state.  
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4.1.1 Szlachta 
The szlachta which was considered as the only caste of citizens within the state, 
continued to dominate politics as well as cultural development from the late Middle 
Ages until the Age of Enlightenment (Davies, 1981; Tazbir, 1986 (a)). It was indeed 
the nobility which codified many of the traditions specific to their group and in effect 
to the future of Polish society (Snyder, 2003). It is necessary to further elaborate on 
the position which the gentry held in the Commonwealth as its status allows for 
further discussions on the role it played during the era marked by the state’s 
dissolution. Successive unions between the szlachta and the elected kings allowed 
codification of certain laws which with time gained significant importance and were 
recognized as the basic principles of ‘democracy of the gentry’ (Walicki, 1982:11; 
Brykczynski, 2010). They also elevated the nobility to the status of the heritage 
bearers and the protectors of Christian culture in Europe (Tazbir, 1986 (a)). Since the 
first election of the king in the sixteenth century and creation of artykuly 
henrykowskie16 (King Henry’s Articles, 1575) each king-elect had to agree upon 
certain laws created by the nobility. With successive elections, these laws became 
greater claiming most of the significant authority of the sovereign and granting it to 
the gentry.  On a political level the szlachta “enjoyed rights relative to the sovereign” 
(Snyder, 2003:22) on the cultural level the gentry was involved in creation of 
numerous myths surrounding both its origin17 and the turning the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth into a great European power.  
In the eighteenth-century the costs of the freedoms granted to the nobility 
continued to mount. Andrzej Walicki (1982) and Janusz Tazbir (1986a) argue that 
                                                          
16 Set of privileges granted to the nobility, agreed upon by the king.  
17 The Polish gentry claimed a direct descent from the warrior Sarmatian tribes who allegedly had 
created the first Polish state (Davies, 1981, Walicki, 1982, Snyder, 2003).  
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the nobility was unwilling to modernise from the inside. The slow progress of the 
state was inherently linked with the myths of election of the nation. Walicki claims 
that “(…) the Golden Freedom of the Polish gentry was only a historical anomaly or a 
strange anachronism – a relic of the pre-absolutist feudal anarchy” (Walicki, 
1982:12).  
The inability to change this political impotence obstructed modernisation 
which in effect delayed the process of evolution of the middle classes. Preventing 
necessary change had negative effects upon the state and led to a growing division 
between the archaic social class and those excluded from political activity. Decisions 
made by the landowning gentry did not foster industrialisation, and in effect 
“eighteenth century Poland (…) [was] characterised by the decline of its cities and by 
the unchallenged rule of the nobility” (Walicki, 1982:12).This obstructionism blocked 
socio-political changes without which the creation of a politically significant 
bourgeoisie was not possible. These and other disagreements led to political 
divisions between the nobles who in effect had created confederations18 united 
against the modernisation of the state and the strengthening of the monarch’s 
position.  Moreover, the constitution of 1791 recognised the special role of the 
szlachta in the preservation and shaping of Polish national identity. In the Second 
Article of the constitution “Szlachta Ziemianie” (Noble Landowners), the upper strata 
are recognised as the lawmakers and the highest authority in the state. The Szlachta 
were also recognised as the defenders of freedom in Rzeczpospolita (II Szlachta 
Ziemianie, Konstytucja 3 Maja, 1791).  
Enlightened groups within the szlachta believed that change was inevitable 
but due to a variety of circumstances they were not able to introduce the alterations 
                                                          
18Confederation of Bar 1768-1771 and Confederation of Targowica 1792 
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to the ailing system. Some of the steps taken by the nobility became of primary 
importance to the process of mythmaking rather than to the socio-political transition 
required within the contemporary realm, “in Polish eyes, the refusal to accept the 
political situation as reality has formed an essential spur to national consciousness” 
(Davies, 1981:532). It is important to note that both the Sejm Czteroletni as well as 
the constitution of 3 May (1791) had an impact on the creation of the myth of a 
progressive republic aiming to become a modern state. The inability to implement 
either the constitution or the Proclamation of Polaniec (1794) did not have an 
obvious short or mid-term impact, however, within a century it became clear that 
these events layed the foundation for modern Poland and provided essential tools 
necessary for consolidation of the Polish nation.  
Furthermore, the modern symbols of Polish ethnicity were marked by both 
the courageous acts denouncing the Russian protectorate19 and the hopeless battle 
against the superior forces of advancing enemy. Finally, it is important to outline 
some of the central ideas from the Proclamation of Polaniec issued by Tadeusz 
Kościuszko on 7 May 1794. The document preceded Napoleon Bonaparte’s calls for 
the abolition of serfdom, although it was never officially implemented and did not 
have any actual overt political impact at the time of its introduction. Its aims for 
including the lower strata of the society in the war with Russian empire gained only 
moderate support (Davies, 1981:538-539).  
Andrzej Walicki (1982) argues that the achievements of the Polish Sejm in the 
late eighteenth century became the turning point the Polish nation. Indeed, ideas for 
involving a wider spectrum of society in political activity were not implemented until 
                                                          
19 In 1716, after the Commonwealth’s imminent defeat in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) Silent 
Sejm (1716) gave away patronage of the Polish state to the Russian Tsar, this political situation 
remained the status quo until the final deconstruction of the state in 1795. 
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the second half of the nineteenth century. To the szlachta however, accustomed to 
their privileges and not prepared to share their ‘golden freedom’ such proposals 
seemed controversial. The upper strata recognised elevation of the masses to the 
status of citizens as a threat to the early-modern democracy of the nobility, granting 
the upper strata extensive privileges. This event, although dividing the traditionalist 
nobility from the progressive idealists such as Hugo Kołłątaj, triggered a debate on 
the decay of the Commonwealth, and  future improvements necessary for the state to 
address issues concerning the emergent middle class and the peasantry gaining 
national awareness (Walicki, 1982:33).  
Although, the Szlachta lost its sovereign state in the late eighteenth century it 
was able to create a gradual programme of national renewal. Although the 
achievements of the Sejm and the Proclamation of Polaniec had only a limited impact 
in the 1790s, a century later these events became ethnocultural symbols which were 
used to create a bridge with the masses, elevating them to the rank of nobility. The 
szlachta fall into the category of what Anthony D. Smith defines as political cores 
capable of carrying and disseminating national myths and ethnocultural traditions in 
different periods of history (Smith, 2008:108). Although pre-modern and early 
modern allegiance to the state was shared only by the upper strata with the masses 
excluded from the society, in the nineteenth century commemorations of the glorious 
past, and the achievements of the Polish antiquity became an element of shared 
national identity (Dabrowski, 2004:106).  The upper classes, however, required 
support from Roman Catholicism which, until the final partition, was the religion of 
nearly half of the population of the Commonwealth (Smith, 2008:109).  
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4.1.2 The Roman Catholic Church 
By the late-nineteenth-century the Church was able to claim a paramount role in 
constructing a bridge between szlachta and the lower strata. Until the nineteenth- 
century the Church did not have the dominant role in shaping the national 
consciousness. In fact, according to some historians, remained only one among many 
elements of Polish consciousness (Pease, 2009; Porter-Szucs, 2011).  
The clerical monopoly over education was weakened, the reading public delighted in 
a long list of anticlerical satires, the lifestyles of the elites grew ever more secular, and 
the Church had to defend itself against attacks from enlightenment theorists (Porter-
Szucs, 2011:6).  
 Furthermore, although some historians (such as Ewa Jabłońska-Deptuła) 
claim that Catholicism was the crucial element in preservation of Polish ethnicity, 
Porter-Szucs (2011) argues that there were other “spaces of expression” allowing the 
preservation of the ethnic organic definition of Polishness. In fact, the myths and 
traditions were to a large extent preserved in the literary tradition and until the 
second-half of the nineteenth century “the Church was just one of many sites for 
cultivating Polishness during the period when there was no Polish state” (Porter-
Szucs: 2011:8). The Church remained one of the ethnic cores codifying distinctive 
ethnocultural elements and disseminating them in the nineteenth century. During the 
nineteenth century  the Church preserved the ethnic-organic rather than the 
territorial tradition of the state derived from the Commonwealth. Competition 
between different ethnic groups for self-determination narrowed the appeal of the 
polyethnic realm. Furthermore, the ethnocultural traditions preserved by the Church 
were not designed to reconstruct the early-modern societal ties. Roman Catholicism 
provided a continuity of pre-1795 state effectively shaping the framework for the 
organic Polish nation. This could be evidenced by the unwillingness of Pope Pius VI to 
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support the Kościuszko insurrection as implementation of the constitution (1791) 
was an immediate threat to the status of the Catholic Church in Rzeczpospolita 
(Porter-Szucs, 2011:210).  
 Moreover, Janusz Tazbir (1986) claims that Catholic Church was only able to 
gain the role of a hegemon with the deterioration of the state institutions. The decay 
of the bureaucratic system created an environment in which populism came to the 
fore. While through the existence of the Commonwealth the Church remained present 
in state affairs it was not central to Polishness until the nineteenth century as it was 
one of the faiths (Tazbir, 1986(a):80-81) and was not granted a special status until 
the constitution of 1791. 
When its citizens failed to perform all of their duties, God cut its territory 
significantly. (…) [Poland] was compared to Jerusalem, punished by God in the same 
manner for committing sins (Tazbir, 1986a:211) 
The state institutions recognised the Church as the last bastion of sovereignty 
as relations with the states’ neighbours were becoming sour. The nobility unwilling 
to reform became involved in escapist ideas such as the antermurale christianitatis20, 
hoping that the “Western character” of Poland would protect it from destruction 
(Hutchinson, 2005:173; Tazbir, 1986 (a) 204-219). This political tradition of Poland 
as the furthest bastion of civilisation to the east of Rome or as the contemporary 
Jerusalem remained influential within the rhetoric of the Church and was 
disseminated in the nineteenth century in the literature of Romanticism.  
Furthermore, the xenophobic traditionalists were adamant that the Holy See 
and “civilized Europe” could not afford to lose the outpost of Western civilisation. The 
myths of national election and the messianic role of the Polish nobility circulating 
                                                          
20Antemurale (Latin; przedmurze, Polish) was the final line of defence before enemy reached city walls. 
In the eighteenth century Poland was compared to the final line of defence of the Christian world from 
the “barbaric” east (Hutchinson, 2005:173). 
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prior to the destruction of the state became influential in the following century and 
were propagated by the Romanticists. In 1791 the Church was granted the role of the 
“reigning national religion” which led to strengthening of the position of the 
institution across Rzeczpospolita (I Religia Panujaca, Konstytucja 3 Maja, 1791).  
“The reigning national religion is and will be the holy Roman Catholic faith with all its 
laws. Conversion from the dominant confession to any other confession is forbidden 
under the penalty of apostasy (…). The religion obeys us to love others, worshippers 
of all religions (I Religia Panujaca, Konstytucja 3 Maja, 1791).  
Neal Pease (2009) argues that while in the early modern Poland Roman 
Catholicism was merely a “salient indicator of Polish identity” (Pease, 2009:5) in the 
nineteenth-century it became the only functioning institution preserving the 
continuity of the Polish nation. In the nineteenth-century the Church became a bridge 
linking the upper strata and the peasantry.  When the Church assumed its role as a 
transmitter between the early modern Poland and the partitioned Polish ethnie it 
also acquired a role of ethnic core responsible for disseminating the national myths in 
the nineteenth century. The Church (according to ethnosymbolism) became one of the 
Polish ethnic cores with the ability to transfer specific “social and cultural 
parameters”. The Church was able to preserve “certain events, heroes, landscapes 
and values [which] formed a distinctive repository of ethnic culture” (Smith, 
1991:38). 
Moreover, the Church played an important role in the preservation of the 
character of the organic Poland rather than the polyethnic Commonwealth. It was 
able to attract the nationalist elites as well as the lower strata leading to a 
consolidation of the ethnic Poles rather than other ethnic groups which inhabited the 
partitioned state. Although the nineteenth century nationalists hoped to widen the 
appeal of the envisioned Rzeczpospolita within its pre-1795 boundaries, this measure 
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remained unappealing to non-ethnic Poles, who increasingly aspired to create their 
own nation-states (Dabrowski, 2000).  One of the earliest attempts to enfranchise the 
masses into the body of citizens, previously held exclusively by the nobility, was 
through linking events inherently linked with Polish national history and religious 
celebration. Presentation of the distinctive national character through “juxtaposition 
of religious and national events” (Dabrowski, 2000:402) allowed for the inclusion of 
non-ethnic Poles in the process of statecraft. Although the nationalist elites and the 
Church “paradoxically, just as the nation was being broadened to include peasants, 
regardless of their ethnic affiliation, there did not appear to have been any room for 
non-Catholics” (Dabrowski, 2000:410). This ambiguity in the language of Polish 
nationalists and the Roman Catholic Church authorities disconnected the followers of 
Latin-Rite or Eastern-Rite Churches.  
The period of Romanticism which lasted in Poland until the 1860s, frequently 
utilised various tropes affiliated with spirituality and faith. Roman Catholicism was 
essential in the works of Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) and Juliusz Slowacki (1809-
1849) providing them with a source of mysticism and creating a link between 
religion and the nation. The idea of the state promoted by the poets and artists 
remained stagnant. The messianism21 (discussed further in the following section) of 
the Polish nation, however, remained anachronistic. It did not address the issues of 
social polarisation which would surface in the following decades.  
The attempt by the elites proved unsuccessful to construct a national identity. 
It was not until the “Galician Massacre” of 1846 and the failure of the “January 
Insurrection” of 1863 that the elites acknowledged their inability to achieve 
                                                          
21 Messianism (mesjanizm): Messianism was both a literary and political trend among certain strands 
of the Polish émigrés presenting Poland as a state chosen by God with a mission to save all other 
oppressed nations (Walicki, 1982:58). 
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independence without the masses. In fact, the campaign of 1863 saw strengthening of 
the ties between ethnicity and religion as many Roman Catholic followers cried: “For 
God and Fatherland” (Porter-Szucs, 2011:167).  The distrust between the peasantry 
and the nobility became an obstacle in consolidating of the nation.  
Anti-Catholic campaigns, aiming to alienate the population from the Church, 
had a reverse effect as the desperate populations resorted to religion for both 
guidance and deeper meaning in their lives.  This in effect redefined the role of the 
Church in modern Polish history. The obstacles posed by Russification22in the Russian 
partition lands as well as Otto von Bismarck’s Kulturkampf23 strengthened the role of 
faith among the Polish subjects of those empires and led to the coining of a stereotype 
of a Catholic Pole (polak-katolik24) (Pease, 2009:7), which came into a wide use in the 
twentieth century.  
Ethnic groups that formerly comprised the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
found that not only religion but also that their language was an expression of distinct 
ethnic provenance which could no longer be omitted in the process of national revival 
(Snyder, 2003:42-43; Kamusella: 2007:140). People of non-Polish ethnicity, such as 
the Ruthenes or the Jews were forced to consider assimilation in order to fit into the 
social framework of the hypothesised Polish state.  
The nationalist elites challenged Russian policies of forced conversion which 
followed the 1863 uprising and attempted to include the followers of Greek 
Orthodoxy in the envisioned Polish nation. In Austro-Hungarian Galicia the 
                                                          
22Rusyfikacja(Russification): policy aiming at eradication of Polish culture by abolishment of Polish 
language and Roman Catholic Religion (Kohn, 1971:66; Roszkowski, 2009:8). 
23Kulturkampfwas a policy introduced by the German Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck (part of 
Realpolitik) aiming to assimilate populations with the dominant culture of the state (Garlicki, 
2000:144). 
24Polak-katolik- “the conviction that to be Polish was to be Catholic and (…) not to be Catholic was not 
to be genuinely Polish” (Pease, 2009:7) 
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authorities were reluctant to accept any attempts of the Russian Empire to convert 
the Ruthenes. The Holy See preferred to turn a blind eye on manifestations of 
Ukrainophilia25 rather than forge links with the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Furthermore, “the Vatican treated Ukrainophilia as lesser evil than Russophilia” 
(Snyder, 2003:124). Yet neither the Russification process, nor the policies of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire or those belonging to the Polish nationalists can be seen as 
having been successful.  Instead a distinct identity based on Greek Catholicism and a 
mixture of Ruthene dialects initiated the process of shaping of the Ukrainian nation in 
the late nineteenth century (Snyder, 2003:124-125).  
From the 1870s onwards it was becoming evident that in Galicia the 
Ukrainian, rather than Polish or Russian, identity was becoming a significant 
counterbalance to that promoted by the Polish speaking elites. The evidence shows 
that by the late nineteenth century “only about 3 per cent of the population in the 
Russian provinces of Volhynia, Podolia and Kiev declared Polish as their first 
language” (Snyder: 2003:120). It became clear that the unsuccessful uprisings of 
1830, 1846, and 1863 weakened the appeal of the Polish culture among non-ethnic 
Poles. Furthermore, the deteriorating appeal of the socio-political traditions of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was observed with the establishment of 
institutions such as the Shevchenko Society26 in Lwow in 1873 (Kohn, 1971:67). 
Polish nationalism was losing ground to the national revival across the former 
Rzeczpospolita.27 The inability to establish any secular institutions which would enjoy 
                                                          
25Ukrainophiles- advocates of the use of local vernacular and the distinctness of local people from 
Russians (Snyder, 2003:124).   
26Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861): his romantic poetry became a powerful demonstration of the 
distinct Ukrainian identity (Davies: 2005:53) 
27
  Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (from Polish): Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, from 1792 known as 
Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland) 
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a wide support among the populations led to the vanishing of the polyethnic 
traditions of the early-modern realm.  
With regard to the people of the Jewish faith who communicated in various 
languages including Yiddish, Hebrew, Russian, Byelorussian, and Polish, the situation 
was complicated from both the perspective of citizenship and that of religion in the 
nineteenth century. Although in some regions, especially in towns in the eastern 
regions of the former Rzeczpospolita Jews constituted a substantial proportion of the 
population and in some cases a majority of the towns’ populations28 the Jews were 
not able to press forward their claims for an independent state. This was because 
although urban areas were dominated by Jewish populations, the surrounding rural 
areas were dominated by the Catholic and Greek Orthodox populations. Timothy 
Snyder (2003) argues that the lack of national tradition in Europe and the population 
being scattered across East-Central Europe rather than focused on any particular 
region pushed the Jewish people towards support for the polyethnic rather than 
monoethnic national states (Snyder, 2003:57). 
Jewish claims for citizenship granting them more opportunities as well as 
religious freedom fostered anti-Semitic sentiment among Roman Catholic and 
Orthodox populations. In the region of Poznania (German empire) “Jews considered 
themselves to be Germans in terms of both citizenship and nationality (…). Poznanian 
Jews transformed themselves from Polish into truly German Jews over the course of 
the nineteenth century29” (Drummond, 2001: 461-464). In the Russian empire, the 
                                                          
28Mińsk (51 per cent Jewish), Homel (55 per cent Jewish), Pińsk (74 per cent Jewish) (Snyder, 
2003:56) 
29 The Polish population of the region responded with an anti-Jewish as much as anti-German policy 
Swój do Swego (“each to his own”) boycotting non-Polish businesses.  
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development of Zionism30 was directed at proponents of assimilation with the 
dominant culture. The Zionist response was clear “(…) in their use of Yiddish and 
their advocacy of Hebrew they could further distance Jewish culture from Polish” 
(2003:57).  
Moreover, the poor economic situation in the Russian Empire posed a number 
of problems such as social inequality and overpopulation in cities such as Warsaw 
which in return led to the growth of anti-Semitism across Greater Poland 
(Wielkopolska) (Davies, 2005:150).   
 
4.2 The Foundations of the Modern Polish Nation  
In the midst of the nineteenth century, nationalist agitation in East-Central Europe 
lay the destroyed Rzeczpospolita with the elites struggling to comprehend what had 
led to its ultimate fall. One of the largest European realms of the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth centuries had suddenly disappeared, leaving behind one of the most 
numerous political elites in Europe. Freedom of the Old Republic romanticised by the 
Napoleonic campaigns of the early nineteenth century had merely created an 
autonomous Duchy of Warsaw. Following the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte, the 
romanticised vision of the noble Poland led to the “November Insurrection” of 1830, 
bringing nothing but misery and further waves of emigration (Walicki, 1982:24-28).  
 The nationalists deemed it necessary to enfranchise the peasantry and the 
urban populations crystallising into modern European middle classes were becoming 
aware of their identity. This widening scope of the Polish nation required masses of 
                                                          
30 Zionism called for creation of a Jewish homeland. In Eastern Europe this was a complex matter and 
its aim was dedicated to distancing Jewish people from any assimilationist attempts from the Polish or 
other nationalisms (Snyder, 2003:56-57)  
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population demanding independence from the foreign rule. The matter of national 
belonging in order to reach the population without regard for their ethnic, religious 
or linguistic affiliation had to be drafted carefully allowing inclusion of the greatest 
numbers of a people dispersed across the territories of three different Empires. 
Achieving the aim of national liberation through insurrections failed, yet the 
advocates of an independent Poland were capable of readjusting their programmes to 
the evolving socio-political situation. The understanding of nationality and 
citizenship among the émigré as well as internal political elites continued to evolve 
and as the agitation for an independent Poland continued, the out-dated state model 
where the Polish elites and Polish culture would set the tone for future development 
remained unacceptable. The oppression in the hands of the Polish nobility across the 
kresy31 through the nineteenth century made the future relationship unsustainable 
(Snyder, 2003:121-123). 
The growing need to incorporate the peasantry into the hypothesised Polish 
state required revisiting and reframing the national past allowing the nationalist 
agitators to gain prominence and promote their cause. Some of the liminal figures of 
the Polish émigré societies such as Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861), or Joachim 
Lelewel (1786-1861) dedicated their works to widening the definition of the Polish 
nation. Although representing competing visions of the future state, both Czartoryski 
and Lelewel discussed the Polish nation through the prism of a population extending 
beyond the upper strata previously perceived as citizenry (Czartoryski, 1847: III).  
                                                          
31 Kresy (Kresy Wschodnie) eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
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In the nineteenth century the connotation of the Polish nation was altered 
from the original naród szlachecki (Nation of the Gentry32), (Walicki, 1982:16; 
Brykczynski, 2010:652-653) and effectively widened to other social strata inhabiting 
the territory of the former Commonwealth. 
The competing diaspora in Rome, Paris and London saw the future of Poland 
differently. The émigré groups could not achieve consensus as to which territories 
would become the theorised Polish state (Walicki, 1982: 65-70). Following the 
“Galician Massacre” of 1846 when the peasantry turned against the landowners, 
slaughtering the nobles and burning the estates, it became clear that shaping a 
common understanding of the Polish identity was required in order to avoid such 
conflicts. It was argued by Andrzej Walicki (1982) that because the gap between the 
peasantry (pospolstwo) and the nobility (szlachta) was so great, the idea of a body of 
citizens sharing equal rights and identity was through the nineteenth century simply 
unimaginable (1982:70).   
 
4.3 Nationalist Rhetoric in the Nineteenth Century  
Poverty and underdevelopment of the rural areas of the Austro-Hungarian and the 
Russian Empires led to waves of migrations and the creation of diaspora in Western 
Europe (France, Great Britain) and in North America (Canada and the United States of 
America) (Roszkowski, 2009:8). Following the “January Insurrection” (1863) and 
disenchantment with Romanticist ideologies33 came an era of passive attitudes 
                                                          
32
 Only the people of noble birth were considered as citizens of the state, this excluded any other social 
groups from active political participation 
33 Authors of Romanticism claimed messianic role for the people of the former Commonwealth. They 
believed (Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki) in all partition revolutionary movement which would 
recreate the Polish state 
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towards any form of armed rebellion against the partitioning empires. It was argued 
that the immediate damage following crushing of the rebellion was so severe that “if 
Polish identity was to be retained, then other means of defending it had to be found” 
(Prazmowska, 2010:18).  Defeat of the final uprising was indeed a low point for a 
once thriving Polish culture.  Drastic change in approach to the case of national 
identity in the partitioned state may be observed in writings and speeches of the 
émigré authors.  
 In the decades following the loss of sovereignty, Polish émigré elites were 
involved in revisiting the past, the decayed state and understanding numerous issues 
which had led to the destruction of the state. The émigré society constructed around 
Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861) located in the Parisian “Hotel Lambert” argued 
that although the majority of the changes proposed during the 4 years Sejm (Sejm 
Czteroletni, 1788-1792) and by the 3 May Constitution (1791) were short-lived and 
unable to prove their progressive ideas, the enlightened message of the constitution 
which proposed gradual changes to the social structure of the state was righteous 
(Czartoryski, 1847). It was in the interest of Prince Czartoryski to present to the 
public his idea of republicanism concentrated on the achievements of the final years 
of sovereignty rather than those of the corrupt and oppressive nobles. Prince Adam’s 
émigré organisation with its main thinkers such as Karol Hoffman (1798-1875) 
argued that the state’s traditions were out-dated and Poland-Lithuania’s gradual 
decomposition was as a result of anomalous internal developments (Walicki, 
1982:37-38).  
 Moreover, Andrzej Walicki (1982), argues that although some of the main 
thinkers of the monarchist camp (Hotel Lambert) shared certain features of 
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conservatism, the Prince himself was rather “more of a liberal” (Walicki, 1982:37). 
Following the unsuccessful insurrection of 1830 “the constitutionalists” were forced 
to rethink their strategy and discuss further issues such as the extent of the Polish 
nation with regard to its social base and the place of different ethnicities and social 
groups in the destroyed Rzeczpospolita. Czartoryski, although supportive of the 
construction of a polyethnic state believed that non-ethnic Poles could not become 
the driving force in construction of an independent state as they could not be relied 
upon. He was nevertheless aware of the substantial numbers of the non-ethnic Poles 
(as perceived through the prism of the language and religion) who would have to be 
presented with equal rights in order to support reconstruction of modern Poland.  
(…) [Jewry] oppressed severely by those whom they have offered their loyalty to, 
recall Poland, remembering, just how much it used to provide for them. (…) They 
suddenly began to understand that in their own interest they should connect with the 
other inhabitants of the common lands34 (Czartoryski, 1847; 61)  
 
 In the opinion of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his camp it was in the best 
interests of all groups to find a consensus based on the laws outlined by the 
constitution (1791). Such process would involve social groups such as the 
bourgeoisie becoming active in support of an independent Poland. Furthermore, 
according to the conservative camp, the lower strata of society were ready to join the 
citizenry but only those who were citizens (such as the city and town bourgeoisie) 
were able to actively take part in the life of the state (Walicki, 1982:33). To many 
political theorists in Poland and abroad the draft of Poland proposed by the 
monarchists was unacceptable. The revolutionary period led some nationalist 
agitators to oppose such a divisive system and to advocate the incorporation of the 
                                                          
34Translated by author from Mowy Xiecia Adama Czrtoryskiego of roku 1838-1847: “[ ż ydzi] Meczeni 
okropni przez tych którym sie oddali, zwracaja oczy ku Polsce, przypominaja sobie ile im dawniej 
świadczyla. Ped ducha dochodzi I do nich, dla ich sprawy radzilby laczyc sie z innymi mieszkancami 
spolnej ziemi” 
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entire population rather than the selected middle classes into the active body of 
citizens.  
 Although the former lands of the Commonwealth were not directly involved in 
the Springtime of the Nations (1848) émigré thinkers could not deny the fact that the 
political climate in Europe was changing rapidly. All camps were forced to revise 
their strategies. It became clear that the movement which involved various social 
groups had had an unparalleled impact on the understanding of nationality and 
citizenship. The empires were forced to create a new set of laws in order to keep the 
masses obedient. Such laws included the ukaz (law) of 1861 within the Russian 
territories which granted full emancipation (introduced in the Congress Kingdom by 
the ukaz of 18 March 1864) to the peasantry (Davies, 2005:138). Events such as the 
Cracow Rising (1846) and the Springtime of Nations (1848) proved that masses were 
important in any attempt to reconstruct the Polish state. This was observed by Prince 
Adam Czartoryski who in the first instance supported the cause of the Insurgency of 
1846 as the will of the people. In the collection of speeches Mowy Xiecia Adama 
Czartoryskiego (1847), the author acknowledged that the conflicts between the 
peasantry and the nobility were in fact a civil war, perceiving the peasantry as Polish 
nation.  Furthermore, without the creation of a bond between the social groups, the 
traditions stemming from the Polish past were doomed: 
I have to admit, I would have never thought that the so-called communism- madness 
caused by the deterioration, here and there, of civilisation, would have access to our 
residents (…). In the villages you could hear voices claiming that old Polish brotherly 
and Christian truths were no longer valid (…) (Czartoryski, 1847:111) 
 
 Joachim Lelewel on the other hand blamed Czartoryski and the monarchists 
for the slow progress with regard to the shaping of a strong Polish nation. He argued 
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that citizenship and full participation in state affairs should become a universal right 
of all inhabitants of the hypothesised Polish state (Walicki, 1982:34-35). Lelewel 
openly criticized the social structure and ideas for the reconstructed Polish state as 
proposed by Prince Adam Czartoryski and his followers, arguing that the corrupt elite 
should relinquish its role in the construction of modern Poland. The ideologue 
understood that it was not possible for the peasantry to accept the return of the 
oppressive system. Claiming equality among classes by the monarchists was 
according to Lelewel outrageous and was nothing more than a continuation of the 
hypocrisy which led to the downfall of Rzeczpospolita (Lelewel, 1855:3-6).  
 In order to construct a modern national identity which would include the 
masses it would be necessary to undermine the corrupt system which had led to its 
destruction. The shaping of a modern Poland and a Polish people would require in 
the first instance a clear break from the ‘oligarchy of magnates’ and the destructive 
influences of the Western enlightenment (Walicki, 1982:34-35). Lelewel demanded 
that other political circles accept that without unified laws no progress in the 
reconstruction of the Polish state was possible and that the system of inequality 
which destroyed the Commonwealth was untenable. 
Unification had to take place among the commoners, the non-noble for the sake of 
freedom. It was due to the fact that role of peasantry was leading to continuous 
servitude as they belonged to the landowner: these commoners should be bound by 
the same civil law along with the gentry (Lelewel, 1855:211) 
  
 Lelewel, although calling for equality of the peasantry, promoted the 
construction of modern Poland on Slavic roots. This idea spread by the ideologue was 
perceived as an awakening of pan-Slavism which envisioned the national revival on 
pre-modern national foundations. It was also argued that Lelewel’s definition of the 
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Polish nation did not create a framework which would allow clear definition of a Pole 
(Davies, 2005: 51).  
Similar ambiguities created fertile ground for the ideas spread by the Polish 
Democratic Society (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie; TDP). The TDP promoted 
ideas which in the early stages of its existence were parallel to those of Joahim 
Lelewel. However, when  Wiktor Heltman published his Great Manifesto (1836) it 
became clear that its programme was promoting radicalisation and construction of a 
coherent national programme. Stanisław Worcell (1799-1857) who at first accepted 
Lelewel’s ideas concluded that the political situation required radicalization and 
firmer action against the partitioning powers (Davies, 2005:211). According to both 
Worcell and Heltman the only way to create a pure republican state was by 
developing democracy (Heltman, 1866). The TDP argued further that the new Polish 
state had no other choice but to remove all ties linking it with the un-republican and 
un-democratic ‘democracy of the gentry’ (Walicki, 1982:36). It was vital to 
demonstrate that reconstruction of the Polish state and its well-being was only 
possible if social groups of different ethnic provenance could cooperate and shape a 
better future for the entire state.  
Wiktor Heltman whose work influenced the twentieth century ideologues 
argued that the envisioned Poland should be shaped through its past greatness. 
Referring to the achievements of Poland-Lithuania under the Jagiellon dynasty, where 
the cooperation between various ethnic and religious groups was central to the 
state’s success, Poland could yet again gain freedom. Heltman called for national 
consolidation claiming that: “(…) the great mission for Poland was not yet completed 
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(…).Torn unity and dispersed national forces gave a natural outcome: common 
weakness” (Heltman, 1866:3-4).  
Another significant aspect of the TDP’s agenda was the alleged messianic role 
of the Polish noble nation. Radical thinkers from the left of the political spectrum 
used literature by aforementioned nationalist writers such Mickiewicz (1798-1855) 
and Słowacki (1809-1849) to propagate romantic messianism among the Polish 
nobility (Davies, 2005:38). Criticism of the messianic trend was also present within 
the literature of the era and it was represented by Cyprian Kamil Norwid (1821-
1883). Norwid argued that during the revolutionary year of 1848 Polish people 
needed to share their future with the rest of Europe as much as they should cherish 
their past (Walicki, 1982:322-323).  
In the post-1863 environment the émigré organisations lost their credibility. 
Repression by the partitioning powers led to the development of novel forms of 
opposition such as gradualism and loyalism35 (Roszkowski, 2009:9). Although 
throughout the 1860s and the 1870s the revolutionary groups were still involved 
“with student demonstrations, radical agitation in the countryside, and even political 
assassinations” (Porter, 2011:352), military insurgency was discredited for decades 
to come. The widespread persecutions of educational institutions and the Church 
resulted in weakening of the connection with the early-modern state (Snyder, 
2003:34-36).   
 
 
                                                          
35
 Loyalism was a policy which required from Polish citizens to follow the policies of the partitioning powers 
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4.4 Redefining the Nation  
The Romanticist visions of noble revolution led by the Polish szlachta against 
the partition powers gradually became anachronistic and the reconstruction 
movement led by the elites could not motivate the mass population of Polish 
speakers to call for self-determination. became replaced by The failure of the 
nineteenth-century uprisings demanded a different approach which would effectively 
lead to reconstruction of Rzeczpospolita. The approach which gained a following in 
the second half of the nineteenth century identified the pivotal role grass-root work 
and widening of the national consciousness was aiming at improvement of the 
welfare of society through hard work and cooperation among Polish speakers. The 
expansion of Positivist36 literature and organic work37 (praca organiczna) 
programme outlined the long-term goals of the Polish nation and revitalised the 
Polish identity. Moderate opposition within the boundaries of the law allowed 
strengthening of the ties between the Polish speakers in the urban cultural centres. 
The creativity of the Positivist authors allowed collection of the elements of the 
national consciousness and re-imagining Poland. The period of repressions, which 
followed the January uprising (1863-1864), increased the role of Polish literature and 
culture in shaping the new generation of Polish intellectuals who became “critical of 
the gentry’s preoccupation with fomenting uprisings while ignoring the social 
consequences of industrialisation” (Prazmowska, 2010:20). 
                                                          
36 Movement initiated in the second half of the nineteenth century which introduced scientific 
approach to philosophy and literature. In the territories of partitioned Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, Positivism became central in shaping anti-Romanticist approach to the socio-political 
sphere and promotion of development through science and grass root work. 
37 Body of society was compared to biological organism in which each particular organ is substantial to 
its proper functioning just as each element of the society was necessary for its further development 
(Garlicki, 2000:159). 
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The 1870s and the 1880s were dedicated to organic work and the gradual 
development of society. Decades of steady work allowed the construction of modern 
national identity from the foundations upwards (Garlicki, 2000: 158-159). The 
conservative visions presented by the monarchists proved anachronistic. The 
nationalist elites of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century acknowledged 
the role of all inhabitants in attaining future autonomy and eventually independence. 
According to the Positivist authors, Poland and its people constituted an organism. 
Ethnic Poles needed each other to oppose alien programmes aiming at the weakening 
of the divergent socio-political culture shared by the Polish people (Davies, 2005:33; 
Porter, 1992:640).  
This novel approach was aimed at the revitalization of the modern Polish 
middle classes inhabiting Warsaw, Krakow, Wilno and Poznan situated in three 
different states. A Polish people was to develop, but only through minor 
achievements and rapid consolidation of all social groups into a single society. It was 
a programme of gradualism38 promoting development through hard work which in 
effect became the slogan of the Conciliatory39 camp (Davies, 2005:33). Key thinkers 
of this movement were Aleksander Świętochowski and Bolesław Chlebowski. 
Novelists and poets such as Eliza Orzeszkowa (1841-1910), Maria Konopnicka (1842-
1910), Bolesław Prus (1847-1912) and Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916) argued that 
the preservation of a distinctive identity could be attained through self-improvement 
of ethnic-Poles and ridding the population of the memory of the stratified society. The 
                                                          
38 In literature gradualism went under the term positivism. In partitioned Poland it was popular 
among the late nineteenth and early twentieth century authors and thinkers supporting gradual 
development rather than insurrections which according to positivists denied years of social progress 
towards national independence.  
39 The conciliatory camp focused on the gradual development of the Polish people which would 
eventually give independence: they also opposed insurrections.  
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main focus of these activists was development of society through “establishing 
schools, cooperatives, self-help circles and model farming” (Prazmowska, 2010:26).  
  Indeed by the late nineteenth century political participation by all social 
groups was observable. Only some of the parties were aiming to reach the people 
from across the three partitions. Among others, the most influential Polish 
organisation formed in the late nineteenth century included the National Democratic 
movement (Narodowa Demokracja; ND, 1893), the Polish People’s Party (PSL, 1895) 
and the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socialistyczna; PPS, 1893). The final 
decade of the nineteenth century and the early of the twentieth century witnessed 
“increasing mass participation in social and political life” (Prażmowska, 2010:28).  
 
4.5 Ethnic-Organic and Civic-Territorial Models  
The two leading strands which crystallised at the turn of the century perceived 
Poland from two conflicting angles. Neither the vision of the ND nor that held by the 
PPS became dominant. However, it was prior to the 1918 independence that 
programmes of both the leading organizations (ND and PPS) outlined their optimal 
Poland. Dmowski and Balicki framed the Polish nation similarly to the way in which 
Johann Gottfried Herder and Immanuel Kant envisioned the German nation in the 
eigteenth century. Balicki, the chief ideologist of endecja claimed that the nation is the 
consciousness of the citizen, the ultimate good, and its ultimate goal should be 
predominantly concentrated on the social ethics. Moreover, Balicki called for 
strengthening of Polish national identity through exclusion of non-ethnic Poles from 
the envisioned state. According to Balicki incorporation of Jews and Germans was 
threatening to the distinctive national character (Balicki, 1903:25).    
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Piłsudski, on the other hand, raised in the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth had an immeasurable influence on the process of shaping the 
polyethnic model of Poland, The PPS vision was based on the idea of civic Poland 
rather than ethnically Polish population conterminous with the envisioned state 
borders. The National Democrats believed that mutual effort of all the “national 
forces” such as the Polish culture, religion (Roman Catholicism), ethnocultural 
elements would allow regaining national dignity, and eventually reconstruction of 
Poland. Dmowski, in his flagship work Thoughts of a Modern Pole (1903), claims that 
he is not only connected to the contemporary national consciousness but also to the 
ancient principalities and kingdoms which shaped his national identity (Dmowski, 
2007:28). Although endecja focused their actions on moderate steps aiming at 
expanding this national consciousness to populations from across the former 
Commonwealth according to Dmowski, ethnic groups such as the Jews could not 
become part of the Polish nation. He firmly believed that the Jewish peoples’ identity 
continued to crystallise over centuries and its traditions could eventually come to 
overpower the youthful Polish nationalist movement (Dmowski, 2007:164).  
 
4.5.1 The Ethnic-Organic Model 
National Democracy was established in 1893 and became the first of the two forces 
central to the shaping of the modern Polish identity. The vision of Zygmunt Balicki 
(1858-1916), the founder of the ND, was to undermine the contemporary European 
political trend of peaceful coexistence. In his National Egoism and Ethics (1903), 
Balicki argues that construction of independent Poland trumps all other 
considerations (Balicki, 1903:26). Balicki together with Roman Dmowski became 
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involved in the construction of Polish nationalist ideology which would influence the 
leading political organisations in the twentieth century (Dawidowicz, 2004:135).  
 The National Democratic ideologues set out a programme which would 
entirely change the understanding of the national history and shape the aims for the 
future development of the Polish nation. The term nation in the jargon of endecja 
gained a novel connotation. Previously the term would refer to all nobility without 
regard for ethnic background. Paradoxically, although on the surface the term 
appeared inclusive its role was to disenfranchise all other social groups from 
identification with Rzeczpospolita. Roman Dmowski understood that being a Pole 
carried particular responsibilities including preservation of the achievements of of 
successive genarations of Poles and other peoples who the influenced shaping of the 
distinctive ethnocultural traditions (Dmowski, 2007:30).   
Furthermore, Dmowski’s particular political programme became known as 
“national realism.”40  Dmowski blamed the weakness of the pre-partition 
Rzeczpospolita on corruption of szlachta and the passive attitudes of the state 
authorities41. Furthermore, the author argued that the will to cooperate with non-
ethnic Poles was a weakness which ultimately led to the downfall of the republic. 
Anachronistic policies derived from ancient ideals blocked the Polish nation from 
absolute domination over the minorities inhabiting traditionally Polish lands 
(Dmowski, 2007; 23). Moreover, the National Democrats argued that populations 
which were not willing to assimilate into the dominant Polish culture would have to 
                                                          
40
 According to the program of “national realism” opposed the Romanticist approach to politics. Its role 
was to clearly present the situation of Poland and the options for future development. It opposed 
glorification of the uprisings or any form of martyrology.  
41
 As a parliamentarian of the Russian Duma, Dmowski was dedicated to protection of the Polish 
interests within the Russian Empire. He was also dedicated to promotion of the Polish question on the 
international arena.  
88 
 
leave the hypothesised state. The analysis presented by Dmowski led him to believe 
that Poland had to be aggressive and that Polish high culture should lead to the 
creation of a Great Poland with proud citizens. In his writings the leading ideologue of 
endecja proposed a model of “(…) an expansive Poland stretching from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea and from the Dnieper to the Oder” (Porter, 1992:639). The frontiers of 
Polish culture were according to the National Democrats further than it was ever 
imagined and ethnic Poles had to reclaim their rightful land. Zygmunt Balicki in his 
National Egoism and Ethics (1903) argued against the polyethnic traditions of Poland. 
To Balicki, the approach to national identity through the prism of cohabitation of 
Poles, Jews, Germans and other ethnicities was to decrease the chances of Poland 
becoming independent. Dmowski firmly believed in a distinctive Polish national 
identity which trumped all other identities. In one of his interviews he stated “If a Jew 
is going with us, if he [Jew] is not combating the national goals, we treat him as one of 
our own. If not, we fight him” (Wergieżski, 1907). Although in his 1903 work 
Dmowski identified the Jewish population as a factor weakening the Polish character 
in his later works he acknowledged that through assimilation a fraction of Jewish 
people could stay in Poland (Dmowski, 2007:164).  
The borders of Poland were (…) not limited by ethnography or history, but were 
determined by the transcendent needs of the living nation- needs tied to an eternal 
international struggle for physical existence and national expansion (Porter, 
1992:645) 
 
Dmowski’s research led him to believe that the creation of a strong state 
required a strong and proactive population. The survival of the Polish nation 
required ethnic Poles to acknowledge that nations and peoples were in a perpetual 
state of war: in order to salvage the Polish nation other ethnic groups had to be 
defeated (Dmowski, [1903] 2007: 43). The programme presented by the National 
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Democrats appeared to be realistic. This was because the growing divisions evident 
across the former Rzeczpospolita. The Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms42 which 
were laying claim to the territories integral to Rzeczpospolita prior to 1795 
strengthened the appeal of the ethnic/exclusive programme. The ethnic Poles 
inhabiting both the rural and urban regions of the kresy saw the weakening of the 
Polish “high culture” and the influence of the nobility in the remote regions (Snyder, 
2003:25).  
Following the implementation of Kulturkampf in the German partition, religion 
became one of the guardians of the distinctive national consciousness in the Prussian 
partition. The role of the Catholic Church in the Protestant Prussia became essential 
in 1872, when instruction in Polish language became restricted. Otto von Bismarck’s 
government dedicated substantial finances to pursue the aim of colonizing the lands 
of the former Rzeczpospolita and assimilating the Polish speaking population. 
Paradoxically, it was the well-organized Prussian bureaucratic machine with its 
strong judicial system which allowed the Poles, citizens of Prussia, to organize Polish 
organizations such as the Association of Workers’ Co-operatives, and combat 
unlawful activity undertaken by German settlers (Prazmowska, 2010:23). 
Elizabeth A. Drummond (2001) claims that “(…) the Catholic Clergy had, alongside 
the nobility (szlachta), long been one of the two main pillars of Polish nationalism” 
(Drummond, 2001:462). Furthermore, it was through the nationalist agitation of the 
Roman Catholic priests that the population was becoming aware of belonging to a 
separate ethnic group. This influential role in spreading the nationalist ideology 
allowed the Church to claim a dominant role in shaping the modern Polish identity.  
                                                          
42
 Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms did not become active until the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Following the “January Uprising” (1863-1864) Polish culture became perceived as weak and 
out-dated allowing alternative national identities to flourish.  
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4.5.2 The Polyethnic/Inclusive Model  
According to the Socialists attempts to assimilate non-ethnic Poles and exclusion of 
Jews and Germans, meant construction of a small and weak Poland. Piłsudski argued 
that Poland had to fully use its potential created by the polyethnic populations 
inhabiting East-Central Europe and by sharing some of the ethnocultural and political 
traits established in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Unlike the National 
Democrats, who believed that the modern nation should be formed upon the pre-
modern and ethnic foundations, the PPS believed that the construction of modern 
Polish nation required implementation of state model created by the Jagiellon royal 
family. The Jagiellon state model, as outlined by the PPS, perceived Poland beyond the 
narrow ethnic definition of the nation. The view shared by the PPS perceived Poland 
as a patchwork of communities, and understood that using language or religion to 
determine the borders of Poland would result in losing a significant portion the 
territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Porter, 1992:650; Tomicki, 1983). 
The Socialist leadership firmly believed in reconstruction of Poland upon its 
early-modern foundations in the form of a modern Commonwealth (resembling a 
federal state) bound together through the appeal of the shared history and the role of 
the Polish “high” culture which, according to the Socialists, shaped the Polish nation. 
The state model proposed by the PPS was described by Timothy Snyder in a following 
manner: 
The socialist federalism, a halfway house between early modern patriotism and 
modern mass politics, can be distinguished from Dmowski’s National Democracy in 
three ways. First, it was inherited tradition rather than invented history. Elite families 
who wished to restore the Grand Duchy (Rzeczpospolita) were operating within 
generationally continuous conceptions of nationality. Second, socialist federalism was 
advanced enlightening the masses but by conspiring with trusted comrades (…). 
Third, socialist federalism presumed that the nation was not a linguistic but a status 
group. (Snyder, 2003:58) 
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The Socialists argued that without the original lands of Poland-Lithuania the 
hypothesised state was prone to internal discord and vulnerable in the international 
arena. The PPS leadership knew that recklessness and selfishness of the nobility had 
destroyed the Rzeczpospolita. According to Waldemar Paruch (1997) the PPS was 
aiming to expand the definition of Polish nation to allow other ethnic groups to 
become citizens of Poland while preserving their distinct identity (Paruch, 1997:48).   
In contrast to the vision demonstrated by the National Democrats, the 
Socialists defined the nation in political, historical and territorial categories whereas 
the leadership of endecja saw the Polish people predominantly as an ethnic and 
linguistic community. Furthermore, the construction of the modern state upon the 
traditions sourced from the pre-partition state would according to the PPS leadership 
resolve social and ethnic matters without implementation of any specific national 
programme. The memory of the Commonwealth, according to the Pilsudskiites was 
strong enough to survive the upsurge of nationalism. The ideologues of the PPS 
agreed that in the hypothesised Poland the central role had to be assigned to the 
bureaucratic state machine supporting all citizens rather than aims of any particular 
ethnic group. According to Adam Skwarczynski, one of the chief ideologues of the 
PPS, “(…) existence of a nation (narod) without a state (państwo) makes it 
handicapped: only as a state (państwo) may a nation thrive (…)” (1997:56). It 
becomes evident that in contrast to the endecja, to the Socialists there was no 
equation between the nation and the state. The construction of a federal Poland 
required the widening of the definition of the Polish citizenship. This envisioned state 
could only be sustained through implementation of the civic territorial state model.  
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The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 was more beneficial to the 
independence programme proposed by the Socialists rather than that of the endecja. 
The programme of building national awareness led by the National Democrats 
remained steady. The Dmowskiites saw prospective independence in the 
construction of a strong ethnic community capable of achieving independence in a 
political rather than a revolutionary manner. Moreover, the educational programmes 
across the three partitions allowed ethnic Poles to acknowledge the role of organic 
work. The nationalist organisations perceived the Socialist programme as out-dated 
(Pankowski, 2010:16-17) with another national revolution leading to the 
undermining of the progress achieved.  
On the other hand, the Socialists, in a Romanticist fashion, saw the outbreak of 
the war as a chance for the reconstruction of the Commonwealth. In the political 
thought of the PPS, the Second Rzeczpospolita would incorporate the lands lost to the 
aggression of the absolutist empires. Poland as a political idea binding various ethnic 
communities would continue its military struggle until the Commonwealth was 
restored within its Jagiellon frontiers. Polish cultural tradition43 would according to 
the PPS play a central role in shaping both the political and social programme of the 
envisioned state. The dominant role of the Polish culture in the eighteenth century 
and in the early nineteenth century evaporated by the turn of the twentieth century 
leaving divergent ethnic communities increasingly isolated. The PPS was faced with a 
hopeless campaign to recreate a polyethnic community. 
 
 
                                                          
43
 including both the political culture and the high culture of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Following the collapse of the early-modern state in 1795, Polish nationalist elites 
remained dedicated to Poland-Lithuania. The allegiance of the nobility to the state 
rather than to the monarch was a sign of an early political identity. According to the 
szlachta, the future of the state was in their hands rather than the hands of the 
elected king. Analysis of the primary and secondary sources, such as the 1791 
constitution, the Proclamation of Polaniec, or the national debates among some of the 
leading intellectuals, demonstrates the process of codification of the national symbols 
and their dissemination in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. These aspects 
of identity were also used to preserve the population’s character following the failure 
of  pre-partition Poland.  
The early-modern patriotism demonstrated by the nobility during the 
nineteenth century insurrections and fuelled by the Romanticist authors represented 
an attachment to the ancient realm which continued to exist in the imagination of the 
upper strata. Following the unsuccessful liberation struggle led by the elites, it 
became clear that the unifying national myths and symbols could no longer belong to 
those elites. Kosciuszko, Lelewel, Czartoryski, and many other Polish statesmen 
became aware of the urgent need to extend the definition of nation beyond its narrow 
interpretation. The rapid industrialisation and the dynamic increase in the educated 
urban middle classes at the turn of the twentieth century influenced the spread of 
nationalist thought. This chapter also acknowledged the role of the nineteenth 
century social and technological advancements which according to Gellner (1994) 
were at the foundation of the modern nation. Gellner’s work, however, did not take 
into considerations some of the factors which Smith identified as central to shaping of 
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modern nations. With the use of ethnosymbolism it became possible to analyse the 
impact of the pre-modern and early-modern consciousness on shaping the modern 
nation.  
 Furthermore, the liminal figures of Polish patriotism such as Kościuszko 
played a vital role in the reframing of citizenship in Poland. Indeed it was the 
outbreak of the French Revolution (1789-1799) that became the first step in 
acknowledging that the conception of the Polish nation was anachronistic. The 
awakening of the masses, as described by Joachim Lelewel in the nineteenth century, 
was the key to the construction of a modern Poland on primordial Slavic foundations, 
rather than artificial class divisions. Lelewel demonstrated only one amongst many 
ideas for the construction of modern Poland. Nevertheless, his revolutionary 
writings, alongside those of the conservatives, recognised the essential role of the 
Polish antiquity in shaping the modern nation.  
 This chapter argues that Polish nation was reinvented with the existing 
ethnocultural elements acquiring novel meaning. The “Galician Massacre” of 1846, 
when the Galician peasantry turned against the landowners, evidenced the lack of 
connection between the serfs and szlachta. While this argument could support the 
modernist claims, with regard to the inception of the nation building process, it does 
not explain the persistence of ethnocultural elements and myths which became 
essential in consolidating the populations from across the three partitions under 
similar banners only a few decades later. Through the juxtaposition of pre-partition 
national symbols with religious celebrations the mass population was becoming 
aware of belonging to a particular nation.   
95 
 
  The distinctive character of Polish ethnicity was to a large extent preserved 
by the Church and the nobility which prior to the destruction of the Rzeczpospolita 
acted as ethnic cores and guarded distinctive myths. . These ethnic cores influenced 
the expansion of the Polish identity and promoted claims for independent statehood. 
Preservation of tradition by the clergy and the émigré societies shaped the modern 
national currents. Nearly a century after the destruction of Poland-Lithuania political 
organisations such as the PPS or the ND created their visions of the Polish state and 
nation based upon pre-modern and early-modern history. 
The National Democracy and the PPS shared ideas which echoed the traditions 
of the Piast and the Jagiellon royal families. The endecja protected the ‘truly’ Polish 
heritage which according to them was lost in the Jagiellon era dominated by the 
nobility. The nation according to the writings of Roman Dmowski and Zygmunt 
Balicki had to be Polish in a purely ethno-linguistic sense. The Church became 
acknowledged as essential to this tradition as an inseparable tool utilised by the 
nation rather than as a foreign institution. The ND’s message was to re-educate the 
inhabitants of the former Commonwealth according to the nationalist requirements. 
This in effect would allow assimilation of the Slavic minorities into the nation. 
Effectively, the groups unwilling or unable to join the nation would have to leave the 
envisioned state.  
In contrast to the realist vision was the Romanticist vision presented by the 
Socialists headed by Piłsudski. The ideologues of the PPS argued that the most 
appropriate way to reunite the populations of the destroyed Commonwealth was 
through establishment of a federation. This state model would allow all communities 
to preserve their distinct identities. Furthermore, the Socialists described modern 
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Poland primarily as a state rather than a nation. Ethnic provenance, religious or 
linguistic affiliation would remain private matters of the Polish citizens.  
The agenda of the PPS remained vague on the matter of the national 
programme in the hypothesised state. In twentieth century Europe the construction 
of a strong nation appeared essential to the protection of national borders. This 
socio-political situation led Dmowski to fundamentally disagree with Piłsudski. The 
discord between ethnic minorities prior to 1918 became a signal that the national 
question would persist in an independent Poland.  
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Chapter 5: Nation and Nationality in Post-1918 Poland 
 
5.1 From the Great War to Independence 
Gaining independence in November 1918 was only the first step in the reconstruction 
of Poland (Map II). The modern state gained its sovereignty as a consequence of the 
First World War and through the brief period of its existence (1918-1939) the 
formation of a unified state remained the overriding issue for the authorities. From 
the moment of its inception, Poland struggled for legitimisation both externally and 
from within. The outside struggle was predominantly linked with the territories 
claimed in all directions and the populations which, in effect, were incorporated into 
this state.  The military struggle which lasted until 1921 (Map II) for the territory 
which would include the pre-1795 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Map I) had a 
myth-making role to the Socialists and Józef Piłsudski who identified Poland with the 
territory and shared civic identity rather than with any particular ethnic group.  
 Piłsudski was one of only a handful of politicians to predict that the defeat of 
Russian forces would allow the independence claim. It was through his timely action 
that the military was able to enter the Polish cities under Austrian and Russian 
control and implement pro-Polish authorities. Austrian and Russian armies 
weakened through the war were unable to stem Piłsudski’s forces. It remained the 
key interest of Piłsudski to reach and reclaim the greatest possible proportion of the 
pre-partition Poland prior to the post-war peace conference (Zaremba, 1981:62). 
Territorial disputes, however, weakened Poland from the onset as it was involved in 
international quarrels with its neighbours, the League of Nations and with the 
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“Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian communities [which] showed no desire to 
be included in a new Polish state” (Prażmowska, 2010:88).  
 Piłsudski was aware that it was the responsibility of the Polish army to secure 
its eastern border. The western frontier, however, was dependant on the decision of 
the leaders gathered in Versailles (Zaremba, 1981:62). This opinion was not shared 
by the leader of the National Democratic movement and the Polish delegation in 
Paris. Roman Dmowski’s ambitious programme saw Poland within the borders of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, extended further at cost to Germany (Kaczmarek, 
2011:100). In order to resolve territorial disputes, the Versailles Peace Conference 
took the case of Polish territory into consideration. The United States President’s 
Fourteen Points programme hinted that Poland would be reconstructed within 
territories with an indisputably Polish population (Malec-Masnyk, 1991:10). In order 
to secure the well-being of religious and linguistic minorities in Poland and the 
Entente a treaty granting equal rights to people of ethnicity other than Polish44 was 
signed. 
Poland is technically without borders, everything what we can gain in the West 
depends on the Entente, if it wishes to squeeze Germany a bit more or a bit less. In the 
East the matter is different, there are doors, which continue to open and close and it 
all depends on who and how wide they will be opened by force (Malec-Masnyk, 
1991:13) 
 
The nation building process which accelerated in the nineteenth century led to 
fragmentation of the populations formerly linked by the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. The ultimate collapse of the institutions of the ancient regime 
effectively led to the disconnection of many non-ethnic Poles with the traditions of 
Poland-Lithuania. Although high culture had previously unified the populations 
                                                          
44Traktat Miedzy Glownemi Mocarstwami Sprzmierzonemi A Polska, 28 June 1919   
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within the political nation,45 in the twentieth century the majority of the symbolism 
bonding the polyethnic noble nation was rejected. Piłsudski and the Polish Socialist 
Party (PPS), however, continued to rely on the traits such as the shared political 
tradition and the overriding Polish national identity derived from the Jagiellon era.  
The twentieth century observed the rise of nationalist agitation across East-
Central Europe. The regions which formerly constituted integral parts of Poland such 
as Ukraine and Lithuania saw that they too could construct their independent states. 
The Socialists were aware of these political circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
Pilsudskiites believed that through demonstration of military might and 
reinvigoration of the inclusive model of Polish nationalism they would able to regain 
control over the swathes of land and the non-ethnic Polish populations in the kresy46. 
Furthermore, military intervention in the kresy was driven by two key targets. Firstly, 
conquest of the eastern parts of the former Commonwealth would give Poland the 
strongest possible shape. Secondly, incorporation of these territories would weaken 
Russia by establishing a federation of nations and ethnic groups capable of stemming 
the ambitions of the Eastern neighbour (Pankowski, 2010:17).  
The shaping of the Polish frontiers continued until the signing of the Treaty of 
Riga in 1921. Until then the national borders remained in constant flux making it 
extremely difficult to begin the process of moulding a monolithic Polish nation. The 
territories, such as Samagotia or Ruthenia remote from Warsaw's influence, 
remained disconnected from the federal programme promoted by the Polish 
government. From 1921 it became the priority of the government to consolidate the 
                                                          
45 Political nation (or civic nation) was defined by the Socialists as the country in which the dominant 
role in binding the inhabitants was granted to the state’s institutions rather than any particular ethnic 
group.  
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state previously divided between three empires. The first government was trusted 
with the role of unification of the territories controlled by the Polish military. This 
task was extremely difficult within the framework of a wide spectrum of disparity in 
the complex processes of codification, political traditions and economic development 
within the three partitions (Zaremba, 1981:24).  
The attempts to define Polish nationality on the basis of the polyethnic 
identity outlined by the Socialists appeared unattainable in the nineteenth century 
and religion and language became the main indicators of national identity in Poland. 
Firstly, the mass population which was previously not considered as citizenry was 
not emancipated until the second half of the nineteenth century offering an 
ambiguous link with the nation shared exclusively by the nobility. Secondly, the 
population regarded as Polish was spread across the vast territory between the Odra 
and Dnepr rivers in which they shared the land with Germans, Ukrainians, Jews and 
many other national and ethnic minorities (GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny Miast Polski, 
1928; Eberhardt, 1996:91-94).  
The ethnic groups within the territories which formerly constituted an 
integral part of the Russian Empire and which were adjoined to Poland, refused 
assimilation with Poland which among minorities was widely perceived as a national 
state. The attempts of the Socialist leadership to define Polish identity in civic rather 
than ethnic terms suffered two crucial setbacks which proved impossible to surpass 
in an attempt to construct the nation acceptable to the bulk of the minorities within 
its frontiers. Firstly, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed in 1918 granted independence 
to Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, weakening the legal claims of the Polish 
authorities to these territories. The 1918 treaty also gave a green light to inhabitants 
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of these areas to seek recognition of their own national claims. Secondly, after the 
devastating military campaign between 1918 and 1921 the Polish leadership was 
forced to sign the Treaty of Riga (1921) which effectively divided Lithuanian, 
Belarusian and Ukrainian populations between Poland and Bolshevik Russia making 
the envisioned federation implausible (Kaczmarek, 2010:55).   
 
5.2 Religious and linguistic affiliation in interwar Poland 
Through the analysis of population statistics according to the research of Piotr 
Eberhardt (2001) and the National Population Census of 1931 it is possible to 
examine the Polish population through the prism of religious and linguistic affiliation. 
When assuming that the declared language determined nationality, then 68.9 (21.9 
million) per cent of the Second Polish Republic’s population defined their ethnicity as 
Polish. The Ukrainian population constituted 13.9 per cent (4.4 million), the Jewish 
ethnic group 8.6 per cent (Hebrew and Yiddish speakers) followed by Belarusians 
(5.3%), Germans (2.3%), and others  
The ethnic structure of Poland through religious denomination presented a 
state in which Roman Catholics were the dominant religious group covering 64.8 per 
cent (20.6 million) of Polish citizens. However, other religious groups constituted a 
significant counterbalance to Roman Catholicism with Orthodox Christians 
accounting for 11.8 % (3.76 million), Greek Catholics 10.4% (3.36 million), Jews 9.8% 
(3.13 million), and Evangelical Protestants 2.6% (835.2 thousand) of the state’s 
population (GUS, Pierwszy Powszechny Spis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 
wrzesnia 1921 roku, 1927). Analysis of the 1921 and 1931 census demonstrated that 
the respective populations were mostly concentrated in specific geographic locations, 
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the Ukrainians inhabiting for example south-eastern Poland and the Jewish 
population predominantly living in the urban areas in central and eastern Poland 
(Narodowy Spis Powszechny na rok 1921, 1927; Narodowy Spis Powszechny na rok 
1931; Eberhardt, 2001:112).  
These numbers influenced the Nationalists and the Socialists in drafting 
modern Poland. Whereas the PPS aimed to expand identification with a Poland which 
included ethnic minorities, the ND preferred the course of assimilation and expulsion. 
While the endecja’s Dmowski (based on numbers of Polish speakers and Roman 
Catholics), called for ethnic Poles to assume a dominant position in the Second 
Republic (Dmowski, 1927), the PPS disagreed with assimilationist programmes 
perceiving Poland as a polyethnic state. Articles 87 and 89 from Chapter V of the 
1921 Polish constitution also stated that Polish citizens could not claim citizenship of 
any other country and that the foremost duty of each citizen was loyalty  to the Polish 
Republic. Furthermore, according to Article 96 all citizens regardless of their ethnic 
background were equal in the eyes of the law. According to Article 109 every Polish 
citizen had the right to preserve their “national” identity and to cultivate their 
distinctive language and culture (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1921 roku). 
This 1921 Act officially abolished the szlachta’s previous status, thus defining the 
Polish nation as a population of all those who inhabited  the territory of the state 
rather than any particular group. The constitution also officially supported national, 
ethnic, and religious minorities inhabiting Poland, granting them equal rights with 
other citizens (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1921 roku, Articles 109, 110, 
111). 
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Moreover the 1921 constitution (17 March 1921) which preceded the Treaty 
of Riga (18 March 1921) was dedicated to forming a framework which would allow 
the polyethnic populations incorporated into Poland to exist within the boundaries of 
one state. The Treaty of Riga of 1921, which finalised the competition for the border 
between Poland and Bolshevik Russia, weakened the state model proposed by the 
Socialists by partitioning the Belarusian and Ukrainian populations (Paruch, 1997).   
The 1921 population census and the constitution outlined the proposed model 
of the Polish state. It also demonstrated the differences in interpretation of where 
Poland was and who Polish people were. Analysis of the political programmes and 
proposed by the PPS and ND (ZLN) sheds light on the distinctive perceptions of the 
Polish nation in the interwar Poland.   
5.3 The Socialist programme  
The PPS leadership perceived Poland not through the prism of ethnicity but rather 
through the populations of different ethnic provenance bound by the traditions of 
Poland-Lithuania. The authorities were aiming to build a country which would satisfy 
the needs of the majority of the inhabitants and give them an opportunity for 
participation of which they were deprived as subjects of empires. According to the 
leading daily newspaper Robotnik supportive of the PPS Poland could only become 
strong as a polyethnic and multi-faith state. Rather than insisting on the dominant 
position of any ethnic group, the Republic should be concerned with equal rights and 
opportunities for workers and the working intelligentsia. Furthermore, according to 
Robotnik the aim of the PPS was to build “a democratic and republican Poland for the 
working masses and for the furtherance of world progress and peace” (Robotnik, 
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15.11.1922) and only the Socialist PPS was determined to “connect the working 
people of the urban and the rural areas” (Robotnik, 4.11.1922).  
Formation of a federation and the construction of a nation built upon early-
modern traditions was the ambition of Piłsudski. He sought to rebuild the 
Rzeczpospolita rather than build a new Poland. This goal was taken up by the first 
transitional government headed by Prime Minister Jędrzej Moraczewski. His role was 
to shape an overriding Polish identity which would stem any interethnic animosities. 
Moraczewski and Piłsudski wanted to make Polish state institutions recognised 
across the state. Competition between the Socialists and endecja in the early 1920s 
was predominantly concentrated on the shape of Poland and the definition of 
Polishness. According to the leading newspaper in interwar Poland, the PPS identified 
“the Polish nation (…), not as a nation-state but a state of nations” (Gazeta 
Warszawska, The Warsaw Daily 21.12.1922). Moreover, according to the pro- 
Piłsudski newspaper Kurier Poranny (The Morning Courier)  the state was of the 
utmost importance and all citizens were essential in further development of Poland 
(Kurier Poranny, 31.10. 1922). Kurier Poranny and Robotnik (The Worker) opposed 
the right-wing propaganda, perceiving it as unconstructive and weakening Poland 
during a difficult political period. For them, the goal of Polish democracy was to grant 
democratic rights and equality to all Polish citizens (Kaminska-Szmaj, 1994:118).  
In order to strengthen identification with Poland the authorities identified the 
key institutions which would help in accelerating this process. From the earliest 
stages of statehood a symbol considered as central to the Polish national identity was 
the Polish Army (WP), which was given an almost mythical status and inherited some 
of the “noble” traditions of the nineteenth century insurgents. To Piłsudski and other 
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Poles who were brought up in the national spirit under foreign rule the Polish Army 
“was an element of Polish nationality (…), [which] would complete the political work” 
(Zaremba, 1981:18). Although symbolism of the WP was effective in the areas which 
contained a substantial Polish majority, within the regions with a significant 
percentage of minorities the Polish forces were perceived as occupants no different 
to the previous rulers. Moreover, the military language was also utilised in political 
campaigns where the competing political camps were in fact presented as enemies. 
This approach of newspapers tied to PPS or endecja (ND, ZLN) allowed the media to 
appeal to the population and to involve the citizenry in activities connected to nation-
building (Kaminska-Szmaj, 1994:75).  
Józef Piłsudski’s credo “Poland has to be great or it will not exist at all” 
(Paruch, 1997:51) defined the relationship with the states’ neighbours and the non-
ethnic Poles. His political ideology appeared to his opponents as anachronistic and 
incomplete. This state model could not survive the surge and the appeal of the 
contemporary nationalisms (Pankowski, 2009:17). Piłsudski was reluctant to forsake 
federal Poland as, unlike the National Democrats, he was certain that Poland could 
only reclaim its position in Europe through extension of Polish citizenship to all 
inhabitants of Poland-Lithuania. This particular state model perceived that it was the 
role of the entire body of citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, to take the 
responsibility for shaping the state. Piłsudski and the Socialists argued that social 
equality and national development would be achieved in polyethnic Poland 
(Robotnik, 19.11.1922; Robotnik, 28.11.1922).  
What was referred to as “nostalgic republicanism” remained entrenched in the 
PPS’s national programme (Snyder, 2003:41). However, in contrast to the 
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expectations of the first government, the diversified and deeply fractured society was 
reluctant to accept this imposed identity. Piłsudski, frustrated with the slow process 
of resurrection of the Polish-Lithuanian national identity assumed the role of “the 
heir to the Old Republic’s achievements [and] also of a competent corrector of its 
traditions” (Paruch, 1997:40). This (self-conceived) role of Piłsudski, as a “father” of 
the imagined Polish citizenry continued until his death in 1935.  
Although the PPS refused to openly endorse the Church, it became clear that 
the period of statelessness had granted the Church the role of a pillar of shaping and 
preserving the Polish nation (Drummond, 2001:462; Tazbir, 1986; Davies, 2005). 
Aside from religion, Polish ethnicity was preserved within the literary culture and 
thus manifested through the use of the Polish language and historical achievements. 
The role of Poland as the last bastion of Christianity (as it was perceived by the 
nobility as the final frontier of ‘civilization’) was an important part of the Roman 
Catholic tradition carried from the Middle Ages (Tazbir, 1986).  
Furthermore, it was concluded by the PPS that recreation of the early-modern 
union of nations in the form of a federation was attainable even though the 
Lithuanian nationalist elites refused any integration with this proposed construct 
(Zaremba, 1981:88). The Socialists proposed the programme of cooperation between 
various small nations of East-Central Europe under the patronage of Poland. This 
programme was named Prometheism47 (Prometeizm). One of the key thinkers and 
publicists Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, writing for Robotnik, contemplated the 
building of a “Peoples’ Bloc” (Blok Ludowy) unifying nations into the voluntary Union 
of the Baltic Nations rather than through military intervention. The lack of interest in 
                                                          
47 Prometeizm: a programme introduced by the Socialists which proposed creation of loose federation 
of East-Central European communities based on common security from Bolshevik aggression.  
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voluntary membership led to the intervention of the Polish Army in the East (Śliwa, 
1983:222-223). 
Moreover, although the Socialists refused to acknowledge the need for a 
national programme, it was imperative to regulate the role of the ethnic Poles among 
ethnic groups within the Second Republic. According to the PPS, the non-Polish 
national groups undergoing the crystallisation of their own national identity required 
clear affirmation that they could retain their distinctive cultural character in Poland. 
Subordination of the nation to the state, rather than the opposite, was a step which 
would allow the non-ethnic Poles to associate with the idea of federal Poland. Polish 
newspapers associated with the PPS, such as Robotnik, remained opposed to 
nationalist agitation stemming from the right-wing press such as Gazeta Warszawska 
or Kurier Poznański (The Poznań Courier). The PPS continued to combat nationalism 
perceiving it as contradictory with the state’s interest (Kaminska-Szmaj, 1994:217).  
The formation of a successful federal state was only attainable through 
establishing strong ties between all ethnicities within the Polish state and in return 
the construction of a national identity superseding local affiliations (Paruch, 1997:59; 
Zaremba: 1981:208). Political actions such as Prometeism became essential in 
rebuilding the trust of the citizenry from the kresy through the rhetoric of East 
European, Caucasian and Baltic alliance rather than formation of a nation state 
dominated by ethnic Poles. By contrast, it was postulated by the Endecja that Poland 
had to be reconstructed by ethnic Poles. Unlike the Socialists, the ND drew a clear 
definition of Polish national identity along religious, cultural and linguistic lines. 
While the publicists of Robotnik discussed ways to consolidate the polyethnic 
population of Poland, The leadership of endecja and the press associated to the 
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National Democracy (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy) argued for Poland built upon 
ethnic foundations (Gross, 1973:135). The PPS was aware of the socio-political 
repercussions of attempts to build modern Poland around Polish language and 
Roman Catholicism but the press associated with endecja remained relentless in their 
attacks on minorities especially the Jewish and the German minorities (Dmowski, 
1927; Fuks, Hoffman, Horn, Tomaszewski, 1982:37).  
 
5.4 The Nation in the Rhetoric of the Endecja 
To be a Pole (…) one had to accept Polish “consciousness”, one had to accept 
everything Polish, including the nation’s past and its historical mission for the future 
(Porter, 1992:646) 
 
From the earliest stages, the National Democrats clearly addressed the issue of 
the Polish nation. Through its leading ideologues and dedicated newspapers such as 
Gazeta Warszawska (Warsaw Gazette) or Kurier Poznański (Poznań Courier) the 
movement clearly outlined Polish national heritage and grew more arrogant to the 
extent of the national frontiers. National Democracy, which changed its name in 
independent Poland  Związek Ludowo-Narodowy (ZLN)48, clearly outlined its vision 
of Poland. Gazeta Warszawska presenting the programme of ZLN argued among 
others for “combating Communism in Poland. moral purity in public life, and 
protection of the Polish nation from the overflow of the Jewry” (Gazeta Warszawska, 
31. 10. 1922).  
                                                          
48 Związek Ludowo-Narodowy (Popular National Union) was a political party, established in 1919, 
which role was to connect right-wing politicians with conservative and nationalist options. It also 
aimed to appeal to populations from different economic background connecting urban and rural 
populations. 
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This political agitation and the supreme role of Polish nation in modern 
Poland was set out by the pioneers of the modern rightist Polish national thought. In 
their works Roman Dmowski, Zygmunt Balicki, and Jan Ludwik Poplawski argued 
that ethnic Poles had to understand that their hard work would eventually lead to the 
construction of an independent Poland.  According to the right-wing politicians only 
the Polish nation (Polish ethnicity) would be able to assume the role of defending 
independent statehood. Publicists of Kurier Poznański, associated with endecja 
identified independent Poland with ethnic Poles and opposed the political dominance 
of both the Jews and Germans (Kurier Poznański 12.11.1922).  
Furthermore, attacks on the polyethnic model of Poland proposed by the PPS 
were associated with the belief that Poland remained under control of national 
minorities. Dmowski, remained adamant that the previous “extermination of tribes” 
that had occurred between Poland and Germany would continue in the successive 
generations (Dmowski, 2007: 41). Dmowski believed that it was his role and that of 
the “responsible Poles” to educate those members of society unaware of their role in 
the construction of the modern nation (Mackiewicz, 1941:34). Through the 1910s 
and the 1920s the National Democrats continued their campaign for education of the 
population in the spirit of “organic work” in order to further strengthen national 
identity (Bugajski, 2002:159).  
In its attempt to achieve national homogeneity endecja dedicated its efforts to 
the promotion of the ethnocultural traits associated with Polishness and to eradicate 
elements which were perceived alien to Poland. Application of these tools became 
evident in the post-1918 propaganda of the ZLN dedicated to defining Poland 
through the prism of religion and language. This task required assimilation of the 
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other Slavic populations in Poland and exclusion of both German and Jewish people 
allowing the foundation of Poland where ethnic Poles would dominate both 
numerically and culturally (Cordell and Wolff, 2005:21). Adoption of traditions, 
exclusive to ethnic Poles, would contribute to the building of the strongest possible 
nation. With the restoration of the “original” national character the ND was aiming to 
ensure that the Slavic roots of Poland would resurface. This movement, in contrast to 
the Socialist movement, believed that the state was merely a tool in the hands of the 
nation and a means for its further expansion (Porter, 1992:653). Although initially 
the ND “had a flexible understanding of who was a Pole [which] allowed them to 
claim areas with few ethnic Poles” (Porter, 1992:650) from the 1930s, Polish 
nationality in their rhetoric was becoming more exclusive limiting the nation to 
ethnic Poles.  
Moreover, the rhetoric of the ND gained a Darwinist dimension. Whereas the 
PPS camp promoted peaceful cooperation for mutual benefit, endecja shared Herder’s 
vision of a continuing battle for national survival (Porter, 1992:653), denying any 
possibility of consolidation beyond the lines of ethnicity.  According to this primordial 
vision, nations were integral to the state of nature and the Polish nation had the right 
to extend its physical frontiers even to those regions where ethnic Poles were in 
minority.  
At the root of the endecja’s ideology was the belief that “the borders of Poland 
were (…) not limited by ethnography or history, but were determined by 
transcendent needs of the living nation- needs tied to an eternal international 
struggle for physical (i.e., state) existence and national expansion” (Porter, 
1992:645). The nation-building process required re-education of the Polish 
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population. Dedication and loyalty of its members could only be achieved through 
articulation of clear rules for membership within the national community. The 
Nationalists were involved in strengthening the national spirit through improvement 
of education across Poland and the level of literacy which was lower in the kresy. The 
assimilation process would further support expansion of the borders of Poland 
allowing the state to expand in all directions49. The National Democrats viewed Polish 
history as an important framework for nation-building which required careful 
selection of the Polish ethnic symbols rather than revoking the pre-1795 stratified 
society. At the same time, an ideology of “national egoism” gave the nationalists 
arguments for either assimilation or exclusion of the element identified as sinister to 
the Polish citizenry. In order to secure the future borders, the Polish nation would 
have to determine its position among other nations within Poland and set the plan for 
assimilation of Slavic minorities into the Polish nation. Dmowski further explained 
that expulsion of the Jewish and German populations were measures critical for the 
preservation and strengthening of the nation demanding: “legal discrimination and 
stripping the Jews of civil rights” (Pankowski, 2010:28). For Gazeta Warszawska 
endecja was the only reasonable political option. According to the newspaper the ZLN 
was the only force supportive of “Religion [Roman Catholicism] and Family, two 
eternal lights of the Aryan culture” (Gazeta Warszawska, 6.10.1922). Kurier Poznański 
echoed the claims of Gazeta Warszawska by supporting endecja as the only party 
capable of introducing “God’s order in Poland” (Kurier Poznański, 12.11.1922). 
Endecja identified the Church as the force which would allow strengthening of the 
position of ethnic Poles. Although PPS granted religion a secondary role in shaping 
identity Poland, endecja claimed that it was necessary to grant Roman Catholicism a 
                                                          
49
 Mazurek, P. (2012) Wpływ Polski Na Ogólnoświatowy Rozwój Nauki JPilsudski.org 
112 
 
special status which could undermine the threat of Jewish culture and religion 
(Gazeta Warszawska, 14.12.1922; Kurier Poznanski, 14,11,1922; Porter-Szucs, 
2011:181).  
 
5.5 The State and the Church 
The numbers presented in the national census of 1921 further demonstrate the role 
of the Church in the shaping of the modern national identity (Główny Urząd 
Statystyczny, Mieszkania. Ludnosc, Stosunki Zawodowe (1921), 1927). Piłsudski 
claimed that “[the] vision of Catholic Poland could not serve as the unifying principle 
of the Second Republic” (Pease, 2009:5). For Piłsudski’s nostalgic vision, 
consolidation of the former Commonwealth along religious rather than cultural lines 
could jeopardise the programme of reconstruction. The Socialist leadership feared 
that a “Catholic Poland” could alienate non-Catholic and non-Christian populations, 
such as the Polish Jews, who supported construction of Poland along the civic, rather 
than ethnic lines. Nevertheless, following independence, it was becoming apparent 
that Roman Catholicism had become synonymous with ethnic Poles. ZLN claimed that 
ethics and morality derived from Roman Catholicism should become the foundation 
of modern Poland. According to the newspapers associated with endecja there was a 
clear division between the Jewish and the Christian population. According to the 
publicists of Gazeta Warszawska there were too many cultural differences to find a 
common ground in one state (Gazeta Warszawska, 11.8.1923).  
Although as discussed in the previous chapter, religion in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth could not boast the role of a key indicator of the  national 
identity. Poland-Lithuania remained too large, not only by territory but also by its 
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populations of many different religions such as Protestantism and Judaism. The 
previous cultural exchange, halted in the nineteenth century, together with the 
changing role of Catholicism granted the Church a central role in preservation of the 
organic definition of Poland. Similarly, endecja shifted its outlook on Roman 
Catholicism and vice versa. While in the early twentieth century the clergy called for 
destruction of endecja, perceiving it as secular and anti-Catholic (Porter-Szucs, 
2011:180) following independence in 1918 the Church and endecja became allies in 
combating Piłsudski and the Socialists.  
The leading role of the clergy ranged from educating the peasantry in the rural 
regions of the remote, impoverished regions in Galicia to the formation of political 
parties paving the way for the envisioned independent Poland. Political slogans such 
as “God’s Poland” (Kurier Poznański, 12.11.1922), had an impact on identification 
with the Roman Catholic Church and the mythologised “Fatherland” (Porter-Szucs, 
2011:22-23). In the rural regions, remote from the cultural centres such as Kraków or 
Lwów, priests frequently “acted as the grass-root spokesmen for Poles against the 
alien regimes” (Pease, 2009: 22-24). The Church wishing to retain its dominant 
position in post-1918 Poland allied with endecja. Its involvement in the state’s 
politics, however, was kept under control by Piłsudski. The Socialist newspaper 
Robotnik openly criticised the joint effort of endecja and the Church to curb rights of 
non-Catholics (Robotnik, 5.2.1921).  
Many of the priests, despite the Socialist opposition, chose to cooperate with 
the ZLN, who, unlike the Socialists, saw a multidimensional role for the Church in the 
process of nation-building (Kaminska-Szmaj, 1994:144). Although the leadership 
continued to minimise its role, the PPS identified Roman Catholicism as one of the 
114 
 
ethnocultural elements which preserved distinctive Polish character. According to 
the PPS, however, it was only one among many other indicators of Polishness and 
could not have a decisive impact on the process of state construction (Pease, 2009:5). 
An examination of Piłsudski’s political life demonstrates the continuing 
struggle for guaranteeing religious tolerance. Piłsudski, in order to legitimise the 
extension of Poland’s frontiers, was striving to prove that it was through “high” Polish 
culture rather than through any particular religion that its inhabitants should 
consider their identity as Polish. According to Piłsudski, it was only through equality 
that the state authorities would gain legitimacy among Jewish and Orthodox 
populations. When in 1926 Piłsudski became the head of state following a coup d’état, 
the leadership again refused to accept the Church as a tool in the campaign of 
“purification” (sanacja) (Paruch, 1997:251). Strengthening the central role of 
citizenship founded upon equality of all members of the civic nation rather than 
based upon religious or linguistic affiliation remained the cornerstone of the political 
tradition shared by the Socialists.  
From the mid-1930s however, the authorities were becoming clear supporters 
of national identification through the prism of ethnic symbols. The romanticist era 
represented by Piłsudski would come to an end with his death in 1935 and his out-
dated ideals were forced to give way to endecja’s realism. In the increasingly divided 
society choosing promotion of national identity in ethnic rather than civic terms, the 
Camp of National Unity (Oboz Zjednoczenia Narodowego; OZN) began to consider 
itself as a party committed to Catholic values (1997:252). This fact had further 
consequences and a detrimental effect on the relationship between Catholics and 
other religious groups inhabiting Poland.  
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5.5.1 Roman Catholicism as a Pillar of Polishness 
Roman Dmowski in his key works Thoughts of a Modern Pole (Mysli Nowoczesnego 
Polaka, 1903), Separatism of Jews and its Sources (Separatyzm Żydów i jego źródła, 
1909), and The Church, Nation and State (Kościół, Naród i Państwo, 1927) argued that 
Catholicism was in many ways an integral element of Polish ethnic identity. In the 
early twentieth century, Dmowski had remained cautious about this relationship, 
only hinting that there was a role for the Church in binding of the “historically” Polish 
lands. However, in his latter works, Dmowski indicated that the Episcopate’s 
continuing support in the struggle of the Polish nation could further contribute to the 
shaping of loyal Polish nationals. The endecja movement saw Roman Catholicism as a 
tool in achieving a considerable level of homogeneity among ethnic Poles from across 
the divergent regions of the former Commonwealth. The ND’s ideologues recognised 
this cooperation as mutually beneficial to both the nation (naród) and the Church. 
The endecja saw the role of the Church as subordinate to the needs of the nation 
(Dmowski, [1903] 2002: 55-59).  
Unlike the Socialists, Dmowski, was ardent in utilising religion in the process 
of statecraft. In his work the spiritual leader of endecja argued that:  
Roman Catholicism is not simply an addition to the Polish national identity (…), it is 
instilled within nationality and to a significant extent it is the essence of Polishness. 
Attempts to divide the Roman Catholic faith from the national identity, and Polish 
nation from its religion and from the Church, leads to destruction of the very essence 
of the nation (The Church, Nation and State, Dmowski, 1927) 
 
The Church becoming indistinguishable from the state posed a threat to 
integrity of Poland and Polish citizenship as proposed by the PPS. To endecja, loyalty 
to the Polish state could only be determined through belonging to the national 
community as defined by language, religion and shared cultural tradition. Such an 
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understanding of belonging to modern Poland was have serious repercussions and 
stirred dissatisfaction among the non-ethnic Poles. The National Democrats identified 
the source of threat to their perception of nationality. Gazeta Warszawska claimed 
that endecja was fighting for Poland with “the Left, the Jews, the Communists, 
Germans, Russians (…) (Gazeta Warszawska, 10.12.1922). The competition between 
the two opposing camps continued to deepen through the 1920s, resembling a clash 
between two armies (Pankowski, 2010: 24).  
Although Piłsudski still held a leading role in the state while passing the March 
constitution (1921), parties affiliated to the “national” rather than to the Socialist 
thought, were able to assign the “leading role” to the Church: “the Catholic faith being 
the religion of the overwhelming majority of the nation, occupies in the state a 
leading position among religions endowed with equal rights” (Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1921: Art: 114). The clergy became more supportive of a 
Poland founded upon ethnic rather than civic traditions (Porter-Szucs, 2011:331).  
 
5.5.2 The Church and the First Democratic Elections  
The agreement between endecja and the Church finally became  a successful electoral 
strategy. Within the territories incorporated into independent Poland between 1918 
and 1921, the population of Polish ethnic provenance constituted overall nearly 70 
per cent of the citizenry of the state (linguistic 68%; Roman Catholic 65%). The first 
elections in January 1919 demonstrated how significant both endecja and faith were 
in the lives of the majority of ethnic Poles. Endecja, which in the elections was 
represented as the Popular National Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy; ZLN), was 
able to secure a substantial fraction of the seats in parliament (136), the Polish 
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Peasant Party, Wyzwolenie, came second in the parliamentary elections (58 seats), 
whereas the Socialists (30 seats) were only able to gather a fraction of support next 
to parties with nationalist leanings (Kaczmarek, 2010: 79-80). These elections 
evidenced the role organic work played in the construction of the modern Polish 
nation. Preservation of the national character in the era of nationalism proved 
effective in electoral nationalist agitation (Powszechny Spis Narodowy na rok 1931, 
Glowny Urzad Statystyczny).  
In a parliament dominated by the supporters of endecja, the question of 
citizenship continued to divide politicians from the left and the right of the political 
spectrum. The church authorities saw this political election as an opportunity to 
become more involved as active participants in the political life of Poland. The Polish 
Episcopate became supportive of the national right in a response to the Socialist 
disregard towards its role in national reunification. The inability to satisfy the need of 
the Church for gaining the central role in Poland was a miscalculation on the part of 
the PPS. The first population census (1921) proved how scrupulous endecja’s 
calculations were, demonstrating that identification with Poland through Roman 
Catholicism was especially high in the rural areas (Pierwszy Powszechny Spis 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (1921), Województwo Białostockie, Tablica XI, 1927). 
The Episcopate, although given the “leading role”, was unable to create the 
conciliation within the polyethnic and multi-faith society. It would remain equivocal 
about Piłsudski, unofficially supporting endecja. Evidence of this illicit support to the 
national movement can be found in the response to the assassination of the first 
Polish President, Gabriel Narutowicz elected in 1922. Its ambiguous response to the 
assassination fuelled inter-ethnic animosities weakening both the delicate 
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democratic foundations and confidence in the active participation of non-ethnic Poles 
in the political life of the nation. Sharing Piłsudski’s Polish-Lithuanian identity, 
Narutowicz, elected mainly by the Socialists and the “minority vote”, personified the 
polyethnic face of Poland. Piłsudski and Narutowicz were supported by the Kurier 
Pranny (The Morning Courier) newspaper which claimed that both these men were 
“great citizens” dedicated to serving Rzeczpospolita. Robotnik echoed these claims by 
calling Narutowicz “a good Pole” and “an intellectual European” (Kurier Poranny, 
10.12.1922; Robotnik, 10.12.1922). On the other hand, endecja, and the press linked 
to the ZLN claimed that it was impossible to discern the national allegiance of 
Narutowicz, undermining his achievements and calling him Lithuanian or pro-Jewish 
rather than Polish (Gazeta Warszawska, 8.12.1922)  
The Church failed to support the authorities, remaining ambiguous about the 
attack on the democratically elected state authorities. This turned the guardian of 
Polish culture from the period of partitions into a villain of the post-1918 brief period 
of self-governance. The Roman Catholic Church in Poland accepted that during the 
period of partitions it could not rely on support from superiors in the Vatican, leading 
to the development of a level of autonomy from the Pope. This disconnection created 
a supposition of its ability to become the ultimate judge of the political stage, able to 
decide on such matters as the future shape of the Polish nation. This disregard for 
Piłsudski led to the personal involvement of Pope Pius XI, growingly concerned about 
the Church’s close ties with endecja (Pease, 2009:65). 
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5.6 The Decline of  the Federal Programme 
The spatial division of the population in independent Poland exacerbated the 
obstacle which all governments would have to face: the lack of cohesion. The period 
of 123 years without government unfolded the weakness of the polyethnic state 
model. According to the national census, population was clearly divided along ethnic 
lines primarily in the East (kresy) and populations in the border areas could rarely be 
defined as belonging to a particular ethnic group (Eberhardt: 2001:112-114).  
The issue of disparity was addressed early after the state’s inception in the 
“Minorities Treaty” (signed in 1919 with the League of Nations). Requirements for 
additional support for all linguistic and religious minorities became the main theme 
of the act signed in Versailles. The legal ramifications of this treaty became not only 
difficult to implement, but were also considered a “humiliation” for the Polish 
authorities (Michlic, 2006:73). Concern for the wellbeing of populations incorporated 
into the territory of Poland, led to the drafting of the treaty the role of which was to 
provide a legal framework for relations between the state and non-ethnic Poles (over 
30% of population) inhabiting the state’s territory. The document bound “Poland (…) 
to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland 
without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion” (Traktat Miedzy 
Glównemi Mocarstwami Sprzymierzonemi i Stowarzyszonemi A Polską, Article 2, June 
1919).  
The enforced minority status of non-ethnic Poles in Rzeczpospolita, granting 
them the right to preserve their distinct culture and education in the distinctive 
language, became an obstacle to both to endecja and the Socialists. The PPS 
programme remained adamant that a specific law for the minorities was not 
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required, as the recreated political traditions of the Commonwealth would suffice 
(Paruch, 1997:51). The Treaty of Riga and the constitution both signed in March 1921 
outlined the borders of Rzeczpospolita and the equal status of all populations 
incorporated into Poland. The inability to incorporate the territories previously 
integral to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became costly to the model 
proposed by Piłsudski and the PPS. The constitution, which followed the 1919 
minorities act signed in Paris and preceded the Treaty of Riga, became the document 
which officially defined the relationship between the citizens of Poland (Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1921 roku).  
Although the federal concept coupled with cultural autonomy appeared as a 
viable solution towards resolution of the political stalemate, from the early 1920s the 
project dedicated to creation of the “political” nation consisting of all nationalities, 
continued to deteriorate. The ruthless political campaign led by the extreme right 
wing nationalists leading to the assassination of President Narutowicz (1922) was 
only one of the symptoms of the fractioned society. Ineffectiveness in the 
introduction of policies which would allow identification with the Polish state 
became an obstacle in the integration process.  
The early 1920s demonstrated the fragility of both democracy and the 
polyethnic state model. The nation was perceived through the prism of ethnicity. 
Narutowicz, elected for the office required the support of the Socialists and the 
minorities. Although selected by Piłsudski he was, according to the nationalist 
agitators, not the President of the Poles, his Lithuanian background remaining one of 
the central elements of the endecja campaign. Opposition to Narutowicz evidenced 
the cost of the construction of the nation on the ideology shaped by Dmowski and 
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Balicki. Slogans such as “Away with the Jewish President”50 presented a definition of 
Polish people in contrast to that offered by the Socialists.  
Following Piłsudski’s retirement in 1922, the programme of federal Poland 
deteriorated further. The Sejm dominated by the National Democrats did not agree 
with the programme outlined by the former Chief of State. The ethnic groups in the 
kresy were divided in the process between Poland and Bolshevik Russia and 
effectively denied the chance to form their own nation-states. This failure of the 
Socialists also led to Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists, who did not wish to 
conform to the Polish state model, seeking unification and independence with 
Bolshevik rather than Warsaw’s support. Popular dissatisfaction with the 
secessionist sentiment in Ukraine, led to the general boycott of the parliamentary 
elections in 1922. The population threatened by the growing pressure towards 
assimilation with Poland became alienated from the institutions of the state.  This 
situation persisted across the kresy and the authorities were forced to react to the 
dissatisfaction with the proposed state model. The Polish government also realised 
that the fear of “Polonisation” among Lithuanians was the factor influencing their 
politics and so all of the attempts of return to the idea of “Lublin Union” as a uniting 
factor had to be abandoned (Zaremba, 1981:208) 
 
5.6.1 Towards Authoritarianism  
The “May coup” (Przewrot Majowy) of 1926 could not heal the deteriorating socio-
political situation. Its long-term effects were devastating to the fragile state 
                                                          
50 Godziemba Endecja a Zabojstwo Prezydenta Narutowicza http://www.jpilsudski.org/artykuly-ii-
rzeczpospolita-dwudziestolecie-miedzywojnie/polityka-wewnetrzna-i-gospodarcza/item/1730-
endecja-a-zabojstwo-prezydenta-gabriela-narutowicza; 17 May 2012 
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institution. Through an attack on the Polish parliament (Sejm) the Pilsudskiites 
further damaged the deteriorating social trust. The shreds of trust were further 
destroyed by imprisonment of political opponents four years later. The anachronism 
of Piłsudski’s programme was echoed in 1928, when the minorities shifted their 
support towards lists representing their own ethnicity. The programme of regaining 
the trust of the population from across the state proved unsuccessful.   
Furthermore, the lack of decisiveness in actions of the military led to a general 
confusion about the role of the coup. Introduction of an ambiguous programme of 
political and social purification (sanacja) provided a brief moment of hope for 
political stability and reunification of the political elites (Davies, 2005:315). The 
attempted rejuvenation was aimed at regaining social trust and support. The two 
programmes: inter-sea51 (intermarium) and Prometeism (Paruch, 1997:51) 
abandoned by the Sejm, regained prominence.  
The authorities also found that in order to gain the support of the populace in 
the East it had to “force out the Russian elements from the Orthodox Church while at 
the same time resigning from enforcing Polish national imagery” (Paruch, 1997:152). 
Popularisation of the national programme founded upon polyethnic traditions was 
handed to Stanisław Bukowiecki and Tadeusz Hołówko. Their task was the 
revitalisation of the state’s education system and the construction of Poland’s image 
appealing to the entire population. Guaranteeing freedom for all minorities to 
cultivate their own traditions was part of the government’s aim to foster “good 
citizens of the state by not converting Germans or Ukrainians into Poles, or 
Evangelicals and Orthodox into Catholics” (Paruch, 1997:151). For the sanacja 
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 The rejuvenated version of the Commonwealth promoted in the early 1920s by the Pilsudskiites. In post-
1926 Poland this programme was redefined by Józef Beck as the ”Third Europe” programme.  
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movement, the path towards regaining citizens’ trust in the state authorities was 
through creating and propagating a set of moral rules. The parliamentary stalemate 
and the regressing economic situation halted the process of consolidation in Poland. 
Populations from across the state remained disconnected from the central 
government in Warsaw. The rules such as honesty and inter-ethnic cooperation were 
not codified but rather they were an honourable commitment based on traditions 
adopted from the early modern Poland (Paruch, 1997:54-55). According to Piłsudski, 
the Sejm had become a corrupt institution which could no longer represent Polish 
society as its main focus was on their privileges rather than the future of Poland: 
“What I think about the most is the process of thoughts of parliamentarians. What do 
they say about the society? The parliamentarians only speak of the parliament. 
Whether there is two, three, twelve of them, each one of them is the parliament. (…) 
Parliamentarians need money, money, money (…). This is anarchy” (Wywiad 
udzielony przez Józefa Piłsudskiego Bogusławowi Miedzińskiemu 26. 8. 1930) 
It became Piłsudski’s personal mission to recreate a joint Polish-Lithuanian 
state. The strengthening of regional ties would according to Piłsudski strengthen the 
role of Poland in the region. Moreover, the Chief of State, disenchanted with the 
functioning of the parliament applied authoritarianism to expedite functioning of the 
state institutions. Furthermore, after the coup of 1926, Piłsudski began to openly 
criticise the 1921 constitution calling it “chaotic” and “unclear”. In an interview from 
1930, Piłsudski claimed that parliament was unable to act efficiently under such 
constraints. His impatience with the democratic process led to open criticism of the 
parliament and growing pressure on the parliamentarians (Wywiad udzielony przez 
Józefa Piłsudskiego Bogusławowi Miedzińskiemu 26.8.1930).  
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Although until the late 1920s parties of the Polish Left such as Wyzwolenie and 
the PPS were able to accumulate the votes of the national minorities , by 1928 this 
support was transferred to their own ethnic lists (Groth, 1965:656). This shift further 
weakened the Socialists, fortifying the appeal of the nationalists. The national 
minorities were unable to find effective support which would protect their rights in 
the wake of growing domination of the majority. The adoption of assimilation as a 
realistic method for achieving national consolidation led to waves of dissatisfaction in 
Ukraine in the late 1920s. All protests against the continuing absorption of ethnic and 
religious minorities were brutally “pacified” by the Polish military (Bugajski, 
2002:160). Persecution of the Unitate Church, representing the majority of Ukrainian 
population had severe repercussions for the legitimisation of state institutions. 
Furthermore, the authorities in Warsaw never fulfilled their promise to both the 
people and the League of Nations in 1919 to introduce Ukrainian as the official 
language in the region (Prazmowska 2010:104). Józef Beck, the Polish Foreign 
Minister from 1932, openly opposed the constrictions imposed by the League of 
Nations on Poland. 
  
5.6.2 The Resurfacing of Ethnic Nationalism 
Attempts to create civic national identity floundered as Piłsudski was unable to fulfil 
the specific needs of the national minorities such as territorial and cultural autonomy. 
The dissatisfaction of the communities was also linked to the deteriorating economic 
situation. In the kresy the national minorities felt not only cheated after the promises 
of autonomy were not fulfilled, but also underprivileged compared to the ethnic Poles 
(Snyder, 2003:141). They found a voice in the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists 
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(OUN). The OUN opposed any form of participation of Ukrainian peoples in the 
political life of Poland. Participation of Ukrainian parties in the elections of 1928 
became a controversial issue which according to the OUN was a tool for assimilation 
with the Polish ethnic nation. Acts of terror targeting not only Polish officials but also 
Ukrainians willing to accept the overriding Polish political identity led to reprisals by 
the Polish military (2003:143). 
The role of Polish army extended far beyond the military sphere. It was a principal 
instrument for forging social and national unity (Davies, 2005:310) 
In order to stamp out the threat to the Polish statehood, the military became 
involved in a programme of brutal “pacifications”. Attacks by the army on 
organisations such as cultural and religious institutions suspected of collaboration 
with the insurgents only fuelled the pro-independence sentiment (Zaremba, 
1981:166-167; Kulesza, 1985:148). Aggression targeting the Greek-Catholic Church, 
one of the symbols of the Ukrainian identity as an accomplice in the acts of terror, 
isolated the Ukrainian population making the Jagiellon national model obsolete. 
Deterioration of the internal political situation and successive departure from 
parliamentary politics further disconnected ethnic Poles from citizens of other ethnic 
provenance. With Piłsudski moving away from public life, his entrusted colonels 
began to work towards the creation of a strong Poland upon the military code. The 
role of the Sejm continued to weaken through the early 1930s with the authorities 
disregarding  public opinion. The decaying international situation further influenced 
the passing of the April constitution (Konstytucja Kwietniowa) in 1935, which 
significantly strengthened the role of the President, virtually seizing any remnants of 
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Sejm’s role52. The role of the president could not be questioned by the juridical organs 
and his actions would be judged solely by “God and history”, indicating traits echoed 
by sanacja’s moral code.  
The 1935 constitution passed by the authorities labelling it as “Piłsudski’s 
will” deviated from the model of universal Polish nationality. It mirrored political 
trends of authoritarian rule in other European countries. On the basis of the new 
constitution ethnic Poles would play a key role within the state and it was their duty 
to protect Poland from any threats to its stability. Using the deteriorating 
international situation the authorities denied any calls for territorial autonomy. The 
definition of nationality was also undergoing an important change. Far greater power 
in the hands of the president evidenced the centralisation of all institutions, both 
state-wide and regional pulling further away from the original programme proposed 
by the PPS and the 1921 constitution (Paruch, 1997:273; Winnicki, interview, 2012).  
The failure of the polyethnic model strengthened the government’s argument 
that the main focus should remain on ethnic Poles who were the only citizens capable 
of defending Polish statehood in the case of aggression. It also became extremely 
important to ensure that Polish national identity was strengthened as in the future it 
would become crucial for settling strategically important regions for Poland 
(1997:249-251).  
When Piłsudski died in May 1935 a rejuvenated National Democracy, in the 
form of the Organisation of Young Nationalists (Związek Młodych Narodowców; 
ZMN), began to seek cooperation with the Piłsudskiites represented by the Non-
partisan Block of Cooperation with the Government (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z 
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 Kallas, M. Konstytucja kwietniowa (1935) http://edukacja.sejm.gov.pl/historia-sejmu/polskie-
konstytucje/konstytucja-kwietniowa-1935.html 
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Rządem,  BBWR) (Zaremba, 1981:182). The National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-
Radykalny, ONR) which trumped all other fractions of the National Democrats was 
the manifestation of a turn towards fascist trends in mainstream Polish politics. Many 
of the concepts previously alien to Piłsudski’s camp such as anti-Semitism were 
slowly creeping into mainstream politics. The popular distrust towards ethnic 
minorities as un-Polish led to acts of violence which continued to increase through 
the 1930s across Poland. The growing division between the ethnic groups in 
educational institutions was growing and the authorities were either turning a blind 
eye on the deteriorating situation or could no longer preserve the inclusive national 
programme. In addition,  the “Bench Ghettos” (Getta Lawkowe) were introduced 
across higher education institutions in Poland (Krajewski, 2014, Polityka.) 
In 1937 Colonel Adam Koc, President Ignacy Mościcki and Marshall Edward 
Rydz-Śmigły established the Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego; 
OZN) with a rhetoric resembling that of the National Democrats rather than that of 
the Socialists. The OZN radicalised the visions of Dmowski and Balicki. In the late 
1930s Poland was no longer safe for the ethnic minorities. The programme of the 
authorities perceived construction of a homogenous Poland as it was in their interest 
to preserve an independent Poland. Non-ethnic Poles, according to the authorities, 
did not wish to make sacrifices for the Polish nation (Pankowski, 2010:19).  
(…) [T]he right wing of the sanacja movement opted to exploit anti-Jewish sentiment 
as a means of gaining stability and means of greater influence among the various 
parties representing the political right (Michlic, 2006:71)  
 
Waldemar Paruch argues that after 1935 the authorities were plotting a 
political course consisting of three key branches: nationalism, Catholicism and 
totalitarian rule (Paruch, 1997:256). This novel direction excluded people who would 
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not identify themselves as Poles from active political life. The “Polonisation” 
programmes, dedicated to the assimilation of non-ethnic Poles, were embraced by 
the military in regions of strategic importance. The ethnic Poles in the late 1930s 
became the sole owners of the Polish state. With prioritisation of one ethnic group 
over another, further distinctions were inevitable. The influence of Italian and 
German fascism popularised the concepts of national purity and introduced them to 
the political mainstream in Poland. Distinctions between ethnic groups and concern 
for ethnic purity led the OZN to propose creation of ghettos for non-ethnic Poles. The 
proposed ghettos would, according to the nationalists, “guarantee national autonomy 
for minorities and security for Polish nation” (Paruch, 1994:273-274). 
 
5.6.3 The Roman Catholic Church as a Tool of Ethnic Mobilisation 
The term Polak-Katolik53 was coined in the interwar period. Throughout the 1920s, 
the newspapers affiliated with endecja questioned the allegiance of Jewish people to 
independent Poland. Agitation against the Jewish population and the supporters of 
polyethnic Poland remained present in the press and in nationalist rhetoric. Gazeta 
Warszawska saw Jews as the eternal enemies of Christianity while other pro-endecja 
newspapers echoed Dmowski’s arguments against the assimilation of Jewish 
population which apparently did not share the Christian morality and ethics (Gazeta 
Warszawska, 16.11.1922; Kurier Poznanski, 14.11.1922). 
In the 1930s, with the deteriorating economic and international situation, the 
crisis of polyethnic Poland continued to deepen. With the failure of the PPS 
programme for the reconstruction of Poland upon its ethnocultural foundations and 
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129 
 
the republican political traditions derived from Poland-Lithuania the Church 
acquired the central role in  the definition of the Polish nation. This paramount role of 
the Church clashed with the previous declarations and equality of all citizens in 
Poland.   
Furthermore, following the introduction of the 1935 Constitution, the role of 
the Church in the preservation of the nation was officially recognised by the Polish 
authorities. The Roman Catholic press, notably the Maly Dziennik, maintained that it 
was impossible to define a Pole without referring to Roman Catholicism and went as 
far as to argue that without the Church Poland could not survive (Porter-Szucs, 
2011:330). Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution formally granted the Church 
superiority among other state religions (Konstytucja Kwietniowa, 23 April 1935). 
Many religious buildings and other non-Catholic institutions were either destroyed or 
“Polonised” in order limit the role of the “anti-Polish” institutions. The reframing of 
nationality “created a category of Poles of Greek-Catholic, Orthodox and Evangelical 
faith” (Paruch, 1997:253). 
As the old leadership within the sanacja programme began to fade away in the 
early 1930s, the Church regained its political influence which had been held back by 
its close ties with endecja were criticised by the Vatican. This growing influence of the 
role of the Episcopate was simultaneous to the successive weakening of the idea of 
civic state model and  the drifting towards ethnonationalism. The Church was granted 
a significant role in Polish national revival, becoming not only an indicator of 
Polishness but also the key force bonding Poles from across the state (Pease, 
2009:157).  
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 For the OZN, Roman Catholicism would in conjunction with the military code 
create a higher form of morality and effectively a devout patriotism. The Church 
regained its status which led to minimisation of the role of the non-Roman Catholic 
institutions. In the late 1930s Poland did indeed return to certain traditions which it 
had followed in the pre-partition era. In effect, when it became clear that the 
government was unable to influence the population through reforms and attempts to 
create a political nation consisting of all citizens failed, it resorted to Roman 
Catholicism as the symbol of civilisation and ultimate sacrifice. In the eastern parts of 
Poland where religion was identified by the regime as the main threat to the stability 
of the state, the authorities approached this issue in a following manner: “(…) in the 
Polish kresy any government must concern itself with religious questions and support 
the Latin rite as an element of Polishness” (Pease, 2009:157). The process of 
institutionalisation of religion was also important in terms of creating particular 
moral sanctions derived from Roman Catholicism which had an impact on the 
relationship between state religion and religious minorities (Paruch, 1997:253). 
 
5.7 The Second World War and the Aftermath 
The homogenisation of Poland in the years preceding the outbreak of the Second 
World War fractured inter-ethnic relations. The attempts of the OZN to create a 
nation congruent with the state, capable of defending the state from outside invasion, 
proved unsuccessful. Piłsudski’s idea of a federal state vanished in the 1930s leaving 
ethnic-Poles as the Polish nation. Non-ethnic Poles were disconnected from the 
nation building process and in the period leading to the outbreak of the Second 
World War the minorities were perceived as enemies of the state.  
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 Relations with Nazi Germany continued to deteriorate through 1938 and 
1939. The attack launched by the German forces on 1 September 1939 was quickly 
followed by an invasion by the Red Army on 17 September in accordance with the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, making it impossible for the Polish forces to 
simultaneously defend both fronts (Kaczmarek, 2010:380-382). Poland was divided 
between the Soviet and German armies. The German section of Poland was 
incorporated into the Grossdeutches Reich. The murderous policies aiming at 
achieving ethnic purity were put in place and many individuals considered as non-
German were displaced. The programme of Germanisation was implemented 
predominantly in Upper Silesia (Cordell ed.; 2000:105). Polish society underwent a 
process of Aryanisation. In order to achieve this goal, the authorities implemented a 
programme which would segregate the population. The Deutsche Volksliste (German 
National List, DVL) created a racial order which allowed for the creation of a 
homogenous society (2000:108). During this brutal process, hundreds of thousands 
of Poles were murdered, and many more died as a result of destitution and disease. 
 The programme imposed by the invaders was more than a bureaucratic 
machine aiming to determine whether the population was sufficiently “Germanised”. 
It also further distorted the relationship between the communities inhabiting Poland. 
The disappearance of state regulations and introduction of ethnic terror by the Nazis, 
forced the local communities to prioritise their ethnic ties rather than any civic 
patriotism. The aggression and implementation of a system based upon an ethnic 
model, led to destruction of millions of people, primarily Jewish communities from 
across Poland, but also ethnic-Poles, Roma populations and others (Eberhardt: 
2001:122-123).  
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Atrocities against  the Slavic, Jewish, Roma, and other populations committed 
by the German Nazis but also by the local Polish, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian 
populations in various regions of occupied Poland led the politicians from the 
Government-in-Exile and the to consider separation of ethnic populations in East-
Central Europe. To the Polish politicians residing in London, homogenisation 
appeared as one of the key proposals for the post-war reconstruction of Poland 
(Fleming: 2010:26). 
Between 1941 and 1942 (…), removal of the Germans and acquisition of German 
territory dominated thinking. Underpinning these views was the notion that 
minorities such as Belarusians and even Ukrainians within the new Polish state could 
be assimilated and even integrated into the Polish mainstream (Fleming, 2010:25-26)  
 It was already assumed that there would be a need for the ethnic populations 
to “move” to different sections of the post-war political map. The idea of an ethnically 
homogeneous Poland became the dominant political vision and the only concern for 
the exiled Polish Government was related to the difficulties of proceeding with the 
enormous scale of future forced and voluntary population transfers.  
Hopes for the creation of an independent state disappeared with the crushing 
of the Warsaw Uprising in October 1944. For his part, Joseph Stalin’s aim was to 
connect the various Polish leftist organisations operating in the territory of occupied 
Poland and within the USSR. The creation of the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego; PKWN) aimed to remove all 
opposition which would not become subordinate to Stalin’s plan; for example the 
National Army (AK) (Kaczmarek, 2010: 481:482). The PKWN was also responsible for 
the creation of the act of inception of “new Poland” (Manifest PKWN, 1943) which 
rejected the 1935 constitution and accepted the 1921 legislation approving the 
democratic future of political organisation and in effect the future Poland. The PKWN 
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became the executive power and the State’s National Council (Polski Komitet 
Wyzwolenia Narodowego; KRN) became the legislative branch. These new regulations 
under the auspices of the Soviet Union became known as Lublin Poland (Polska 
lubelska) in reference to the city where the new government would reside until 
independence.  
 By the time the war ended in May 1945, up to seven million of Poland’s pre-
war population had been killed. The impact of the mass purges of the Jewish 
population, Slavic, Roma, and other ethnicities, destroyed the connections between 
these groups which had been established during the interwar period and prior to the 
creation of Poland in 1918. The new authorities used the destruction of the Polish 
nation to support their own aims of creating a new state on the basis of ethnic 
difference (Eberhardt: 2001:135-136). 
 The final destruction of the patchwork of ethnic communities in East-Central 
Europe during the Second World War undermined one of the fundamental elements 
of Poland’s continuity. One of the ethnic cores which remained central to 
reconstruction of Poland in 1918 was its polyethnic character defining the realm until 
the eighteenth-century partitions. Despite the interethnic animosities which became 
evident after the independence in 1918, the Polish authorities continued to refer to 
historical processes such as the distinctive ethnocultural traditions and myths which 
shaped the contemporary state. The longue duree’ remained evident in the 
functioning of the interwar Poland. Various ethnic and national groups which found 
themselves within the borders of Poland, frequently against their will, were 
growingly disenchanted with Warsaw’s aggressive assimilationist programmes. The 
conflicting national programmes of endecja and the Socialists allowed, similarly to the 
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nineteenth-century organisations, ethnic self-renewal. Anthony D. Smith defines 
some of the key mechanisms of such rejuvenation which were observed in the 
interwar Poland (Smith, 1991:35). Firstly, the Church underwent the reform and it 
was forced to adapt to its new role in independent Poland. Competition with other 
religions for central role in the state led to multiple conflicts with the Socialists and 
the Vatican City (Hutchinson, 2005: 144; Pease, 2009). Secondly, the mass population 
was elevated to form a body of citizens. The introduction of universal suffrage 
allowed for popular participation in the democratic process.  Finally, myths of ethnic 
election, outlined by Smith as one of the key aspects of ethnic self-renewal, became 
central to the entire ethnic group rather than only the upper strata (Smith, 1991:34).   
 The Second World War put an end to polyethnic Poland. This political 
tradition which remained one of the foundations of early modern Poland did not 
survive the conflict which drew clear lines between ethnic groups in East-Central 
Europe. The atrocities committed during the Second World War influenced drafting 
of a new Poland in borders dissimilar to its predecessors.54 Furthermore, the ethnic 
structure of Poland would change after the war with many ethnic Poles forcefully 
moved from the territories incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1945 into 
remodelled Poland. Similarly, other ethnic groups, especially Germans, who lived in 
post-Yalta Poland, were affected by these revisions (Eberhart, 2001:139).  
 These extensive changes which involved mass expulsions and reconfiguration 
of Poland required support from the pro-Soviet Polish political leadership which 
would create a narrative for such extensive change. With the return to the “original” 
pre-modern borders of Poland, the nation, defined through the prism of ethnicity 
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 During the Yalta Conference in February 1945 it was decided that Poland’s territory would be 
reconfigured. It lost 179,300 sq km of the eastern territory, gained 1002, 700 sq km of eastern Germany 
(Eberhart, 2003:137-138) 
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rather than territory, was becoming officially the most common interpretation of the 
population and territorial shifts. The rhetoric of endecja and the authoritarianism of 
the 1930s remained among the elements bridging the interwar with the Communist 
Poland.  
 
5.8 The Construction of “Piast” Poland 
Poland formally reappeared on the map of East-Central Europe in the summer of 
1945 after it was decided by the Allies in Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-
August 1945) that a significant westward shift and substantial population 
adjustments (Map III) were required in order to accommodate Soviet expansionism. 
These alterations were at the expense of Wilno and Lwów, two of the main centres of 
Polish culture,  which were incorporated into the newly created Lithuanian SSR and 
Ukrainian SSR. Loss of the territories known as kresy was “compensated” by moving 
Poland’s borders into territories that either had had no links with Poland since the 
Middle Ages (Western territories) or had no past relations with Poland (former 
Eastern Prussia) (Davies, 2001:88-90). 
With the front shifting westwards through the late 1944 the PKWN 
established its headquarters in Lublin. In early 1945 PKWN, with Soviet support, was 
granted a status of provisional Government called the  Temporary Council of National 
Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, TRJN) opening a power struggle 
between the authorities  supported by the majority of the Polish population (the 
Government-in-Exile in London) and the Temporary Council of National Unity with 
the Soviet Union as its guarantor (Wolff-Powęska, 1993:49-50). 
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The Polish Worker’s Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza; PPR) abandoned the 
search for reconciliation of various nationalities and religions. Instead the Party 
leadership focused on identity in ethnic rather than civic terms as the path for the 
future national construction in Poland (Fleming, 2010:16). In order to build 
compliance among the majority of the population incorporated into post-1945 
Poland, the authorities used the language which resembled political traditions of the 
National Democratic movement rather than that of the Socialist party. 
Homogenisation of the Polish population was identified as essential to securing of the 
shifted borders. 
 
5.8.1 Mimicking Endecja’s National Programme  
Nations, it is argued, are not enduring, homogeneous, substantial communities with 
fixed traits and essential needs, but simply practical categories imposed by states 
intent on classifying and designating large numbers of their populations in suitable 
ways, as was attempted and to some extent realized in early Soviet nationalities 
policies (Smith, 2008:24). 
It was already presumed by the Soviet sponsored “Lublin government” and by 
the leadership in London as early as 1943, that the most effective way to ensure 
stability of national borders in East-Central Europe was through the creation of an 
ethnically homogenous Poland (Cordell, 2000:78). In a drive to build a Communist 
Poland the authorities appropriated elements of the ethnocultural tradition collected 
at the turn of the twentieth century while at the same time the Soviet sponsored 
regime according to Smith “miss[ed] out entirely on the understandings, sentiments 
and commitments of large numbers of people” (Smith, 2008:24).  
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Nationalist circles also envisioned an ethnic nation conterminous the state 
borders as early as 1943. This plan would be achieved through expulsions of the 
population, identified as German from the post-war territory of Poland. Other ethnic 
groups residing within Poland, such as Ukrainians and Belarusians were largely 
expelled with a small minority integrated and eventually absorbed into Polish society 
(Fleming, 2010:25-26; Wójcik, 2002:31).   
 Through the process of utilisation of the National Democratic programme the 
authorities were also aiming to legitimise the rearranged national borders. The TRJN 
was informed after the conference in Yalta (February 1943) that Poland would 
sustain substantial territorial losses in the East. In return, Stalin pledged to support 
claims for shifting Polish borders westwards at the expense of Germany. 
Confirmation of this substantial alteration of Polish territory required acceptance 
among the population. This issue was resolved though redefinition of Polish national 
identity through the prism of the pre-modern Polish history. Through a return to the 
Poland of the medieval Piast royal family and its territory it was possible to address 
the issue of the westward shift. The rhetoric of the “return” to the ancient Polish 
lands became linked to a return to the traditional Polish national identity based upon 
ethnicity. The anti-German propaganda compared Germans to the Teutonic Knights 
identified as the eternal enemies of the Polish statehood. Furthermore, posters 
released by the Department of Education and Upbringing (Wydzial Polityczno-
Wychowawczy) was responsible for “reclaiming” the ancient Poland from Germany 
with phrases such as “Kolberg must be Kolobrzeg” or “We haven’t been here since 
yesterday, we used to reach far west” (Jaworski, Strembski, Plakaty propagandowe z 
lat 1945-1989, 2007).  
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The authorities were also able to recognise the role of the organisations 
dedicated to the incorporation of the alleged Piast territories in interwar Poland. The 
Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni; IZ) in Poznań promoting “western” thought, 
linked the interwar period with the National Democratic movement and became the 
dominant anthropological force behind the process of legitimisation of the post-
Potsdam status quo. Work of historians, geographers, archaeologists and linguists 
who researched issues relating to western borders and ethnic groups inhabiting 
these territories played a key role in the legitimisation of Poland’s westward shift 
(Tomczak, 1993:162). Between 1944 and 1945 the Polish Western Committee (Polski 
Związek Zachodni, PZZ) and from 1945 the Western Institute pledged their loyalty to 
the authorities and Poland within its proposed borders (Tomczak, 1993:167-168). 
The institute became an important tool in homogenisation of the communities after 
the westward shift. It also allowed reframing the definition of the Polish nation. 
Centuries of cultural borrowing which shaped the society and cultural traditions 
were denied.  
Through careful selection of various aspects of Polish ethnic past, the 
Communist authorities embarked on a mission to legitimise the “historical justice” 
and the return to the frontiers of Polish civilisation (Pankowski, 2010:46). In this 
period organisations such as the Western Institute in Poznań, assumed the role of 
supporting the westward border shift. Through research of folk traditions and the  
primordial past of the western territories, academics from various disciplines 
continued their work for reunification with the so-called “traditional” Polish lands. 
The institute’s examination would provide evidence for the reunification with 
“historic” Polish regions. The Western Institute’s role was to demonstrate that the 
Second World only accelerated the process of reunification of “recovered territories” 
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with Poland (Dmochowska, 1993:230). In order to further support primordial links 
with these territories, the authorities formed the Commission for the Determination 
of the Names of Places and Physiological Objects (Komisja Ustalania Nazw 
Miejscowości i Obiektów Fizjograficznych) (Fleming, 2010:68). 
 
5.8.2 The Construction of a Homogenous Poland 
The establishment of the post-war Poland should also be approached in context of 
integration of populations from divergent regions. Expulsions of populations prior to 
and post the arbitrary verification process forced millions of people from their 
homes. Over 2 million Poles were sent to Siberia and another 2.2 million Poles 
resettled by Nazi Germany returned to Poland by 1948 making the integration 
process more difficult for both the authorities, local populations and “expellees” 
arriving from pre-war territories of Poland between 1944 and 1949 (Ther, 1996:780-
781).  
 One of the directives of the temporary (Rzad Lubelski) authorities was to 
launch the process of expulsions of populations identified as unfit for remaining on 
the future territory of Poland. Establishing the State Repatriation Office (Państwowy 
Urząd Repatriacyjny; PUR) in October 1944 allowed immediate expulsions of 
populations recognised as non-ethnic Poles. Although these population shifts were 
labelled as “voluntary transfers”, the inhumane conditions experienced by all ethnic 
groups were brutal and demeaning (Fleming, 2010:31). Some of the camps and 
prisons operating under German authorities were after the war utilised by the PKWN 
and the TRJN for detention, verification and rehabilitation purposes (Fleming, 
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2010:34). Following the agreement of September 1944, resettlements, expulsions 
and repatriations involved nearly 1.5 million people (Kaczmarek, 2010:553).  
 Agreements regarding population transfers between Poland, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Lithuania were signed in September 1944 and they were put in motion the 
following month. What was referred to by the authorities as “voluntary transfers” of 
Polish people into “new Poland” and other ethnic groups into their designated 
territories, was in fact the first wave of expulsions which would involve millions of 
people and continue until the late 1940s (Ther, 1996: 790). Although expulsions led 
by PUR were scheduled to end by February 1945, it became clear that verification 
and transfers required additional time, extending the duration of expulsions in 
Eastern Poland until mid-1946 (2010:34). Due to the continuing conflict between 
Polish and Ukrainian populations it was in the interest of the PKWN to expel all 
remaining Ukrainians into the territories controlled by the Soviet Union in order to 
avoid further ethnic persecutions (Prażmowska, 2010:164; Ther, 1996:785).  
 In Western Poland prior to the Potsdam conference (July-August 1945) PUR 
was operating without any official state-wide guidelines. The field authorities were 
frequently responsible for creating the “law of the land” in their own locality. Many 
German people who did not escape when the Soviet front moved westwards had no 
one left to protect them. Immediately after the Red Army pushed German forces 
westwards many people were resettled without any prior verification (Kulczycki, 
2001:212; Kacprzak, 2011:150), people recognised as Germans who failed to escape 
in time were treated as second class citizens. Although some local populations of 
Mazuria, Pomerania or Silesia were able to persevere through the acts of banditry, 
they were frequently unable to protect their property from the untamed expulsions 
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led by the field administration (Kaczmarek, 2010:555; Roszkowski: 2009:158). 
Formally, guidelines for regional verification of local populations were not released 
by the Provisional Government until April 1946 (Kacprzak, 2011: 150). 
 In 1944 and 1945 all cultural elements linked with Germany resulted in 
verification of a population as German. In some areas, field administrations 
frequently unfamiliar with local circumstances, took the initiative in separating the 
German from the Polish populations (Kacprzak, 2011:153). Controversially and only 
for brief period, white armbands with the letter “N”   would indicate people verified 
as Germans and hence unfit to remain on the Polish territory (Madajczyk, 1998:66-
72). Such propositions exemplified the wider social attitude and the demand for 
revenge on “traitors” and Germans for the crimes committed during the Second 
World War (Prażmowska, 2010:172). The authorities “provided a safe target on 
which the population could vent frustration and anger” (Fleming, 2010:83). 
 Arbitrary treatment of non-ethnic Poles frequently resulted from a conflict 
between the local population (ludność rodzima) and ethnic Poles resettled from kresy 
(ludność napływowa). Many encounters were a result of disputes over the land owned 
by the local populations and inefficient verification effecting forcible detention of 
people who were in fact eligible for ‘rehabilitation’ (Madajczyk, 1998:72; Ther, 
1996:800). People recognised as German nationals were put into prisons and camps 
where they would either await expulsion or ‘rehabilitation’ (Kulczycki, 2001:213; 
Madajczyk, 1998:67).  
 Although in August 1944 all German nationals were stripped of Polish 
citizenship by the State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa; KRN) this 
legislation was not passed by the TRJN until September 1946 (Madajczyk, 1998:70). 
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The TRJN adopted the German Peoples List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL) established by 
the National Socialists during the Second World War for the purpose of ethnic 
identification and which from 1944 was used in order to verify whether population 
was from the ‘recovered territories’ and thus eligible for ‘rehabilitation’. This process 
involved individuals in the ‘recovered territories’ who before the war were in fact 
Polish citizens, however, during the war were included in one of the categories of the 
DVL. Approach to the DVL evolved with time and although in the early stages of 
verification only people from categories 3 and 4 were successful with group 1 and 2 
designated for expulsion, by 1947 people from group 2 were also allowed to reclaim 
their Polish citizenship (Linek and Born, 2000:138). In order to retrieve their Polish 
nationality all people whose names were found on the DVL (groups 2,3 and 4) were 
required to fill out a declaration stating that they were forcefully registered on the 
German national list which was followed by affirmation of loyalty to “democratic” 
Poland .    
There were also official guidelines for ‘rehabilitation’ and resettlements set by 
the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) in May 1945. MAP divided German 
population into separate categories based on their position on the DVL and their 
future usefulness in the process of reconstruction of the Polish state. The process of 
verification was biased as it did not target populations who migrated from the 
territories of pre-September 1939 Poland. Populations inhabiting the “recovered 
territories” who were German or Mazurians, Silesians, and Kashubes whose identity 
was shaped by various historical circumstances were presumed traitors (Kulczycki, 
2001:213-214; Madajczyk, 1998:66). Individuals who were allowed to remain were 
treated through the prism of the newly adopted communist jargon as 
either ”volksdeutsch”  or “autochthon”  and were used as forced labour isolated from 
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the rest of the Polish society. Piotr Madajczyk (1998) argues that the construction of 
the modern national identity disconnected populations which in the interwar period 
defined their ethnic background as Polish. The Warmian population, which identified 
with Poland through Roman Catholicism and Polish culture, created their own 
enclaves where they spoke German and in the course of time choose to leave for 
Germany. Among other local populations inhabiting the pre-war borderlands who did 
not wish to identify with Poland were the Mazurians and Silesians (Madajczyk, 1998: 
73-75).  
 
5.8.3 Integration through Adoption of Nationalist Rhetoric  
The Polish government assumed that if everybody living in post-war Poland and its 
western territories was a Pole, all problems would be solvable (Ther, 1996:797). 
 
 The Communist authorities preferred ethnic nationalism as the tool for 
building a strong Polish society. The ethnic Poles from across the pre-war state 
arriving into the western territories had priority access to all goods and benefits. The 
Communist authorities saw minorities as backward treating them as second class 
citizens (Ther, 1996: 797-798; Madajczyk, 1998:82). Referring to newly the acquired 
territory of Poland it remained the priority of Władysław Gomułka to remove all 
“Germans” from the territory of Poland while avoiding any losses on Polish side 
(Kulczycki, 2001:206).  
The process of homogenisation of the Polish population was achieved by the 
Communist authorities through taking advantage of the advancing social 
disintegration resulting from the exhaustion of the population after the war. The 
authorities were eager to highlight the “We/They” dichotomy using the extant 
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distrust of the “expellees” towards the local populations inhabiting ‘Recovered 
Territories’. Through application of the “We/They” division the authorities were able 
to redefine who was a Pole. Through policies prohibiting the use of the German 
language in public and forceful change of names, the authorities were dedicated to 
creating a uniform Polish society (Kulczycki, 2001:215).  
Those who supported this [PPR’s] programme and were of the right background 
were the “We”; those who opposed it and were of the wrong background the “They”. 
(…) The PPR sought to manage social anger in the immediate postwar period through 
the configuring of a We/They opposition which attempted to disconnect social 
tensions arising from a changing economic and political system (Fleming, 2010:67)    
 
 When in 1948 Władysław Gomułka lost the leadership of the PZPR, the Central 
Committee altered its attitude to the nationalist terms shaping the post-war Polish 
national identity. Although advancing Stalinisation was effecting the destruction of 
the middle classes, trade and regionalism (Madajczyk, 1998:82) the authorities began 
to acknowledge that the issue of populations refusing to assimilate into the Polish 
society needed addressing. This led to verification of the non-integrated local 
populations along class rather than national provisions (Kacprzak, 2011:158). There 
were two main angles which led to this alteration. Firstly, there were economic 
factors related to fears that further loss of specialists from strategic industries (i.e. 
mining) caused by expulsions and emigration to Germany would slow down 
production or even bring it to a standstill. Secondly, there was the inability of the 
authorities to integrate local populations, through prioritisation of an ethnically 
Polish workforce, resulting in further departures from Poland (Madajczyk, 1998:83). 
Inability to promote integration led to subsequent departures of local populations 
from the “recovered territories” in Poland over the course of the following years 
(Ther, 1996:796-797). Maltreatment in the form of public humiliations, verbal abuse 
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and acts of aggression created an environment in which many non-ethnic Poles 
considered migration (Madajczyk, 1998:80-83; Fleming 2010:71-73).  
Resettlement of thousands of Polish Jews from the Soviet Union between 1945 
and 1948 led to waves of dissatisfaction among ethnic Poles and reluctance to accept 
varying definitions of Polishness (Madajczyk, 1998:86). People of Jewish ethnic 
background who received posts within the structures of the post-war authorities 
were portrayed within mainstream Polish society as foreign agents, planted in 
Warsaw by the alien regime (Olejnik, 2003:9-10). Many other Jewish people 
returning to their pre-war homes found local industries and housing already adopted 
by the Polish “expellees” from Eastern Poland and the Western Soviet Union. These 
circumstances led to hostilities between the locals and the newcomers. According to 
official declarations, the authorities were aiming to integrate people of Jewish ethnic 
background with the rest of the Polish society through eradication of the pre-war 
stereotypes of linking Jews with the capitalist bourgeoisie (Olejnik, 2003:9; 
Kaczmarek, 2010:86). 
 Attempts to assimilate the Jewish population within the state through 
minimising support from the Western Jewish organisations and further state 
suppression of all Poland-based Jewish cultural organisations and Jewish media by 
the late 1940s led to the disillusionment of Jews with the Polish state. It became clear 
that despite the PPR’s official declarations, the authorities were set to homogenise all 
sections of  society. It is difficult to give the accurate number of Poles of Jewish 
ethnicity who left for the West and to Palestine before 1950 but it was estimated at 
140-200 thousand people (Kaczmarek, 2010:558). The effect of ethno-nationalist 
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policies in the immediate post-war era led to weakening of any possibility of social 
conciliation and integration.  
 
5.8.4 The Revised National Programme 
By the end of 1949, expulsions from territories with mixed populations had ceased. In 
regions where minorities constituted a significant percentage of the population, the 
Central Committee (KC) with the MZO ensured that through resettlements of ethnic 
Poles into these regions, they would become “Polish in character” (Eisler, 2003:161). 
When the process of homogenisation was completed in 1949, nationalism left the 
centre stage and the subjection of the entire population to the Stalinist regime 
became of primary importance, the shared aim of the nation was parallel with that of 
the proletariat rather than of any particular ethnic group (Łepkowski, 1983:16-17).  
  
“The shift in the ethnic structure of Poland had many consequences. Until 1945, 
Pomerania, Lower Silesia, Lubusza, and most East Prussia had a predominantly 
German character. Following the virtually complete exchange of population these 
areas became ethnically Polish” (Eberhart, 2001:141). 
 
Expulsions of the non-ethnic Poles which lasted until 1950 produced a radical 
configuration of Poland’s ethnic mix. According to the 1950 census, more than 97 per 
cent of people inhabiting Poland were Polish (GUS, Narodowy spis powszechny z dnia 
3 grudnia 1950 r, 1952). According to Piotr Eberhart (2001), the data provided by the 
1950 census is not straightforward and it is difficult to determine the exact number 
of non-ethnic Poles inhabiting the country. Yet it is clear that the expulsions and 
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resettlements lasting until 1950 left Poland markedly more homogenous (Eberhart, 
2001:141).  
It was in the interest of the PZPR to integrate the remaining non-Polish 
inhabitants by allowing those of uncertain national provenance who were willing to 
remain in Poland to apply for citizenship. Although in some regions the authorities 
were stricter with regard to national verification, by 20. July 1950 the Sejm had 
passed legislation which would stop any further persecution of people who during 
the war had chosen German nationality or belonged to a group “privileged” under 
occupation (Dz.U.1950 Nr 29 poz. 270). Through amnesty, people who previously 
failed the rehabilitation or verification process were relieved from any further 
appeals and were given the same rights as the rest of society (Kaczmarek, 2010:557). 
Such concessions became acceptable to the Communist authorities only because the 
social structure of the state had been entirely altered. While ethnic Poles constituted 
65.7 per cent (23.2 million) of the state’s population in 1939 by 1950 this percentage 
had increased dramatically to 97.8 per cent (24.4 million). The number of Ukrainians, 
the second largest minority in 1939 was reduced from 15.7 percent to 0.7 per cent, 
while the Jewish population from 9.3 per cent had gone down to 0.2 per cent by 1950 
(Bugajski, 1994:362; Eberhardt, 2001:142). 
Our class programme, programme of proletariat ideology is now interwoven with the 
basic interests of the nation, with the very essence of its independence (…) (Bierut, 
1952:125) 
 
In his 1952 speech from the VII Plenum of the Central Committee (Komitet 
Centralny; KC) of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) entitled “Towards the 
Strengthening of Unity between Urban and Rural Areas in the Contemporary Period 
of Socialist State Construction” (O Umocnienie Spójni Między Miastem i Wsią W 
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Obecnym Okresie Budownictwa Socjalistycznego), Boleslaw Bierut, argued that the 
role of the authorities was to construct a strong nation through unification of all 
national forces. He also calls for “further homogenisation” of  the Polish economy and 
a culture which would effectively lead to resurfacing of the “hidden potential” (Bierut, 
1952:27-28). 
(…) white and red flags, national and Piast belonging interwoven with anti-German 
propaganda, Mazurek Dąbrowskiego (…), Rota, all these aspects were aiming to 
underline revolution in national rather than class terms (Łepkowski, 1983:11)  
  
 The process of Stalinisation of the Polish state took different shapes and 
forms. The main aim was to nationalise those remaining groups which continually 
refused to assimilate with the Polish society. In the early 1950s when the authorities 
saw  Poland as a homogenous state with its entire population regarded as citizens, 
Poland entered the next phase of nationalisation where all of the inhabitants were 
subject to invigilation and structural rather than subjective violence as was the case 
in the 1940s (Fleming, 2010:76). The national and ethnic traditions relating to both 
secular and Roman Catholic celebrations were replaced with Marxist-Leninist 
rhetoric demanding dedication to development of the state devastated during the 
war. 
 
5.9 Kultura as the Medium for Reconciliation   
Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 led to a transformation in the leadership of both the 
Soviet Union and its satellite states. Its impact was not visible within the Soviet 
Union, however, until the speech by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 at the XX Party 
Congress in the Soviet Union where he criticized the policies of the former leader. In 
149 
 
Poland, the wave of destalinization began in 1955 with changes within the party 
structures. The disenchantment initiated a dialogue and even some criticism of the 
PZPR. The Polish people were able to vent some of the frustration which had built up 
through Stalinism. Political magazines such as Nowa Kultura (New Culture) and Po 
prostu(Frankly) allowed intellectuals to launch a debate on the expulsions and 
contemporary persecutions of the Communist authorities. Some intellectuals were 
able to find paths around censorship and even to discuss such issues as the anti-
Soviet uprising in Hungary in 1956 (Brzezinski, 1967:274; Kaczmarek, 2010:616). 
The symptoms of de-Stalinization led to a periodical dialogue between the new 
generation of communist revisionists and the PZPR’s ideological journal Nowe Drogi 
which featured discussion on the future of the nation (Prazmowska, 2010:182-183). 
The transition at the highest level of state hierarchy had the impact of reviving the 
discussion surrounding the future of Poland. Although the authorities agreed on a 
change of course, the Soviet experience remained crucial for the future development 
of Poland (Brzezinski, 1967:245).   
 Lively debates on the future direction of Polish society also began to emerge 
abroad among the exile communities. Unlike Wiadomosci (News) representing the 
national programme of the Polish émigré societies in London, Kultura, established in 
Paris, refused to sentimentalise the past. It remained open to various solutions 
attempting to connect the ideas of the pre-war PPS and endecja in order to create a 
framework for the future liberal-democratic state (Hofman: 2007: 76).  
Kultura embodied an attempt to recreate the democratic Poland and also to revive 
the debate on the relationship between state and nation that had been present in 
interwar Poland. It became the symbol of revisionism. The magazine initiated 
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dialogue with Poland’s neighbours, especially concerning the future relationship with 
the German Federal Republic (FRG) (Hofman, 2007:78). Kultura also became 
involved in rebuilding a Polish nation upon past traditions. However it did not simply 
copy the federal idea promoted by Piłsudski but rather modified the understanding of 
the national question in the kresy. Juliusz Mieroszewski was given a responsibility of 
drafting and shaping Kultura’s programme for future political relations with 
Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. It was a significant step to promote conciliation and 
partnership with states which until 1939 had formed an integral part of Poland 
(Kowalczyk, 2000; Snyder, 2003: 221-223). 
 
5.9.1 Realism and Romanticism in the Programme of Kultura 
Juliusz Mieroszewski synthesizing the interwar models of Poland and the visions for 
the Polish nation assumed that: “A Poland which would be strong and important in 
Europe must be a polyethnic organism; this conclusion is derived from the specific 
political geography of Eastern Europe” (Hofman, 2007:124). Kultura sought to build 
the ideological ties with interwar Poland. Preservation of the continuity of national 
traditions targeted for eradication under the Communist regime was not only crucial 
in the reconstruction of democratic Poland but also essential in the shaping of a 
modern society.  
The editors were close to the vision of the Jagiellon or polyethnic Poland 
which would become strong through building bonds with other East-Central 
European nations. Kultura saw Poland as the future ambassador of nations 
crystallised in the regions formerly integral to Poland. However, unlike Piłsudski, 
Mieroszewski and Giedroyc believed that it was necessary to cooperate with 
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Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine through “abandoning territorial ambitions and 
civilizational claims” (Snyder, 2003:223) as preached by the Piłsudskiites in post-
1918 Poland. 
Kultura synthesized the federalist tradition of Piłsudski and the nationalist tradition 
of Dmowski, presenting a realistic programme for a future in which the nations of 
Communist Eastern Europe would enter the contemporary international system as 
states (2003:225) 
 
 Kultura disagreed with revanchist demands with regard to kresy issued by the  
Government-in-Exile in London, as it continued to claim that any such declarations 
would have a detrimental impact on relations with Germany and the legitimacy of the 
border on the Oder-Neisse Rivers (Mieroszewski, Kultura, 1955; Mackiewicz, Kultura, 
1956). Kultura played a crucial role in changing the perception of Polish people in 
Germany. Through attempts to start a dialogue on the expulsion process, the 
intention of Kultura was to learn to remember and to forgive (Mieroszewski, Kultura, 
1955). 
Kultura continued to represent Poland in the international arena through the 
1970s and 1980s publicising some of the key events and promoting democratic 
movements within the state. It was also influential in continuing the dialogue with 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In the 1980s it was supportive of German 
unification and under the precept “To not forget, to think through, to forgive” 
continued discussions on reconciliation between both populations which required 
forgiveness on both sides (Ursyn, Kultura, 1985).  
From the early 1950s both Kultura in Paris and Radio Free Europe (Radio 
Wolna Europa; RWE) were involved in influencing both the intellectuals and the 
masses. Their role was to inform and give the Polish people a connection with the 
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world outside the Communist bloc (Hofman, 2007:79). Kultura was open to 
discussions with groups inside and outside of Poland. Émigré organisations based in 
London were unwilling to create a link with organisations from within Poland as they 
continued to promote a conservative set of values relating only with the previous 
eras and did not discuss contemporary Polish society. The Paris based émigrés, on the 
other hand, found that only though connecting the divided social groups in Poland 
could the nation make a change. To authors of Kultura the change had to come from 
within Poland rather than outside (Tyrchan, 2011:50-51). The RWE alongside 
Kultura became a medium of communication between the Polish émigrés and the 
Polish population in Poland. The informative role of the organisation was an 
instrument of combat against the Communist indoctrination (Giedroyc, Grudzinski, 
Kultura, 1978).  
 Kultura not only sparked off a debate regarding the most recent Polish history 
but also became central in initiating the debate on society and its future development. 
The magazine played a central role in initiating dialogue between the working classes 
and the intellectuals separated by the Communist authorities. After 1956, the 
magazine, apart from its role in representing Poland on the international arena, 
focused on developing a greater social understanding of the events which were 
taking place in Poland. It became the main role of Giedoryc and his colleagues to find 
means of informing the population of their aims and to create common aims which 
would allow the development of collective demands in the future (Tyrchan, 2011:53-
54).  
The magazine was not only influential with regard to developing the system 
but it created a plan which saw “Commonwealth as the basis for an alliance of 
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modern nation states” (Snyder, 2003:229). Kultura also identified the Roman Catholic 
Church as a possible ally rather than a prop of the Polish right arguing that it was 
necessary to utilise the Church in order to achieve national reconciliation (Zespół 
Problemowy Polskiego Porozumienia Niepodległościowego, Kultura 1977). 
 
5.10 Heterogeneous Poland and the Church  
 
Under communism the Catholic Church held a quasi-monopoly over the production 
and reproduction of national identity and could control the mobilizing discourse of 
the nation (Zubrzycki, 2001:631-632) 
The Church went through a period of transition in the Communist Poland. Between 
1945 and 1947 it played a central role in the programme of the provisional 
authorities and was granted the task of constructing links with the territories 
acquired after the war. However, immediately after the Potsdam conference it was 
utilised as a tool of national verification, allowing the authorities to assess whether 
populations assumed by Poland were of Polish ethnicity. 
Catholicism was understood by many within the PPR as being part of Polishness. 
Indeed, even the traditional anti-clerical ethos of the PSL was muted, as PSL leader 
Stanisław Mikołajczyk also recognised the crucial role that the symbolic and cultural 
Catholicism could have (Fleming, 2010:102) 
 
 All measures designed to homogenise the Polish population were launched in 
order to achieve the highest possible degree of control over society. In the period 
following the establishment of the provisional government up until 1947, the 
authorities were adamant that legitimisation of the authorities and strengthening of 
the security apparatus was of greater significance than establishing Stalinist ideology 
and propaganda and would in the long term allow greater degree of control within 
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Poland (Łepkowski, 1983-13-14). The expulsion of the German population following 
the westward border shift gave way for the Polish Roman Catholic clergy.  The 
claiming of sacral buildings previously in the hands of the German Catholics and 
German Evangelical Protestants was treated as evidence of the Polish character of the 
incorporated territories. Prior to the drastic worsening of the relationship between 
the Roman Catholic Church and the authorities after 1947, it was noted that the years 
1945 and 1946 “witnessed astounding religious revival that was supported in various 
ways by the state (…)” (Fleming, 2010:105-106).  
 When the PZPR became the dominant force in the Sejm in 1948 the role of 
Roman Catholic Church became obsolete and even threatening. When primordial 
links with “Piast” Poland were established, suddenly the Church became a threat to 
People’s Democracy. The authorities found it necessary to regulate the Church, 
reduce its role within the communist state and to manage its relations with the 
Vatican. Shifting from a relationship based on mutual benefit, the authorities lost all 
interest in future cooperation with the Polish Episcopate (Fleming, 2010:109; 
Kaczmarek, 2010:653). 
 Through attempts to minimise role of the Roman Catholic Church in the life of 
Polish society, the authorities unwittingly created a firm opposition to the regime’s 
legitimacy. Through concealed attacks aimed at the religious institutions and the 
clergy, the authorities undermined some of their gains achieved with the support of 
the Church. Prior to the parliamentary elections of 1947, the Roman Catholic Church 
moved toward opposition. In the following years the relationship soured further as 
the Holy See issued a decree which opposed the Communist programme (Mazgaj, 
2010:31). Through the following decades it would remain defiant in its protection of 
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Polish national identity, combating communist attempts to redefine Polishness. For 
its unwillingness to conform to the Communist authorities the Episcopate would face 
punishments such as the internment of nearly one thousand clerics in the period 
between 1952 and 1954. The authorities feared that the Church was capable of 
persuading the population of alternatives to the PZPR. Legislation discussing 
religious education in primary and secondary schools, passed in February 1953, 
aimed to create a degree of control over the influence of the Church on young citizens 
(Mazgaj, 2010:49-51).  
The authorities undertook other methods of regulation such as additional 
taxation and confiscation of non-sacral buildings (Eisler, 1991:117). Among other 
initiatives, the authorities supported a revival of the pre-war fascist organisation 
Falanga as a pseudo-religious state-supported “PAX” Association. Both were chaired 
by Boleslaw Piasecki, who represented a mixture of “nationalist, Catholic and socialist 
rhetoric” (Pankowski, 2010:38). Piasecki, together with the PZPR, waged campaigns 
against the insubordinate Episcopate and its role in inciting sentiments other than 
those of Polish ethno-nationalism. Revival of this pseudo-religious organisation 
evidenced the campaign of the PZPR against the Holy See and the preservation of the 
tradition of pluralism in Poland (Dworzecka, 1970: 167-168; Kaczmarek, 2010:652).  
 The repression of the Church eventually culminated in 1965. An attempt to 
begin a dialogue with priests from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) during the 
Second Vatican Council was criticised by the authorities. In the months preceding the 
Millennium of Christianity in Poland (1966) the Roman Catholic Episcopate issued a 
pastoral letter to German Catholic and Evangelical churches (18.11.1965) in which 
Polish Primate Cardinal Wyszynski invited clerics from the FRG to take part in the 
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celebrations. In the letter the Polish Episcopate in a Christian manner “grants and 
begs forgiveness” to Poland’s neighbours (Eisler, 1991:118), offering a model of a 
Polish nation which was conflicted with the anti-German propaganda sustained since 
1945. The Catholic clergy became the ambassador of the Polish nation. Nevertheless, 
the Communist authorities remained defiant, arguing that the past heritage was an 
element of an out-dated elitist Poland and it had to give way to the socialist progress 
and classless Polish nation (Mazgaj, 2010:117). Although the anti-religion Communist 
regime continued to combat the Church preceiving it as a threat to the integrity of the 
enforced state model over 90 percent of the Polish population continued to declare 
their faith Roman Catholic which made the Church one of the most powerful 
influential institutions in authoritarian Poland. The role of the Church in the life of the 
population forced the Communist authorities to  compromise with the Episcopate 
and find the middle ground in order to avoid a widespread disobedience (Szczerbiak, 
2006:55-56). 
 
5.11 Fractures in the National Programme  
Through the early 1970s the leaders of the March 1968 protests were encouraged by 
Jerzy Giedoryc to work closely with Kultura and organisations within Poland in order 
to synthesise ideas of both the intellectuals and other social groups. Through 1971 
and 1972 issues of Kultura discussed new approaches to the role of “organic work”, 
linking people of various political affiliations. It was also acknowledged by the 
opposition that the Roman Catholic Church was being underutilised in the struggle 
against the system (Tyrchan, 2011:117). In terms of the future socio-economic 
development of Polish society, intellectuals began to find common goals with the 
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leading Roman Catholic circles surrounding organisations such as the Clubs of 
Catholic Intellectuals (KIK), Tygodnik Powszechny (The General Weekly), Znak  (Sign) 
and Więzi (Ties). Leszek Kołakowski, one of the leaders of March 1968 protests, 
believed that although institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church were 
important for the cohesion of society, the new Poland needed to be built upon an 
ethical code. Kołakowski, together with other leaders of the leftist opposition, 
remained concerned about the revival of “right wing nationalist authoritarianism” 
(Tyrchan, 2011:123). Kołakowski’s opinion was not shared by all of the intellectuals, 
significantly slowing down the process of establishing links between various 
segments of Polish society. Influencing public opinion in Poland was a slow process 
which required both extensive grass-root work and involvement of various 
intellectual circles. The activists at both the 1968 demonstrations in Warsaw and the 
1970 workers protests on the Baltic coast were unable to understand that their 
struggle for citizen rights required unification (Wałęsa, 1990:83).  
 Attempts to connect intellectuals with the working classes materialised with 
the creation of the Committee for Worker’s Defence (Komitet Obrony Robotników, 
KOR) which began to represent of the large swathes of Polish society rather than 
scattered social groups. The creation of KOR became crucial to the future relationship 
between key components of Polish society, successfully divided by the authorities 
until 1976. Intellectuals, workers and the clergy were able to begin redefining Polish 
national identity. All these groups agreed that the “moral reaction” of all these groups 
is to demand from the authorities to respect certain rights which all citizens should 
possess regardless of world-view, profession or relationship to the Party (Wałęsa, 
1990:84).  The Committee also challenged the  legitimacy of the authorities by 
creating organisations defending and supporting workers, taking on a role which was 
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supposed to be a central feature of a socialist state. KOR questioned some of the ideas 
at the foundation of thePeople’s Poland (Wałęsa, 1990:84-85).  
Worker’s protests against high prices which represented the dissatisfaction of nearly 
the whole of society were followed by brutal repressions. In Ursus, Radom and other 
cities protesters were beaten, kicked, and arrested. The most common punishment, 
alongside with the arrests, were mass dismissals of the employees which had a direct 
economic impact on the families of those who lost their jobs (Andrzejewski, KOR, 
1976)  
 
 Arrests of members of the opposition from Warsaw and Kraków weakened the 
Ministry of Interior (MSW) further as following the public outrage it was forced to 
release many of them from prison (Prazmowska, 2010:202). It was still unclear 
whether the opposition had a great enough following within other segments of 
society to launch further demands. Although the Church did not openly support the 
crystallising opposition due to fear of further oppression from the state, it was 
becoming clear that the role of faith in the life of ordinary Poles could become the 
factor cementing the Polish people together (Snyder, 2003:230). It was in the 1970s 
when the “We/They” divide began to symbolise the struggle of the people against 
that state authorities. Lech Wałęsa argues that various organisations lacked a 
component which would connect these frequently ideologically opposing groups and 
“create a logical whole out of the turbulent 1970s” (Wałęsa, 1990:85).  
Furthermore, it was becoming clear that the political elites of the PRL were 
unable to implement necessary reforms. From 1976, it was becoming clear that the 
authorities were no longer capable of alarming the population with a threat of 
internal and external enemies of the Polish nation. Kultura dedicated much attention 
to the growing dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime. According to Zygmunt 
Merka the regime’s inability the use of the old techniques of intimidation further 
evidenced that the authorities were unable to stop the grassroots movements in 
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Poland (Merka, Kultura, 1976:75-77). Merka’s arguments were further echoed by 
Józef Kwaśny who observed that the authorities were unable to bring a halt to the 
developing ties between the intellectual elites and the working classes: 
“Currently the leadership of the Party is doing everything in its power to disintegrate 
the society, political tranquilisation of the society, and atomisation of the intellectuals. 
The central policy is based on refering to national-ptriotic motifs (…). Gierek’s camp 
has been, since Stalin’s era, the most pro-Soviet group and  the use of national 
terminology is a nothing but forgery and cynicism” (Kwaśny, Kultura, 1976:74).  
 
 Moreover, Kultura continued to argue that the aim of the Party was to create a 
conflict between the intellectuals and the Church. The PZPR aimed to attach 
ethnonationalist elements to the rhetoric of the Church and its liminal figures such as 
Cardinal Stanislaw Wyszynski, who openly opposed the authoritarian regime.  
“Not everyone realises that the aim of [of the Party] is to put a wedge between the 
Cardinal [Wyszynski] and non-Catholic opposition in Poland. (…). Gierek’s camp is 
well aware that the Cardinal’s goal is freedom of the Church and the nation, similarly, 
freedom is the goal of the liberal intellectuals. The Party claims the Cardinal to be a 
nationalist and it alters his rhetoric adding antimasonic and antisemitic elements” 
(Kwaśny, Kultura, 1976:75) 
 
 The authors of Kultura similarly to the intellectuals in Poland became 
continued to discredit the authorities. It was clear that the PZPR’s aim was to further 
divide diverse social groups. Kultura revealed these techniques applied by the ruling 
party aiming at the atomisation of the nation while at the same time it supported 
strengthening of the ties between the Church and the liberal opposition.   
 
5.12 Binding the Society 
“The Poles want to “be”- and they wanted that even then, when all they and the 
onlookers thought that they wanted to “have”; when they were taking to the streets 
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against poverty, against taking away the last scraps of food from them, against 
transferring the cost of the “dynamic and harmonious” development onto their 
shoulders (…). Even then in 1956, in 1970, and in 1976, the protesting crowds sang 
different songs and called for different things, which many did not hear (…). Then 
they also wanted to “be”, they wanted to save the meaning of their lives together, to 
find sense in this continuing work; and then after multiple attempts (…) in 1976, they 
came back transformed (…) creating various forms of self-defence, electing from 
among their own outside of the system: activists, leaders, their own technicians, 
poets, organizers, lecturers, ideologists, codes of conduct, their own chaplains and 
court defenders (…); electing a whole new world of liberty while enslaved, authentic 
life among dummies and mannequins (…)” (N.N. Czego chca Polacy?, Kultura, 1981:7) 
The Communist authorities failed to comprehend the salience some of the 
central elements of the national identity in Poland such as the myths of origin or the 
influence which Roman Catholicism had on the preservation of the distinctive 
national character. Moreover, the authoritarian regime was unable to comprehend 
the impact which the cultural borrowing had on shaping Poland in successive 
generations. The appropriation of political slogans linked with endecja or anti-Church 
campaigns did not allow the Soviet-sponsored regime access to the process of 
shaping the Polish nation. The attempt to undermine the ethnic cores combined with 
the worsening economic situation in Poland resulted in the reconstruction of the 
national ties away from the official channels. Polish émigré organisations were 
involved in support for the unions and organisations forming after the creation of 
KOR and later “Solidarność”. It was important to involve institutions such as the 
Church in the unification of the Polish nation. Both Kultura and other influential 
émigré societies, such as Aneks, aimed to persuade the Roman Catholic Church to take 
a stronger position against the authorities (Tyrchan, 2011:206). The Church, one of 
the ethnic cores, could only offer a limited support to the opposition. Kultura became 
involved in bridging the opposition and the Church and it also opened a dialogue 
between the dispersed organizations across Poland appealing to particular social 
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groups. The émigré organisation required the Church to bond distinctive social 
groups. 
“The initiative in creating a wider collaboration should be part of the responsibility of 
the leadership of "Solidarność" but the representatives of all social forces operating in a given 
territory should be involved: representatives of the local administration, trades unions, 
Church, political organizations, directors, and representatives different trades- workers, 
farmers, etc.” (Konwersatorium "Doświadczenie i Przyszłość", 1981:172). 
The bonding power of the Church became clear with the first visit of the newly 
elected Pope to Poland in June 1979. Although the Ministry of Interior (MSW) 
launched the operation “Summer of 1979” (Lato 1979) it was unable to stop millions 
of people coming to see and hear John Paul II whose speeches gave hope and lifted 
the spirits of a population suppressed by the authorities (Kaczmarek, 2010:726). In 
total, around 10 million people came to see Karol Wojtyła during his nine-day visit, 
an event which inarguably had an impact on the deepening of faith among the mass of 
Poles for whom religion offered the only remaining sense of freedom from systematic 
oppression and propaganda. In his speeches, the Pope referred to the oppression of 
the Polish peoples before 1918 and the continuous striving for the preservation of 
Polish national identity. References to pre-independence Polish history became a 
metaphor for the contemporary socio-political situation. To a significant extent, this 
visit became the fuse that had been absent in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976. Through 
the Pope’s own experience of growing up and living in the Polish People’s Republic 
both the circles of intellectuals and the working classes could relate to his speeches 
(Jan Paweł II, 2005:146-147). From the beginning of his papacy, John Paul II 
promoted ecumenical approach and promoted shared European roots in Poland 
attempting, to open and maintain between Roman Catholicism and other Churches in 
East-Central Europe (Gawlikowski, 1990:11). 
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By breaking ties with its interwar links with the National Democracy, the 
Roman Catholic Church embarked on a mission to unify various strata of the Polish 
population in order to build a coherent Polish nation. This aim would be achieved by 
appealing to the authorities on behalf of the Polish nation (Snyder, 2003:229; Wałęsa, 
1990:68). 
For the first time during our anniversary, priests were present. Shared prayers and 
songs were a novelty next to the shipyard. It was thanks to priests that our anger and 
rebellion fused with contemplation (Wałęsa, 1990:93) 
 
 The first step towards integration of Polish society was achieved with the 
Papal visit in June 1979. The First Secretary of PZPR Edward Gierek and his staff 
failed resolve the economic crisis and the issue of rising food prices, in particular. 
Loans from the West could tame the dissatisfaction for a while but eventually such 
short-term measures, without appropriate economic reforms which the PRL 
required, would only slow down the process of economic disintegration. The effects 
of these failed reforms together with oppression of the working classes resulted in an 
explosion of social dissatisfaction (Prazmowska, 2010:206). During the tenth 
anniversary of the Gdańsk shipyard protests in 1980 and commemoration of those 
killed by the army both the intellectuals and the Roman Catholic Church authorities 
were present symbolising the unification of these groups (1990:93).  
The government must obey freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution of 
People’s Poland PRL while at the same time it is not allowed to oppress free 
publishing houses and supply access to mass media for the representatives of all 
religions (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee, 
1980) 
 
 The “twenty-one postulates” drafted by workers became the first such listing 
of requirements from the Government. The workers were not aiming to overthrow 
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the system but rather requested fair and equal treatment of all citizens. Although the 
majority of the “twenty-one postulates” focused on the well-being of the working 
classes, demands for freedom of speech and freedom of the media and conscience 
were at the backbone of ideas behind the protests of March 1968 and the programme 
proposed by the authors of Kultura. The unity of the workers led to the signing of the 
“Gdańsk Accords” and the creation of NSZZ Solidarność (Niezależny Samorządny 
Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność", Independent Self-governing Trade Union 
"Solidarność"). In the short term, the unified action of the workers proved the 
strength of collective action. The presence of intellectual and political oppositionists 
such as Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Bronisław Geremek in tandem with Lech Wałęsa 
created another dimension of cooperation between different groups within Polish 
society (Prazmowska, 2010:209).  
“A certain tradition of images, cults, customs, rites and artefacts, as well as certain 
events, heroes, landscapes, and values, come to form distinctive repository of ethnic 
culture, to be drawn upon selectively by successive generations of the community” 
(Smith, 1991:38) 
 
 This combination of distinctive national forces standing in opposition to the 
authoritarian regime led to the construction of a united Polish nation within the state 
ruled by an alien regime. Kultura, which collected and rejuvenated elements of the 
early-modern and interwar political traditions preserved the national character 
which stood in contrast to the model enforced by the Communist authorities. 
Furthermore, Kultura assumed the role of ethnic core and following the Second World 
War was dedicated to transmitting elements of Polish heritage and traditions. 
Following Smith’s definition, Kultura assumed the role of a distinctive repository of 
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ethnic culture and disseminated this heritage in successive generations, forming a 
bridge between different national forces.  
 
5.13 The Divergent Visions of Nation in the Rhetoric of Solidarność  
“For seven years the opposition headed by Wałęsa propagated the belief that “there is 
no reform without Solidarność, It turns out that there can be Solidarność, there can be 
a reform, and at the same time objection from the workers (…).  Solidarność, can no 
longer ensure the collision-free course of reforms” (Jagiełło:Romaszewski, Kultura, 
1989:126).    
  
 It became clear that Solidarność was facing similar challenges to those of the 
Communist regime. Attempts of the Communists to create a homogenous nation 
proved unsuccessful. The PZPR’s scheme to build a nation upon traits of ethnic 
identity mixed with elements of nationalism lost its appeal after decades of 
continuous repetition. Solidarność which offered pluralism and was dedicated to the 
expansion of the workers rights across Poland. In the late 1980s, the organisation 
assumed the role of representing the clandestine Polish nation. Economic and 
ideological disparities linked to the rapid growth of the organization became evident 
in the late 1980s with different trades demanding additional reforms 
(Jagiełło:Romaszewski, Kultura, 1989:127).   
 Decades of nationalistic indoctrination had left Poland divided. Although the 
Communist authorities were becoming increasingly discredited, the draft of future 
Poland and the interpretation of the national character remained an element of 
contestation between the oppositionists.  
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Jan Józef Lipski, one of the founders of KOR and member of Solidarność, 
criticised the chauvinistic political campaign of the PZPR and in his essays appearing 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, he presented an alternative vision of Poland to that 
preached by the Communist authorities. His works became a symbol of the pluralist 
vision for Polish society and constituted an opposition to nationalism and 
megalomania propagated by the Communist authorities. In his essay, Lipski argued 
that “xenophobia and hatred towards everything “foreign”, and national egoism  
cannot be reconciled with the Christian foundations of Poland. Patriotism, on the 
other hand, may be reconciled. Moreover, Lipski undermined nationalist chauvinism 
saying that “Love of everything Polish- is a common form of the national, “patriotic” 
stupidity (…). Patriotism is not only respect and love of tradition, it is also the 
unrelenting selection of the traditional elements and the duty of intellectual research 
in this field” (Lipski, Kultura, 1981:4-5).   
 Jan Józef Lipski together with Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń and other leaders of 
the opposition openly attacked the vision of Poland supported by the Communist 
authorities. Equally the oppositionists feared that the weakening of Polish Marxism-
Leninism would allow right-wing organisations promoting the idea of exclusive 
nationalism to demand recognition in Poland and in effect weaken relations 
established with Poland’s neighbours. To the opposition on the left side of the 
political spectrum, this threat loomed larger with the division of KOR into separate 
organisations with programmes resembling competing schools of political thought 
(Tyrchan, 2011:235). Similarly, Kultura analysed the changing relationship between 
ethnic Poles with the Jews, Germans, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. In an attempt to 
find an interethnic understanding authors of Kultura attempted to expand the narrow 
definition of Poland propagated by the PZPR. Through research of the relationship 
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between different ethnicities in Poland and in East-Central Europe such authors as 
Czeslaw Milosz or Andrzej Szczypiorski exposed Polish xenophobia and antisemitism 
in the interwar Poland, during the Second World War, and in the Communist state.  
“Poles and Jews experienced a great loss during the Second World War. It is a great 
loss and pauperisation to Poland that the Jewish spirit will never again enrich our 
culture, which was, after all, formed by Poles and Jews. To a lesser, but still a 
meaningful extent, it was shaped bu other peoples of Rzeczpospolita. For the Jews it 
was a painful blow as they lost the country which for many centuries was their great 
asylum, for others it was simply their homeland (…)” (Szarf; Szczypiorski, Kultura, 
1979:132) 
 
 Furthermore, Jerzy Giedroyc and his colleagues had promoted cooperation 
between the intellectuals and the working classes from the 1950s through to the 
1980s and when Solidarność, envisioned by Kultura, became a reality. The committee 
combining workers from various industries together with the Roman Catholic Church 
and the intellectuals realised that only through cooperation would they be able to 
create a democratic Poland. Although they came together in Solidarność in order to 
rebuild the state so that it would reflect and fulfil the needs of its citizens, the ideas of 
some members challenged the pluralist vision of Poland envisioned by Kultura and 
the leftist opposition. As in the struggles within the PZPR in the 1950s and the 1960s, 
the Solidarność underwent a crisis of its own, leading to divisions into partisan 
groups of “True Poles” and others (Pankowski, 2010:58). Among the organisations 
which influenced Solidarność, there were those which, similarly to National 
Democracy, saw Polish history in terms of a national struggle and the survival of 
Poland among other hostile nations. The Young Poland Movement (Ruch Młodej 
Polski; RMP) supporting shipyard workers and later influencing the ideology of 
Solidarność (Jagiełło:Romaszewski, Kultura, 1989:122-123; Wałęsa, 1990:89),  
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 In the 1980s, Solidarność began to represent more than exclusively shipyard 
workers. It was an organisation which would bridge various social and political 
groups creating a platform collectively calling for a democratic alternative. The Polish 
population was able for the first time in decades to see that it was the people who 
were Poland and not the authorities (Wałęsa, 1990:95). Such a realisation became 
possible through the grassroots work of the opposition, defiance by the Roman 
Catholic Church and a non-conformist vision for Poland drafted by various 
contributors in émigré organisations and magazines such as Kultura. In effect, 
political symbols became less important than national symbols of both 
“Romanticism” and “Realism” which had prevailed the decades of censorship and 
shaped the core of the Solidarność movement (Pankowski, 2010:61; Snyder, 
2003:220-221). Desperate attempts by the authorities to control social anger through 
means such as the introduction of martial law in 1981 were only of short term use, 
unable to stem the growing division between the Polish nation and the state 
authorities. The murder of the dedicated supporter of Solidarność,  the priest Jerzy 
Popiełuszko symbolised the sacrifice of all members of the movement in 
overthrowing of the oppressive system: 
(…) [P]riest Jerzy demonstrated that when facing violence we [Polish nation] are all 
on the same side. I was able to say by his coffin (…): Solidarność lives because you 
sacrificed your life for the cause (Wałęsa, 1990:371)   
 
 With the PZPR losing ground, the Party was unable to propose any reforms 
which would have any impact on the mood of Polish society. The first idea for talks 
between the authorities and the opposition appeared in February 1988 in the 
magazine Konfrontacje and from this point onwards, the continuing protests of 
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industrial and mining sectors led to the acceleration of the inevitable meeting 
between the leaders of the Polish state and the Polish nation.  
 Czesław Kiszczak representing the PZPR began his semi-official meetings with 
the leader of the trade unions Lech Wałęsa in September 1988. Although certain 
groups within of the opposition did not agree with the meetings between the PZPR 
and the leader of Solidarność, these talks continued and on 16 September after the 
first meeting between the Non-Governmental All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions 
(OPZZ) with its governmental counterpart, the parties within the coalition with PZPR, 
the decision was taken to organise “Round Table” talks in October 1988 (Kaczmarek, 
2010:778).  
“The contemporary reality was perceived as black and white, constructed of 
conflicting elements: the authorities- opposition, Communists- Solidarność, Wałęsa-
Jaruzelski. (…) after the last plenum KC PZPR and after the resolution of National 
Executive Committee Solidarność it is necessary to find a different approach to 
comprehend the socio-political transitions taking place in Poland” 
(Jagiełło:Romaszewski, Kultura, 1989:121). 
Solidarność could not survive the transition to mainstream politics. Despite 
the success of the trades union in the 1980s, to many it became clear that although 
the organisation was constructed by the people and served the people over time it 
lost its impetus and fractures became evident (Charłamp, Kultura, 1989:142:143).  
 
 
5.14 Conclusion 
The independence of Poland had become a reality in 1918 with the demise of the 
polyethnic empires responsible for partitioning Rzeczpospolita in 1795. The 
construction of modern Poland was closely connected to various forces operating in 
169 
 
East-Central Europe and in other parts of the continent. Modern Poland, as drafted by 
Piłsudski and the PPS, adopted the polyethnic foundations and the respect for the 
early-modern political traditions. The elevation of the mass population to the status 
of citizens included people of all faiths and ethnic affiliation. The Socialists, who 
outlined the first model of the state and combated until 1921 to include all peoples of 
Poland-Lithuania in the Second Rzeczpospolita effectively failed. This programme 
which proved out-dated became moulded with that of endecja propagating an ethnic 
definition of Poland and the assimilation of other peoples in East-Central Europe to 
the Polish tradition. This interpretation of the nation became recognised as the 
“national egoism” and became one of the dominant political features in the late 1930s 
and was after the Second World War adopted and adapted by the Communist 
authorities attempting to legitimize their rule in Poland.  
 With the use of ethnosymbolism, this chapter analysed whether particular 
institutions such as the Church or the szlachta retained a role of ethnic cores capable 
of collecting, codifying, and disseminating elements of ethnocultural tradition and 
wider Polish heritage shaped by different ethnic groups across Poland. The 
newspapers, journals, and secondary sources from the interwar period, as well as 
those from after the Second World War, demonstrate continuity of a distinctive 
national character in Poland. Although the state remained partitioned for 123 years, 
the symbolism and traditions which remained essential to the preservation of 
national identity among the szlachta became crucial to the mass population. This 
“distinctive repository of ethnic culture” allowed expansion of the nation and 
preservation of the cultural heritage. Although cultural borrowing and ethnic renewal 
became limited following the Second World War, the émigré organisation, domestic 
intelligentsia, and the Church retained memory of the democratic tradition and 
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pluralism in the interwar Poland. Memories of independent statehood and 
democratic traditions served as a blueprint for the future Polish state. The political 
tradition of the PPS or the ZLN remained a resource for the intellectuals during the 
period of authoritarianism. The authors of Kultura collected the ideas outlined by 
different intellectuals and initiated a debate on Poland’s past and present. They were 
able to create a sense of continuity between democratic Poland (1919-1926) and the 
clandestine opposition which over decades of atomisation was becoming dissatisfied 
with the worsening economic situation and the Communist ethnonationalism which 
was dedicated to depriving Poland of its cultural heritage.  
 The Church, which became one of the elements of cultural heritage essential to 
the preservation of the distinctive national identity following the partitions, 
underwent the transformation in the interwar Poland and during the Communist 
period. While in interwar Poland it remained the right arm of endecja, openly critical 
of the Socialists and demanding a clear role in shaping Poland and guiding Polish 
people after the Second World War and especially in the late 1940s it became a target 
of the Communist authorities. The internal reform of the Church in this period 
demonstrated the role which Roman Catholicism had in the life of the Polish nation. 
Although in interwar Poland it was predominantly associated with organic definition 
of Poland after the Second World War it became a symbol of freedom and pluralism.  
 Kultura, which assumed the role of ethnic cores, became a forum for the 
national debate. It was able to collect the writings of Polish dissidents and establish a 
relationship between distinctive social groups disintegrated by the authoritarian 
policies. Its main achievement was to allow an honest discussion on Poland’s past 
which allowed shaping of a dialogue with Poland’s neighbours and the minorities 
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existing in Poland. The magazine supported building of a strong relationship between 
the liberals and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland which would allow discrediting 
of the PZPR’s policies. It also informed Polish people in Poland and abroad about the 
achievements of organisations such as KOR and Solidarność 
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Chapter 6: National Identity in Post-Communist Poland  
“The atmosphere in Poland today favours falling into extreme opposite to 
Communism. The Right is enjoying great support, frequently seen through the 
simplifying lens of the Communist propaganda, although now it is praised and not 
condemned. A significant proportion of Solidarność activists turned away from, once 
popular within the organisation, ideal of social justice (...). The liberals claim that 
equality cannot be reconciled with freedom” (Modzelewski, Kultura, 1991:3) 
 
The collapse of Communism opened a new chapter in the competition for 
shaping of the national character in Poland. The divisions of the political arena in the 
early stages of the transition period resembled wider divisions within society. 
Although a majority of politicians in Poland wanted to forget about Poland’s 
Communist past immediately the growing social cost of the systemic transformation 
weakened national ties (Modzelewski, Kultura, 1991:5-6). Divisions on the early 
1990s political stage express the longings of the Polish society. On one side Polish 
people were  anxious about ’returning to Europe’, while on the other; Polish people 
wanted to stay true to the traditional elements which had allowed the preservation of 
a distinctive national identity through the lengthy period of authoritarianism and the 
Second World War. Analysis shows that the political competition in this period was 
predominantly centred on socio-cultural rather than economic consideration 
(Antoszewki, 2000:75). National identity in post-Communist Poland remained a 
subject to competition between two leading strands. Poland became split between 
the two main currents which described Poles either as an organic or as a territorial 
community.  
 Solidarność which had led a united nation against the oppressive state 
authorities in the 1980s became obsolete in democratic Poland. Competition among 
members of the trades union and various activists led to a discrediting of the 
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organisation. The united front which had been able to fight for freedom from 
authoritarianism for a decade did not survive beyond collapse of the PZPR.  
Aggressive competition and personal attacks among people linked to Solidarność, 
combined with worsening economic situation had a detrimental impact on Polish 
citizens. Between June 1989 and October 1991 the absence in parliamentary 
elections grew from 38 to 57 per cent (Wolicki, Kultura, 1991:47).  
“[Voters] were paralyzed in their civic duty by the presented political options and 
ideological content. (…). They were presented with “substitute” content by the right-
wing parties such as ZChN (…) or KPN and the wide range of small parties (…). The 
“substitute” content (…) suggests to the voters that a necessary and the most 
important feature of a politician is their ideological background: the catechism and 
the April constitution55 serve as Mao’s Red Book” (Wolicki, Kultura, 1991:48).  
 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between Solidarność and the Church in the 
1980s allowed the right-wing Political parties to claim Roman Catholicism as the 
essential element of their campaigns. The Church, identified by the right as central to 
the preservation of a distinctive national character during PRL required assurance 
that its sacrifice during the Communist period would be rewarded. The Christian-
national and the national-conservative parties identified the Church as the core of the 
Polish nation (Wolicki, Kultura, 1991:50).   
 
Ethnocultural Traditions and the process of Shaping Political Programmes According 
to Ryszard Herbut (2000) political parties which officially entered the political 
platform assumed contrasting elements from different periods from the past. The 
cleavages which became most evident during the process of splintering Solidarność 
                                                          
55 The 1935 constitution was the final act signed by Pilsudski before his death 
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were divided between the traditional and liberal cultural attitudes and economic 
etatism in opposition to economic liberalism. These cleavages, however, do not 
demonstrate some of the main problems following the collapse of Communism. 
Herbut argues that the post-Communist and anti-Communist division between 
parties created an independent sphere of competition which through the 1990s 
overtook other considerations.  
On the socioeconomic dimension, the UW is much closer to the SLD than to other 
post-Solidarity parties, but the chances of co-operation between both parties are 
slender on account of genetic differences. With regard to the SLD and the PSL, once 
again genetic factors help explain why the two continue to co-operate with one 
another, just as much as they explain the continued alliance between the AWS and the 
UW” (Herbut, 2000:102) 
 
Although in the last decade of the twentieth century Poland was 
predominantly an ethnically homogenous state, this picture was a recent 
phenomenon. The liberal parties recognised that it was in fact heterogeneity and 
centuries of cultural borrowing which continued to shape Poland with its citizens in 
every successive generation. Extension of equal rights to the national and ethnic 
minorities inhabiting Poland became a crucial element in the process of shaping the 
Polish nation of territorial and polyethnic traditions rather than purely ethnic traits.  
Following the decades of nationalist propaganda of the Communist party, Poland was 
able to return to the inclusive definition of the nation and expand the narrow 
definition of the Polish nation enforced during authoritarian rule. The transition from 
the organic definition of Poland, which remained central to the administrations in the 
late 1930s and during the PRL, granted ethnic Poles a dominant and privileged 
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position in Poland. Following the collapse of Communism this competition between 
Poland founded on the polyethnic traditions, and the nation centred on Polish 
ethnicity remained influential and became evident in party programmes. Over the 
course of twenty-five years, parties continued to search for ideas in the interwar 
programmes outlined by the ZLN and the PPS. The ethnic core, which during the 
authoritarian period stored much of the Polish cultural heritage and political 
traditions were able to disseminate a vast amount of literature in the liberal 
democratic state. The two currents which crystallised in the nineteenth century 
remained important in the Third Polish Republic.  
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Figure 1.1: Two-dimensional political spectrum in post-1989 Poland  
 
KPN: Confederation of Independent Poland (established 1979) 
NOP: National Rebirth of Poland (established 1981) 
ZChN: Christian Democratic Alliance (1989-2010) 
SdRP: Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (1990-1999) transformed into Social 
Democratic Alliance (SLD from 1999) 
PSL: Polish Peasant Party (established 1990) 
PC: Centre Agreement (1990-2002) 
SRP: Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (1992-2012) 
UW: Freedom Union (1994-2005) 
ROP: Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (1995-2012) 
AWS: “Solidarity” Electoral Action (1996-2001) 
PO: Civic Platform (established 2001) 
PiS: Law and Justice Party (established in 2001) 
LPR: League of Polish Families (established 2001) 
RP/TR: Palikot Movement (established in 2011) transformed into Your Movement in 2013 
  
(figure 1.1: Herbut, 2000:103) 
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6.1 Solidarity after Solidarność 
After achieving its ultimate goal of ousting the Communist regime Solidarność 
splintered into various factions competing for leadership in the new Poland. The 
political parties which appeared in Polish politics which appeared in this political 
space (figure 1.1) appeared predominantly concentrated on socio-cultural issues 
rather than the pressing economic matters. Parties of the Right used populism to 
appeal to the voters highlighting the differences between them rather than shared 
goals (Skórzynski, 1991:138).  
Furthermore, despite the programmatic analogies between the ex-Communist 
and anti-Communist parties in the economic sphere, issues related to identity and the 
role of the traditional values played a central role. The two-dimensional spectrum 
(figure 1.1) further demonstrates the socio-cultural and economic cleavages which 
became evident after 1989. The spectrum demonstrates the position in where most 
of the parties were located after the collapse of Communism. This clear turn towards 
the Conservative and Christian Democratic programmes was evidenced by the 
sudden appearance of numerous parties defined by the “traditional cultural 
attitudes” (figure 1.1). This turn may be explained by seeking support from the 
Church in the parliamentary campaign.  
(…) [A]n issueless regime divide between the principal agents and collaborators of 
the communist regime and those who rallied to the Solidarność camp is moderately 
pronounced and may make it difficult to engineer coalitions among parties with 
similar stances in the two-dimensional issue space but different historical roots in 
these alternative camps (…) divisions among the parties that emerged from the 
Solidarność camp and are now located in the Christian-national sector of the policy 
space often derive not from policy disagreements but from personal animosities and 
organizational rivalries (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Tóka, 1999:387) 
 The bitter rivalry between the leading political parties with positioned in the 
close proximity on the two-dimensional political spectrum (figure 1.1), such as ZChN 
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(Christian Democratic Alliance) or KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland), were 
unable to find common ground. Political parties from across the spectrum were 
unable to appeal to a growing number of voters who were becoming concerned that 
“group interests and political ambitions took priority over creating solid political 
programmes” (Poleski, 1992:22). 
“KPN, which continues to shift between coalition and the temptation of rule, appears 
helpless. Despite the mythmaking abilities of its leader, the awareness of continuing 
state crisis took away the KPN’s confidence (…). They can no longer use propaganda 
to sell their recipes and ideas. Their behaviour demonstrates their obsessions with 
petty matters and the need to argue about meaningless issues” (Wolicki, 1992:64-65). 
 
Tomáš Kostelecký (2002) argues that although Prime Minister Mazowiecki’s 
administration “achieved its main goals , it had some detrimental side effects such as 
a sharp drop in actual incomes, a decline in industrial output, and a rapid rise in 
unemployment” (Kostelecký, 2002:67) it was not able to soften the high cost of 
transition.  Moreover, the social cost of transition led to rapid disenchantment of the 
population with the policies of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government. Mazowiecki was 
widely criticized also by his former political partners (including Lech Wałęsa) who 
were attempting to distance themselves from the difficult and unpopular reforms. 
Furthermore, Mazowiecki fearing that animosities and accusations between the post-
Communists and the post-Solidarność could impede formation of a society and halt 
the progress of cooperation with the “international community” suggested drawing a 
dividing line between the old system and the post-Communist Poland. 
(Marczewski,1990:108-110). Mazowiecki’s government and observers outside of 
Poland were becoming aware that the map of Europe was rapidly changing opening 
to Poland and other states in the region new possibilities. These political 
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developments in East-Central Europe created a void which required reconstruction of 
the societal ties and resetting of the relationship between Poland and its neighbours.  
“I do not know whether Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland will create a politically 
influential trio. I do not know what our relationship with the Baltic States will be. One 
system ceased to exist and the new one has not crystallised yet (…). It is essential to 
survive this difficult period of transition from socialism to the free market economy. 
It will be a long period (…), it will require novel forms of cooperation in Eastern 
Europe” (Modzelewski, Kultura, 1991:21). 
 
With regards to the neighbourly relations, Kultura’s authors for decades 
guided the development of Poland’s connection with already existing states and 
Soviet Republics on the course of independence. The reconstruction of societal ties 
became essential to creating a strong Poland as a viable partner for the European 
community. Although a distinctive national character prevailed the decades of 
atomisation, it was necessary to connect the disparate elements of Polish identity.  
“The government, through its politics, ensures the safety of the state, it 
receives external support and kindness towards the transformation taking 
place in the country. This political course includes Poland in the wider 
European cooperation dedicated to building unity on our continent; it also 
transforms and improves the relationship with neighbouring countries and 
nations” (Skubiszewski, 1990:5-6) 
 
6.1.1 Mazowiecki’s “Thick Line”  
According to Władysław J. Stankiewicz (1996), the Polish political system of the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, resembled the structure of post-totalitarianism, which 
was a form of transitional period. Furthermore, Stankiewicz claims that in this 
particular period distinctive ethical, political, psychological, social, and cultural 
elements compete with one another for: 
180 
 
“the primacy in the period of systemic transformation leading from “real socialism” to 
some other political system (…). Moreover, this period like a mirror, which allows 
Western democracies to see the reflection of their previous phases, capture in a split 
moment this “primordial” period preceding the new social contract”(Stankiewicz, 
1996:6)  
 
The transitional period between authoritarianism and liberal democracy stalled the 
process of national consolidation. The waning elites of the PZPR in a desperate 
attempt to remain in power were forced to collaborate with the opposition. The 
direction of Poland became unclear with two opposing forces shaping the domestic 
and international politics of Poland. Poland’s aim to join the democratic West became 
jeopardised with the combination of the undemocratic decision-making in the early 
stages of the Polish parliamentary democracy. The goal of Mazowiecki’s government 
was the creation of a system in which the Polish population would identify with the 
institutions of the state, especially with the Parliament.  
“When parliamentary rules did not take root, and the rule of law is not yet 
sufficiently protected, the corporatism may deafen and tame the youthful 
democratic culture. The politicians, secretly negotiating, may treat the law 
instrumentally. This scenario, could in return, perpetuate the authoritarian 
model where law is not a boundary of power but a tool in ad hoc political 
manipulations” (Lamentowicz, Kultura, 1989:62).  
 
Nevertheless, Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government emphasized the role of the 
European Community (EC) in ensuring the liberal-democratic development of 
Poland. The transitional government recognised that it was necessary to appeal to 
the widest possible body of citizens in order to re-establish a democratic system in 
Poland. In order to reach this goal, it was necessary to avoid post-Communist 
persecutions of the previous regime’s collaborators and to steer the parliament in the 
direction of necessary reforms. The government, which identified rapid unification 
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with the European Community (and other international institutions) as imperative to 
the strengthening of the position of Poland in East-Central Europe, wished to avoid 
internal conflicts which could regress the ambitions of Poland.   
“The government, which I am creating, takes no responsibility for the liability which 
it inherits. It has, however, an impact on the circumstances in which we operate. We 
split away the history of our recent past with a thick line. We will be responsible only 
for what we have done to help extract Poland from her current predicament” 
(Mazowiecki, Expose, 1989) 
 
The Prime Minister proposed the so-called “thick line” (gruba kreska) programme. 
This line would become a metaphorical boundary between the Poland that had 
existed and the Poland which was born out of the opposition to the oppressive 
system. Although it was the aim of the programme to unite all Poles in the struggle 
for a democratic state the “thick line” formed stereotypes and divisions among the 
nationals (Mazowiecki, 2013). Mazowiecki’s proposal aimed to make a clear 
distinction between the past and the present. Although its aims, as described above, 
sought to achieve a peaceful internal transition, it became recognised as one of the 
most controversial aspects of post-Communist Polish history. According to the 
conservatives the “thick line” stalled the process of national consolidation and 
allowed the former Communist elites (nomenklatura) a continued significant role in 
state affairs (Lipinski, 2008:280-283).  
 
6.2 The Formation of Modern Political Thought 
Post-Communist Poland faced a vast array of issues related to economic, political and 
socio-cultural transition. Rebuilding of the nation in Poland required legitimisation of 
the state institution which would relieve the ethnic cores and assume the central role 
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in shaping democratic Poland. The ethnocultural elements, the tradition of cultural 
exchange, or the linguistic heritage, which allowed the preservation of the distinctive 
national character through the authoritarian period, were incorporated by the official 
institutions. These elements, central to through periods of limited sovereignty, were, 
in the post-Communist period, bound by a single denominator which was Europe. 
Despite the ideological competition, the successive democratic administrations 
identified Western European cultural heritage and global democratic institutions as 
the blueprint for Poland’s development. Joining Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and 
the European Community (EC) became the leading objective (Skubiszewski, Expose, 
1991). The discrediting of the Communist system and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
resulted in shaping of a pro-Western European political thought in Poland.  
“The direction of foreign affairs, selected by our nation in 1989, despite a wide range 
of issues and instability of domestic politics, remains the force stabilising and 
strengthening our independent statehood. It is a tool in our dynamic activity in 
accordance with European community and international community. It is because of 
the selected national goals which interplay with the European and global peaceful 
development” (Skubiszewski, Expose, 1991)  
 
Despite the domestic turbulence following the collapse of Communism and the 
costly transitional period, Poland’s goal of joining wider European and global 
institutions was no longer threatened by external aggression. Consolidation of the 
national forces within democratic European framework would allow strengthening 
national identity within Poland.  
In post-Communist Poland, however, the society remained divided and the 
worsening economic situation did not allow strengthening of the ties damaged by the 
decades of authoritarianism. This costly economic transition resulted in growing 
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social distrust, isolationism, and the sense of insecurity. Although more parties 
appeared on the political stage none of them offered solutions which would steer the 
nation away from the crisis (Kaczmarek, 1996:50-51).  
 
The political parties which influenced the political stage in the 1990s were 
representative of particular attitudes of the Polish society, deprived of ability to make 
decisions about the future of their state. This frustration became evident on the 
political spectrum (figure 1.1). Parties which appeared in this period identified the 
organic definition of Poland as appealing to the largest group within the society. 
Elements of the political tradition derived from the interwar period of democracy 
(1919-1926) influenced programmes of KPN or ZChN. The political parties in the 
post-Communist became involved in competition in the socio-cultural sphere (figure 
1.1) giving them an opportunity to use the most recent history as a tool of political 
competition in the contemporary Poland. Economic problems, despite their gravity in 
the early 1990s were merely a backdrop to the ideological contestation  (Kostelecký, 
2002:70; Szczerbiak, 2005:62).   Despite the substantial increase in the ethnically 
Polish population after the Second World War, creating a de facto ethnically 
homogenous Poland (Eberhardt, 2000:161), post-communist politicians of the Social 
Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej;  SdRP56) were presented by the National Conservatives as the greatest threat 
to the integrity of Polish society. Unlike the right-wing parties and the Christian-
nationals, striving to demonstrate at least some degree of ideological continuity with 
the parties existing the interwar Poland, the post-Communist parties were “trying to 
disassociate themselves from their totalitarian past” (Kostelecký, 2002:77). 
                                                          
56 From 1999 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej;  Democratic Left Alliance; SLD 
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Competition between the parties in the 1990s was reminiscent of competition 
between endecja and the Socialists in the interwar Poland. Following the collapse of 
Communism, parties of the Right (with traditional cultural attitudes at the foundation 
of their political programmes), accepted the Church as the “moral compass” which 
would guide Poland. Roman Catholicism was recognised by the Conservatives and the 
Nationalists as a necessary tool in the process of national consolidation in post-1989 
Poland (Pospieszalski, Kultura, 1996:52-53). On the other hand, the programme of 
the ex-Communists and the liberal parties identified the development of Poland and 
its citizens with establishing closer ties with Western Europe. The growing 
competition between the traditional approach to the national character and the pro-
European programme deepened in the post-Communist Poland. Unlike the liberal 
parties such as SdRP or UW the political parties defending Polish ethnocultural 
traditions did not wish to follow the European social development but rather stay 
true to the national achievements (Koraszewski, Kultura, 1997:56-57). The appeal to 
the organic character of Poland rather than the polyethnic heritage  was 
demonstrated by segments of the conservative and right-wing parties in the 
subsequent campaigns surrounding presidential and parliamentary elections (1990, 
1991, 1993) as well as the referendums regarding the constitution (1997) and 
membership in the European Union (EU) (Vermeersch, 2012:130-131).  
 
6.2.1 The Socio-Cultural Sphere of Competition in Poland  
In the 1990s, the ‘historic’ political cleavage present in interwar Poland (organic-
territorial) was absorbed by the right-wing, Christian-national and Social-Democratic 
parties. This cleavage was represented by the traditional right-left party division and 
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following the accession to the EU it was absorbed by the two leading conservative-
right parties: the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) (Markowski, 
2006:816-817).  
In interwar Poland the endecja distinguished Poland as both the nation and 
the state. Through claiming the paramount role of the ethnic nation, the interwar 
Nationalists called for a construction of national identity with the ethnic Poles as a 
core of the national community (Hutchinson, 2005:40). In post-Communist Poland, 
ethnic homogeneity was no longer a major concern for the Christian-national and the 
right-wing parties; however, the weakening role of the Church and bolstering ties 
with the supranational institutions exposed the growing ideological cleavages of the 
Polish population (Prażmowska, 2010:259). In order to strengthen the communal 
ties the right-wing parties adopted the programme of “Polonisation” (Polonizacja) 
which in the post-Communist Poland required education in patriotic spirit. 
Propagation of the distinctive culture and the role of the ethnically Polish population 
in the preservation and reconstruction of national identity became central to the 
programme of the right-wing political parties such as the Confederation of 
Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej; KPN) and The Christian 
National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe; ZChN). The re-education of 
the population, although homogenous ethnically, but ideologically heterogeneous, 
would require the harmonious cooperation of binding elements (such as the 
linguistic tradition) and institutions which carried the divergent cultural and political 
traditions (Micewski, Kultura, 1998:124-125). These elements, although based on the 
model constructed at the turn of the twentieth century, required re-evaluating in 
order to shape contemporary patriotism. Effectively, utilisation of these tools would 
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legitimise the post-Communist authorities and allow identification of the Polish 
population with the state institutions. 
“It’s saddening that, the main force of resistance for a few decades of PRL, until the 
formation of a democratic opposition (KOR) (…),,the Catholic Church unconsciously 
allowed to become in large part incorporated into the nationalist camp (…) unable to 
lead the country” (Micewski, 1998:125) 
 
 Disputes in the socio-cultural sphere became both the main ideological 
locomotive as well as the centre of contestation until the formation of a united front 
challenging the Constitution proposed in 1997 by the SdRP/SLD. Unable to present 
an economic programme which could challenge the post-Communist parties, post- 
Solidarność groups utilised the “we/they” dichotomy claiming the heritage of 
Solidarność (Bielasiak, 2010:44). The Church and the Polish culture as central to the 
preservation of the distinctive identity through the period of statelessness and 
limited sovereignty, were frequently employed in modern national discourse. 
Conflicts between the traditional-organic definition of the nation and the community 
founded upon the liberal and civic-territorial principles reignited the competition 
between “we” (the post-Solidarność politicians) and “they” (the ex-Communists or 
leftist politicians) sphere of contestation was transformed into a “we/we” conflict 
(Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Tóka, 1999:392-393). Impact of the early 
experience with the post-Communist transition and the influence of the 
supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova, Markowski, Tóka, 1999:391) on shaping the Polish market economy 
were approached with suspicion by the right-wing parties and instilled distrust 
towards Western institutions and companies.  
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 Socio-cultural competition continued through the 1990s and became essential 
to national self-renewal. The competition which lasted through this period was most 
evident in the debates surrounding the evolving ties with the European and global 
institutions. The ‘return’ to the ethno-religious traditions became essential in 
strengthening the national ties weakened during the Communist period. The conflict 
between the traditional interpretation of national identity, based on the philosophy 
of national egoism defined in the early twentieth century, and Western territorial 
nationalism continued beyond the twentieth century and remained present in the 
successive party programmes.  
 
6.3 “The Western Standards” and the Polish Nation 
Mazowiecki’s transitional government (transformed into UD prior to the 1991 
parliamentary elections) (1989-1991) was dedicated to promotion of “(…) the civic-
territorial, not ethnic, citizenship” (Sanford, 2002:74). A commitment to 
implementation of a programme of “Western standards” (“European standards”) 
embraced and reformed by the first Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, became influential in strengthening the nucleus of the civic-territorial 
community through providing the mutual objective for both the successive 
governments and Polish nationals (Skubiszewski, Expose57, 1990; Skubiszewski, 
Expose, 1991; Snyder, 2005:274). Skubiszewski in effect expressed the need for 
strengthening the ties among Poles and the historic ties with Western Europe while 
remaining loyal to the ties which crystallised in East-Central Europe, especially 
between Poland and its neighbours.  
                                                          
57 Exposé- a speech of the Prime Minster presenting the directions of the new government 
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Similarly to German issue, which has its solution in the wider European framework, 
the position of Poland becomes safer in the European order with a high level of 
connections and cooperation between the states. Unified Europe will be a different 
world, eliminating or at the very least diminishing antagonisms (…). We set our hopes 
in this world and we want to work towards construction of such world. This is not 
utopia but rather a real contemporary opportunity. It is due to us, the Europeans, 
whether we will take it. The role of Poland will be substantial” (Skubiszewski, Expose, 
1990:14) 
 
 The “Western standards” became the model for successive administrations. 
The aspiration to join the economic and political structures of the EU overpowered all 
other considerations and became the leading discourse of the 1990s (Antoszewki, 
2000:79). The pro-Western orientation of successive governments influenced 
changes within Polish society, evidenced in the 1990s by the driving of nationalists' 
campaigns from the fringes into midstream politics (Pankowski, 2010:69). With 
negotiations regarding Poland’s membership in NATO and the EU accession, 
conditions posed by the supranational institutions, regarding future membership, 
were used as  propaganda by the right-wing campaigners of the Centre-right and 
Christian-conservative Electoral Action “Solidarność” (AWS) (Stadtmüller 2000:24; 
Wolicki, 1998:114-115).  
The AWS perceived Europe and the “West” as “home” of the Poles who were 
denied equal opportunities in the previous two centuries. Nevertheless, the AWS 
remained cautious about the European future remaining determined to preservation 
of traditional Polish heritage rather than hasty adoption of the development from the 
West (Program AWS, Hutchinson, 2005:173-174). Although the rhetoric of AWS was 
linked with the heritage of “Solidarność” its programme shifted the secular message 
directed to the whole population with the support of “Christian values” and the social 
message of John Paul II (Program AWS, Wolicki, 1998:115). The AWS which became a 
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reservoir of ideas was forced to reach to ethnocultural motifs which would appeal to 
the largest number of the Polish people; “AWS not able to present a clear programme 
returns to the past, to the Christian-democratic idea and the National-democratic 
idea” (Micewski, Kultura, 2000:167).  
The programmes of these political organisations undermined the role of the 
West in shaping Polish national identity. While the programme of “Western 
standards” promoted widening the definition of the Polish nationals the right-wing 
and the radical-right preserved the rigid definition of the Polish nation and strictly 
opposed increasing identification with non-Polish institutions (Program Partii Liga 
Polskich Rodzin). Aspects recognised as traditional to the Polish nation rather than 
Polish society and central to preservation of national identity bore resemblance with 
the programme of the Nationalist parties and organisations operating in interwar 
Poland (Micewski, Kultura, 2000:168).  
 
6.3.1 Heterogeneous Society 
“Patriotism in Poland is understandable but Poland of all countries, situated at the 
crossroads of European cultures, has to avoid all forms of xenophobia, aversion 
towards other states, and national minorities.  Distancing us from all the so-called 
“others” in Poland is a serious political and moral mistake” (Micewski, Kultura, 
2000:171) 
 
Poland’s relationship with its neighbours, especially the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), played a fundamental role in introducing the Poles to the modus 
operandi of western societies. The relationship of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s cabinet with 
Helmut Kohl’s government proved difficult in its initial stages due to the delicate 
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nature of the “2+4” talks and the final settlement in international law of Poland’s 
border with Germany (Zaborowski, 2004:92-93).  
In its initial stages, the process of rapprochement was dictated both by 
political sobriety and requirements from the participants of the “2+4” negotiations. 
The participants encouraged Poland to improve relations with its western neighbour. 
In return, the negotiations impacted the future relationship between national and 
ethnic minorities inhabiting Poland. The steps towards recognition of the diversity 
within the Polish society were evidenced by the Polish state’s recognition of the 
existing minorities. Following this course, Polish citizens of German descent were 
granted the same rights as the rest of society. This symbolic gesture towards the 
German minority in Poland implied similar duties of the democratic Polish 
governments towards other minorities inhabiting Poland. Although in the initial 
stages of the transition the Polish authorities were unable to recognise all of the 
needs of the minorities, extension of their rights was observed in the transfer of 
matters related to minorities from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) into the 
Ministry of Culture and Art (MKiSz) and the creation of the Commission of National 
and Ethnic Minorities (Komisja Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych, MNE) (Filipiak, 
2011:33).   
Furthermore, compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Helsinki Accords became an important step in support of the state’s diversity in 
the early stages of transition (Kancelaria Senatu, 2011; Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych, 2012). Manifestation of support by the Republic of Poland towards 
linguistic, cultural, and religious minorities, and equally for a society based upon civic 
rather than ethnic principles was grounded in the preamble to the 1997 constitution 
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(Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1997; Zubrzycki, 2001:633). From the early 
1990s the Polish government introduced acts which would allow national and ethnic 
minorities equal rights. In 1992, Poland signed an act which would allow ethnic and 
national minorities access to the media (radio and television) (Kancelaria Senatu, 
2011:14). Furthermore, in 1999 Ministry of the Interior introduced legislation (Dz. U. 
z 1999, Nr 90, poz. 999 z późn. Zm) according to which, “towns with clusters of 
national or ethnic minorities names and texts in Polish language may be accompanied 
by versions in minority languages” (Kancelaria Senatu, 2011:14). In 1997 penal code 
“penalised and condemned crimes committed against people of different ethnic or 
national background” (Dz. U. z 1997, Nr 88, poz. 553 z późn. Zm). Moreover, in 2000 
the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, signed the act ratifying the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
“Considering that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to 
enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment 
for each society (…)_Considering that the realisation of a tolerant and prosperous 
Europe does not depend solely on co-operation between States but also requires 
transfrontier co-operation between local and regional authorities without prejudice 
to the constitution and territorial integrity of each State” (Konwencja ramowa o 
ochronie mniejszości narodowych, Dz. U, 2002)  
 
The Constitution became the prime example of this endorsement through the 
appeal to the entire body of the Polish citizens rather than a particular nation within 
the state (Sandford, 2002:85-86). Although passing legislation discussing the rights of 
non-ethnic Poles was not the primary aim of the Christian Democratic of the AWS, 
under the SLD government (2001-2005) the Polish parliament ratified The Act on 
National and Ethnic Minorities (2005) which regulates the relationship between the 
Republic of Poland and its minorities. This document officially defined national and 
ethnic minorities in Poland. It also named the national and ethnic minorities existing 
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in Poland. The act also guaranteed support for preservation of distinctive identities 
while at the same time forbidding any methods of forceful assimilation or attempts to 
change the national or ethnic balance in any region of Poland (Dz. U. z 2005, Nr 17, 
poz. 141 z późn. zm.).  
The legal inclusion of national and ethnic minorities in the process of building 
a territorial rather than ethnic identity in Poland was crucial to the actual 
implementation of the notion of a Poland defined by territorial rather than ethno-
cultural categories.  
Although the 2005 Act granted equal rights and additional privileges to 
minorities, according to the former Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection of the 
Republic of Poland, Janusz Kochanowski and the advisor to the Parliamentary 
Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities, Slawomir Lodzinski there is no one 
universal definition of the term “national minority”. According to Lodzinski: “(…) 
accepting a particular definition [of national minority] in the international law was 
delegated to each particular state which according to the social context and internal 
political situation is able to make final decisions” (Lodzinski, 2002:3). The role of the 
Act of 2005 was to provide the populations recognised as minorities within the 
borders of Poland to “protect minorities from the dominant role of the majority” 
(Kancelaria Senatu, 2011:15).      
Despite the cultural traditionalism and the influential role of the Church in the 
1990s, Poland in the 1990s continued to accept the Western European, territorial 
definition of citizenship. Although Polish cultural tradition was outlined in the 1997 
constitution as essential to shaping of the contemporary Poland, identification with 
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Poland through the prism of the state institutions, rather than ethnicity, became 
officially recognised.  
 
6.4 The Pillars of Contemporary National Identity 
 
6.4.1 The Core of Solidarność: Liberal or Conservative? 
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s the struggle for the definition of national 
identity within the traditional frames remained a fertile ground for disputes. In order 
to build up connections with the Polish underground opposition and gain legitimacy, 
a majority of the post-Solidarność parties built their own identity upon the ideological 
struggle against the former Communist elites (Zubrzycki, 2001:631-2).  
The UW and the ZChN, among other parties, in their programmes referred to 
their past achievements within the anti-Communist front. Highlighting their 
involvement in the protests of the 1970s and the 1980s with a devotion to the moral 
guidance provided by the Church, post- Solidarność groups created a front against the 
secular programme of the “ex-communists” (Bielasiak, 2010:45). Post-Solidarność 
parties competing to fill the void left after the collapse of the national movement 
identified the need for their arguments to remain within the sphere of traditional 
values and sustain the competition between the “nation” and its “enemies”. In order 
to bolster such a cleavage and provide a definition of Polishness, conservative parties 
resorted to the juxtaposition of religious and national symbolism, successfully 
utilised by Solidarność in the 1980s (Pankowski, 2010:44). Christian-national such as 
ZChN and Christian-democratic/National-democratic AWS claimed to be the rightful 
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inheritors of  core message of Solidarność. The conservatives challenged the liberal-
cultural attitudes of society and the degree of the Western influence on shaping of the 
post-Communist Polish national identity (Micewski, 2000:168-169).   
Expanding ties with international organisations also influenced further 
debates on the future shape of Poland. Further opening of Poland to supranational 
organisations such as the Council of Europe (CE), the European Union (EU), and the 
military partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), opened 
possibilities and created a new direction for Poland. At the same time these 
organisations were perceived as a threat to the traditional understanding of 
Polishness. The Church and its role in binding the nation in the Communist period 
gained competition in the form of secular-liberalism. In order to halt the process of 
liberalisation, selected historical (the nineteenth century insurrections, the Second 
World War, Stalinism) and cultural factors (linguistic and religious affiliation) were 
once again utilised by the conservatives to influence the process of framing modern 
Polish national identity. The ZChN became one of the leading forces in the 
competition for “the hearts and minds” of the Polish nation. According to two of its 
most influential leaders Wiesław Chrzanowski (Chairman of the ZChN between 1989 
and 1994) and Ryszard Czarnecki (1994-1996), the Church provided a moral 
compass capable of guiding the post-Communist Polish nation as it did in the 
previous generations (Pankowski, 2010:79). The Episcopate together with the 
Christian-national ZChN and elements of AWS invoked the model of Poland based on 
ethno-national and even nationalist traditions. In the interwar period, Christian-
democracy was unable to match the popularity of the National-democrats. Similarly 
in the post-Communist period the traditional national values and political 
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sovereignty remained central to the Poles and majority of the political parties (figure 
1.1) (Micewski, 2000:170). 
Although the ZChN described its roots as Christian Democratic, it was unlike 
Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. The main difference lay in the 
evoking of ethno-nationalist aspects of the national heritage. An appeal to the Polish 
nation as an ethnic community rather than a Polish citizenry evidenced the strength 
of the ethno-nationalist state model in post-Communist Poland (Micewski, 2000:72). 
Many other political parties resorted to the Christian-national tradition in order to 
define their role in democratic Poland. However, the inability to challenge the Social-
Democrats and the subsequent withering support, led the ZChN to become ingested 
by the AWS in 1996 along with twenty-two other parties (eight parties manifesting 
post-Solidarność and Christian Democratic traits) (Antoszewski, 2000:82; Kawęcki, 
2010: 15-16). The political compromise and the ability to unite many ideologically 
different parties under the banner of Solidarność which continued to resemble the 
social consensus and anti-Communist opposition (Szczerbiak, 2005:63).  
 The conflict which led to deeper divisions in the left-right divide and among 
the post- Solidarność groups emerged most visibly within the debates leading to the 
constitutional referendum in 1997. The document which became the culmination of 
the competition between the post-Communist (or ex-Communist) and post-
Solidarność groups, led to crystallisation of two distinct visions for Poland and the 
Poles (Pankowski, 2010:69-70). Debates over the use of terminology in the 1997 
constitution appeared symbolic, however, the debate surrounding the term “citizens” 
rather than “nation” in reference to the Poles caused disputes surrounding the 
196 
 
“traditional” definition of Polishness in contrast to the civic-territorial conception 
(Zubrzycki, 2001:633-634; Mondry, 1997:58-59).  
 
6.4.2 Civic-Territorial or Ethnic Identity? 
The programmes of the ZChN and the AWS demonstrated the desired model of 
Polish national identity. AWS was led by a devotion to preservation of national 
heritage and distinct identity moulded through centuries and preserved by the 
Church. To the Polish nationalist-conservatives, it was imperative that the 
government should defend the traditional definition of Polish nation nurture 
patriotism in Polish citizens(Program Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność, 1997; Wolicki, 
1998:115).  
In their electoral campaign of 1996/1997 the AWS (governing with UW 
between 1997 and 2001) offered the Polish nation stability in their “own” country 
referring to the dominant socio-cultural elements and the competition between 
entrenched competition between the authoritarian past and the democratic future. 
Although they saw the future of Poland in Europe and in the supranational 
organisations, it was the Polish nation which was the key to the future development 
of the state (Pankowski, 2010:80). Following the victory of the AWS, the rhetoric of 
euroscepticism presented in elections became substituted with European 
cooperation and support for the national minorities in Poland. Prime Minister Buzek 
speaking in Sejm in 1997 declared his support for the European direction of future 
development of Poland: 
“(…) the establishment of Solidarnośc gave the national minorities a rightful status 
(…). I would like to underline that in the programme of the government, (…), there 
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was a very important section about Germany and the Weimar Triangle, it was high on 
the agenda (…), We are considering this matter as extremely important” (Buzek, Sejm, 
10.11.1997). 
 
 Futhermore, Buzek’s administration identified further development of Poland 
with the accession to the European Union. The AWS-UW coalition was aiming to 
expedite the adjustment of the Polish structures for introduction of the European 
legislation. The AWS administration recognised the potential benefits of joining the 
European Union for the Polish nation: 
“I would like to underline that accelerating the adjustment process to the EU 
requirements resulting from the future obligations of the Member State of the 
EU is still our main priority. (…). The report prepared by the government 
confirms that the long term effect of the membership in the political, 
economic, and the social domain will prove beneficial for Poland. (…). Poland 
wants to be an equal member of the Union- Union able to help us realise our 
national interests. We believe that the central goal of the Union should be the 
development of the European solidarity based on the shared cultural 
foundations and shared interests of the nations (Buzek, Sejm, 22.12.2000). 
  
The Law and Justice Party (PiS) claimed to assume the role of  inheritor to the 
Solidarność tradition. In their rhetoric, Solidarność was the last authentic expression 
of Polish national identity and this spirit which led to the unification of the Polish 
nationals could only be reignited through referring to the ethnocultural traditions. 
These achievements included the antiquity of Poland. Similarly to Christian-national 
Parties PiS attached a special role to Roman Catholicism in shaping of the national 
identity (Program Partii Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, 2005).  
 
“In the entirety of our history- since the baptism of Mieszko, Saint Wojciech and 
crowning of Bolesław Chrobry until John Paul II, the priest Jerzy Popiełuszko and 
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Solidarność Christianity is the foundation of  our lives” (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 
2005:6)  
 
Entering the Polish parliament on the platform of Euro-scepticism, PiS 
promised its voters to overthrow the Third Republic, which according to them, was 
shaped in agreement with the Communist authorities, and establish a Fourth 
Republic based on a more “traditional” definition of Polishness with Christian values 
identified as the common currency for the majority of the Polish people. In its 2005 
party programme, PiS identified ethnocultural traditions as essential to shaping 
modern Poland. Weakening of these traditional ties was perceived by PiS as an attack 
on the roots of Poland and it was the role to the contemporary Christian-democrats 
and the National-democrats to defend these strategic elements of Polish ethnicity: 
“Another example is the crisis of polonism and patriotism. (…). The new trends will 
certainly not have any immediate effect on the years which saw the growing crisis of 
values connected with the national identity, especially with the Polish schooling 
system which fails to transmit the values, knowledge, and traditions shaping national 
identity” (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2005:10) 
 
 Furthermore, Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in his Expose echoed 
the role of the distinctive national character in strengthening of the relationship with 
NATO, the Vatican, and the European Union as the priorities of the government.  
“We cannot forget about the responsibility for the preservation of the national 
heritage, and supporting the national tradition. Minister of Culture and 
National Heritage will take the responsibility for these fields, which in the 
recent years were outside of the mainstream of cultural politics. (…). My 
government recognises the essential role of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
life of the Nation and the State. I profoundly believe that it will support us in 
our efforts to rejuvenate the morality in public life (…)” (Marcinkiewicz, 
Expose, 2005) 
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Through the attacks on liberalism following the self-discrediting of the liberal-
left, the national-conservatives put more emphasis on organic national identification 
and the traditional definition of family (Marcinkiewicz, Expose, 2005). Open hostility 
towards cultural and sexual diversity was linked to the adoption of national-
conservative overtones by the PiS and a set of Christian moral values as guarantors of 
strong Poland. Through denouncing cosmopolitanism and obscuring the 
achievements of the transition period, the national-conservative parties created an 
alternative reality. In this imagined realm, the citizens are divided into two 
competing camps which either perceived Poland as sovereign and democratic or as 
oppressed in a continuous battle for liberation (Kochanowicz, 2007).  
It seems that, for many PiS activists and supporters Piłsudski is a symbol of 
patriotism (and of “strong hand” authoritarianism) devoid of any particular 
ideological content detached from the actual political cleavages that were relevant in 
the 1920s and the 1930s (Pankowski, 2010:160) 
 
Subsequently the Polish population was divided by PiS into two categories: 
first we have those who belong to the group concerned with Polish sovereignty and 
belonging to “Solidaristic” Poland. The “Solidarists” who mainly belong to the 
National-conservative groupings were fiercely combating all expressions of Western 
form of development in the Polish society associated with “Liberal” Poland. Secondly, 
we find the “Liberal” or the “pro-Western” Poles who are not concerned about 
preservation of the distinctive character of the Polish nation (Bielasiak, 2010:55; 
Markowski, 2006:820).  
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6.5 “Solidaristic” Poland  
 
6.5.1 Poland against Poland 
Arguably, the transition was concluded with Poland joining the European Union in 
2004. This giant leap, involving a rise inflation and unemployment caused by the 
restructuring of the public sector, overwhelmed a large portion of the society, which 
was unable to accept the social cost of this transformation. PiS seized this moment to 
reclaim and redefine the course of the nation along the traditionalist trajectory. The 
vision of PiS was to “stand against closing of the Ministry of Culture and appreciate 
the role of tradition in the life of the nation, through adding once more the, removed 
by the SLD, National Heritage to its name. Our goal is protection of the national 
culture” (PiS, 2005:105). Reigniting patriotism and discipline would strengthen the 
national character and lead to national consolidation (Bielasiak, 2010: 41-49).  
PiS and the LPR highlighted the role of the family unit in the preservation of 
national identity. In fact, the coalition used the rhetoric which re-framed the nation as 
a collective stemming from a primordial root. PiS and LPR through similar claims 
were attempting to build their legitimacy as the only authentic parties of the Polish 
nation (Marcinkiewicz, Expose, 2005). Repetition of nation-oriented terminology 
such as re-Polonizacja (re-Polonisation) and Polonizm (Polonism) characterised the 
nationalist turn which rejected the development according to the Western model  
(Pankowski, 2010:154-156). The administration of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz 
identified the central role of Polish culture in shaping the successive genaration. 
Marcinkiewicz’s Exposé, the 2005 programme of PiS, and selecion of Roman Giertych 
of the extreme-right LPR for the position of the Minister of Education allowed to 
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claim that Poland returned to ethno-nationalist programme (Marcinkiewicz, Exposé, 
2005; PiS Program Partii, 2005). 
Jarosław Kaczyński, finding that conservative rhetoric was insufficient in 
reigniting the national spirit, eventually accepted his leap into the nationalist camp 
by naming Dmowski a “patriot” rather than a “nationalist” (Nałęcz, Polityka, 2015; 
Pankowski, 2010:155).  
The aim of this rhetoric was to give the question of national identity a central 
position in the life of all citizens. Debates on modernisation and the economy were 
subordinated to deliberations on invigorating the national community (Kochanowicz, 
2007). “Solidaristic”, right-wing politicians became vocal supporters of the organic 
state modelled on the imagined community of ancient Poland or the post-1926 
authoritarianism. In an attempt to redefine Polish national identity and its future 
direction, the constitutional endeavour to create foundations for a civic-territorial 
community was discredited and replaced by an alternative realm (the Fourth 
Republic, Czwarta Rzeczpospolita Polska) as proposed by PiS (Markowski, 2006:819; 
2008:1056). PiS remained determined to strengthen the role of “patriotic” education 
and a “positive” presentation of Poland and its history in the media. Such measures as 
“re-Polonisation of the media” and the public sphere entered the next phase in 2006 
(initiated by the AWS in 1997) through coalition with the SRP and LPR (Pankowski, 
2010:153). This national-conservative partnership revoked some of the symbolism 
inherent to the Solidarność project, rebranding PiS as the modern Solidarność 
pressing for further “de-communisation” and the overthrowing of liberalism imposed 
by the ex-Communist oligarchy (Bielasiak, 2010:50; Rae: 2007:228).  
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6.5.2 Modus Operandi of the National-Conservatives 
‘As inheritance of the PRL we received the old state apparatus with the informal 
schemes and interest groups, which frequently grew on the influences and secret 
connections of the PRL secret services and their links with the criminal  underworld. 
The result of this is the systemic hybrid which is the post-Communist state (…). We 
received a form of post-Communist political capitalism” (Kaczynski, PiS Program, 
2005:7)   
 
The “Solidaristic” vision took various avenues in order to strengthen its 
position. One familiar path was similar to that taken by National Democracy (ND) in 
the Second Polish Republic. After entering into government in 2005, PiS knew that in 
order to ensure long-term support of their state project it had to create pious and 
“patriotic” Poles. In its programme it claimed to have successfully defended the “good 
name of Poland in the world” and was strongly “against the forging of history and the 
attempts of revisionism of the Second World War in neighbouring countries (…)” 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, 2007).  
 Education became one of the key targets of the renewed national camp. In 
interwar Poland, Dmowski had been aware of the long-term impact which “patriotic” 
education would have on the citizens. Dmowski understood the influence which the 
state could have when combined with the moral values and guidance of Roman 
Catholicism. Similarly to the endecja programme, PiS, envsioned Poland as a great 
European power resting upon  a strong Polish nation: “(…) we want Poland to 
become one of the most important countries of our continent. We should desire to be 
a great nation (…)”. Following the elections of 2005, the Church was given a crucial 
role in outlining a programme for re-Polonisation of the citizens which would allow it 
to regain control over the development of the future generations of Polish nationals 
(Marcinkiewicz, Exposé, 2005). PiS and its allies argued that such measures were 
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required in order to allow Poland to break away from the Communist past and 
develop new democratic mechanisms. These mechanisms could not function in the 
state ruled by the Social-Democrats. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in his 2005 Sejm 
Exposé argued that the previous adminsitrations were incapable of leading the 
nation.  
“What I previously called the political pragmatism, which will guide this 
administration is not an effect of political machinations but rather humility. In the last 
16 years of rule the governments demonstrated that they always knew better than 
the voters what was good for the people and the state. They did not fulfil their 
promises and they did not wish to fulfil them” (Marcinkiewicz, Expose, 2005) 
 
PiS recognised the need to move away from the Trzecia Rzeczpospolita project 
and take Polish nation to the higher level of democracy identified with the Fourth 
Polish Republic which would grant justice to all citizens (PiS, IV Rzeczpospoilita, 
Sprawiedliwosc dla Wszystkich, 2005).   
Due to the historical role that the Church has played throughout Polish 
history, the Episcopate maintained a paternalistic approach towards Poland and the 
Poles. Unlike in the Communist period, society was now able to identify with the state 
in a secular manner. The 1993 Concordat, between the Republic of Poland and the 
Holy See, was recognised by its critics as a great loss to the sovereignty of Poland and 
a financial burden. It was also argued that the document was a violation of the law of 
separation of the Church and state (Konkordat między Stolicą Apostolską i 
Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 1993). On the other hand, however, the Church authorities saw 
such act as necessary to redefine the relationship between Poland and the Church.58 
                                                          
58
 The document was described by Minister Skubiszewski as a continuation of the thousand year-long 
cooperation between Polish state and the Holy See 
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The role of the Church in the state politics and its influence on legislature of the 
secular Poland came under scrutiny. The religious-secular cleavage became 
recognised as one of the most significant areas of competition between the political 
parties (Kostelecký, 2002:100).  
However, the role of the Church as the bearer of national identity continued to 
weaken through the 1990s as its preservation of national identity in democratic 
Poland was no longer required as the population increasingly identified with the 
secular national institutions. The defiant elements of the Roman Catholic clergy 
became entangled in symbolic mobilisations of the citizenry following the 
constitutional debate. In 1998 and in 2000-2001 the debates on national identity and 
recent Polish history addressed some of the issues which had remained buried 
throughout the Communist period. The “Auschwitz cross affair”59 and the Jedwabne 
controversy60 divided society with regard to dubious aspects of recent history. 
Hostilities which frequently involved anti-Semitism and xenophobia remained 
marginal but they not only further fractured the fragile civic community but equally 
divided opinion within the Episcopate (Pankowski, 2010:104-108; Zubrzycki, 2006: 
215-218). Both these incidents, which took place in the transition period, 
demonstrated that society was unable to cope with any attack on a national identity 
which was built upon safeguarding of Christian traditions in Europe (Porter-Szucs, 
2011:356-359).  
                                                                                                                                                                               
(http://www.polskieradio.pl/39/156/Artykul/896991,20-lat-temu-Polska-zawarla-konkordat-ze-
Stolica-Apostolska) 
59 Erection of crosses outside of Auschwitz without the permission of the Church or the state 
authorities led to opposition and wide protests sparking a controversy among the Roman Catholics 
and the Jewish community. The protest lasted until 1999 dividing the public opinion.  
60 Apology issued by the Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski in 2001 for the 1944 massacre in a 
small town of Jedwabne where ethnic Poles incited by the Nazi regime murdered hundreds of Jewish 
inhabitants from the area. The controversy continued for the following few years dividing the public 
opinion over the issues of nationality and responsibility for crimes committed during the Second 
World War.   
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The Church as the guardian of morality in Poland was granted a special role by 
the AWS and later PiS-led governments. Following the death of Pope John Paul II in 
2005, PiS combined the message of Solidarność and selected teachings of Pope John 
Paul II, in order to frame its programme as that of the only legitimate political option 
dedicated to defending the “fatherland” and the national interest (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, 2005:42).  
“It is our duty to stay true to His [John Paul II] mission: duty to rejuvenate Europe 
with the spirit of Christian solidarity, expressed in the laws of a human being, family 
rights, and the rights of the nations. Christian traditions are deeply embedded in our 
experiences: democratic traditions of the polyethnic First Rzeczpospolita, patriotic 
traditions of the national uprisings. Moreover, traditions of the campaign against 
Communism (…)” (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2005:42) 
 
Through the juxtaposition of national and religious symbols, PiS used organic 
definitions of the Polish nation and in its campaigns continued to avoid discussing the 
cultural exchange which had a significant impact on shaping of the modern Poland. 
PiS used Polish history to legitimise its programme and gain popular support for the 
proposed Christian-national trajectory of their politics exemplified by the party 
programmes and the Parliamentary speeches. Furthermore, the leader of PiS called 
for intensifying the re-Polonisation campaign aiming at strengthening of the core of 
the Polish nation (Porter-Szucs, 2011: 358-359; Vermeersch, 2012:136). The only 
solution perceived by national-conservative politicians was the ultimate construction 
of a Poland and Polishness opposed to that introduced by the liberals in the 
constitution of 1997. The defiant PiS, in opposition to the pro-Western civic-
territorial model of Poland envisioned the next stage of the national evolution. The 
proposed Fourth Polish Republic with its nation-oriented constitution would provide 
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the traditionalist community with an envisioned state (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 
2009:32-33). 
Through concentrating on issues of national identity the ruling PiS/LPR/SRP 
coalition was aiming to create an environment of distrust. The role of PiS was to 
undermine the liberal-left through “revealing the links between SLD, and its 
predecessor SdRP, in opposing Poland’s membership in the NATO” (PiS, 2005:17). 
Furthermore, utilisation of Catholicism by the coalition and vice-versa served both 
sides in the renewed battle for the survival of the distinctive Polish character. The 
role of Radio Maryja and its founder Father Tadeusz Rydzyk61 served as a tool for 
mobilisation of the Poles disenchanted with the liberal-left governments which 
according to the national–conservatives were effectively crypto-communist (Rae, 
2007:230). In order to reach the core of Polish national identity, Roman Giertych, the 
charismatic leader of the LPR (Minister of Education in PiS/LPR/SRP coalition in 
2006) followed in the steps of the pioneers of national thought by introducing radical 
values, such as the role of familial ties in the life of the state, patriotic history and 
greater emphasis on religious education, in schools (Kochanowicz, 2007, Pankowski, 
2010:181-184). The programme of PiS, although critical of the liberal cultural 
attitudes of the SLD, remained devoted to economic etatism supporting a central role 
of the state in shaping the national character. 
“The idea of liberal Poland, which we continue to criticise, is a post-Communist form 
of social darwinism, masks with slogans about the individual freedoms and the 
integrity of the state (…). Role of the state, according to this concept, is limited and 
passive- in reality it is the guarantor of the inequality characteristic to the post-
Communist society. (…) The liberal vision disintegrates the society in different 
dimensions (…). The opposing vision is that of solidaristic Poland- where the 
                                                          
61 Radio Maryja is the voice of the ultra-Catholics in Poland (Radio, Television and Community). The 
organisation is involved in Polish politics endorsing the nationalist and national-conservative parties. 
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overriding goal is to support the community (…) at the core of the competition 
between these two vision is the question of moral quality of the state” (PiS, 2009:12) 
 In their attempt to create a new model of the Polish citizen, the national-
conservatives became involved in cultural/historical projects whose main role was to 
extend the programme of “historical politics” (Rae, 2007:230). Formation of a nation 
state would be achieved through the use of national institutions such as the Institute 
of National Remembrance (established under the AWS-UW coalition), changing the 
name of the Ministry of Culture (under which name it functioned until 2005) into the 
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage with new departments dedicated to 
nurturing in the patriotic spirit (PiS, 2009:12; Pankowski, 2010:153-154). Measures 
of combating globalisation, presented in the campaigns of PiS, represented their 
move further to the right of the political spectrum and fitted a description of extreme-
nationalist rather than a conservative party (figure 1.1) (Pankowski, 2010:161-162; 
Vermeersch: 2012:130).  
“The Coalition SLD-UP was clearly against family. (…). It is important to remember 
that the coalition SLD-UP began drafting the project on legalisation of the homosexual 
partnerships, not denying the possibility of adoption in such relationships (PiS, 
2005:119) 
Through the 2010s right wing politicians continued their campaign against 
diversity within Polish society. In its 2000s programmes, PiS took a sense of pride in 
combating the “demoralisation of the Polish society” through promotion of 
traditional families and protection of women and children (PiS, 2005:91). The return 
to the envisioned model of the Polish family became, according to PiS, central to 
strengthening the core national values. The family, identified with the core of the 
nation, was under threat and it required support of the national authorities: “Polish 
family is in crisis. It is unable to perform its key duties. It is not the place where we 
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are brought up, become members of the society, and become morally sensitive” (PiS, 
2009:126).  
The envisioned Poland of the “Solidaristic” camp was characterised by “zero 
tolerance for those who break the law (…)” leaving little room for people who did not 
fit within the traditional frames of the Polish nation. Although according to PiS there 
was no connection between nationalism and xenophobia in Poland, it had not broken 
ties with the radical and extreme right organisations which it recognised as 
“patriotic” with “national interest at heart.”62 Anti-globalisation was utilised as a 
powerful tool in the battle for the soul of Poland which, according to PiS lay in the 
rural roots of the Polish population. In their campaigns, PiS professed that that 
without appropriate policies dedicated to the preservation of the national heritage 
the distinctive national identity was destined to disappear (PiS, 2009:12-13). To 
many PiS voters, reluctance to identify with supranational institutions or the 
legitimate national authorities, presented by the nationalist right as “alien”, defending 
the traditional values in fact resembled defence of the Christian civilisation in Poland. 
References to thepre-1795 realm, the Second Rzeczpospolita, the nineteenth century 
uprisings, and the Second World War, interwoven with the teachings of the Church 
and especially John Paul II, in PiS programme evidenced the aim to build a great 
Polish nation upon ethnocultural traditions (PiS, 2005; PiS, 2009:12). 
“As the supporters of the solidaristic Poland we are appealing for the rejection of the 
negative Communist traditions, also in the socio-cultural dimension, and referring to 
the best traditions of Rzeczpospolita- tradition of love for the “Fatherland” (PiS, 
2009:12) 
 
 
                                                          
62 Karpiuk, D. Żołnieże niepodległości http://polska.newsweek.pl/zolnierze-nie  
209 
 
6.6 “Liberal” Poland 
In the post-Communist Poland the liberal parties identified the future of Poland 
Polish citizens with the European integration. President Kwasniewski and the SLD-
UP coalition similarly to the Conservative politicians recognised the economic future 
of Poland within the structures of the European Union. Unlike politicians of the Right, 
who negated the influence of the Western values on shaping Polish nation, politicians 
of the Left identified the supranational institutions as central to strengthening 
identity among East-Central European and Western European communities. 
Furthermore, politicians of the liberal parties recognised the need to strengthen the 
societal ties and social trust rather than Polish nation founded upon ethnocultural 
traditions. SLD became predominantly focused on international cooperation and 
construction of the polyethnic framework in East-Central Europe (SLD-UP, 2001; 
SLD, 2009:49-50). Moreover, the liberals supported separation of the Church from 
the state appealing strengthening the role of the state institution in shaping modern 
Polish citizenry. 
“We support creation of the European Charter for integration of immigrants, 
founded in equal laws and responsibilities as well as mutual respect. (…). We 
want the politics of integration which will allow building of an open society, 
defending the laws of all citizens (…). We support linguistic and cultural 
integration programmes for immigrants” (SLD, 2009:50) 
 
The discussion which divided Poland in the twenty-first century was 
reminiscent of the conflict between the Socialists and the National Democrats in the 
interwar Poland. This discussion continued to evolve as the socio-economic 
environment became heavily influenced by various European and global 
organisations. Unlike in the previous century, Poland’s security was guaranteed by 
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both military (NATO) and economic (EU) partnerships. Such developments 
influenced the changes across the political spectrum and although the National 
Democracy and the Polish Socialist Party were not reformed, the political mainstream 
of the post-Communist Poland, the discussion on national identity and the future of 
Poland became intrinsic to the programme of parties in democratic Poland (Sanford, 
2002: 75-76). 
Although the competition between “Solidaristic” and “Liberal” Poland was  
played down by the Civic Platform, the programme of PiS continued to appeal to the 
traditional Christian values and national identity divisive to heterogeneous Polish 
citizenry (Kordzińska, 2013). It was argued that through the official and clandestine 
support for the movements aiming to break social trust and the support for 
authorities, Jarosław Kaczyński’s party applied conspiracy theories63 in order to 
diminish support for the PO-PSL government (Bielasiak, 2010:51; Rae, 2007:231).  
On the other hand, support for the Social-Democrats which diminished 
through the first decade of the twenty-first century had an impact on the introduction 
of the conservative programme aiming to reverse the progress of the “destructive” 
liberal secularism. Western and traditional definitions were incorporated into the 
agendas of parties such as the centre right Civic Platform (PO) who would dominate 
the Polish political stage following the disappearance of the left-right axis of 
competition (Bielasiak, 2010:51-52).   
 
 
                                                          
63 The 2010 crash of presidential plane in Smolensk was presented by the national-conservative and 
nationalist parties as an assassination sponsored by the President of the Russian Federation  Vladimir 
Putin and Polish Prime Minister Tusk http://www.newsweek.pl/zdjecie-tuska-i-putina-po-katastrofie-
w-smolensku-na-newsweek-pl,artykuly,274478,1.html 
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6.6.1 Liberalism Following the Transition 
In 2004, Poland joined the EU. The process of rapid restructuring and privatisation of 
the state sector required by Brussels as part of the negotiations between the Republic 
of Poland and the EU allowed the state to align its market with other European and 
global economies. However, this rapid process lacked transparency, thus fostering 
corruption. The ruling SLD (2001-2005) was discredited (Żakowski, 2012) and the 
anticipated EU accession received an apathetic welcome from Polish society 
(Kochanowicz, 2007; Pankowski, 2010). The traditional left-right cleavage of the 
1990s was replaced by the dominance of the conservatives who adopted the 
“globalisation/traditionalism” dichotomy as the sphere of competition. The dominant 
political forces in Poland presented contrasting programme for the socio-cultural 
development of Poland following expansion of the EU. In the programmes of PO and 
SLD deepening of the relationship with Europe became a priority for the socio-
economic development of Poland. Furthermore, the liberal left opposed the 
programme proposed by the PiS while defining the role of the state and the Church in 
Poland. SLD also undermined the tradition and family-oriented policies of PiS 
“Our response to the contemporary problems is: MORE DEMOCRACY, more civic 
rights, more European democratic and social standards! Our goal is a tolerant state, 
secular, with a neural world-view. (…). One of our central aims is returning the state 
to the citizens. We will strengthen the autonomous decision-making and construction 
of civic society” (SLD, Sprawiedliwosc Spoleczna, Section I and II, 2005) 
 
 Membership in the European institutions offered expansion of national 
identity. The exclusive national character and the national egoism defined by the 
National Democracy, dominating the Polish landscape during the period of 
authoritarianism, were challenged by the Western model of nationalism. The spread 
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of the European values which included modernisation, secularisation, and shifting 
away from the nation-state became evident in the programmes of parties competing 
for the dominant position in Poland. Anthony D. Smith (1991) argues that although 
ethnic cores collected and preserved ethnocultural traditions there are also events 
which could impact the direction and the future goals of the national community:  
Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but 
to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit 
of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that 
unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that 
unit and its culture (Smith, 1991:35) 
 
Accession to the EU was a historical moment which led to expansion of the 
narrow definition of the national character. . Accession to the EU became the 
symbolic end of old post-Communist Poland and the beginning of the new, European 
Poland. The cultural exchange, necessary for rejuvenation of the national which 
became possible after the collapse of authoritarianism, introduced a novel form of 
cultural identification. Opposition of the supporters of the organic definition of 
Poland became a necessary reaction, which allowed regeneration of Polish 
population after the painful period of transition.  
“Revivalism gained wider resonance when traditional societies, faced with external 
challenges, had to innovate by cultural borrowing. It used two strategies to overcome 
ethnic traditionalism. One was internal moral transformation by employingan 
alternative (dynamic) past to redefine what is authentic tradition. The other was 
‘mythic overlaying’: the creation of a counter tradition of heroic activism based on a 
cult of national sacrifice that legitimised political revolution when traditional elites 
seemed powerless. However, this overlaid and did not eradicate older, often 
religiously-based ethnic identities, and divisions between secularists and religious 
bedevil many nations” (Hutchinson, 2005:6) 
 
 While PiS described Poland in traditionalist/organic terms, PO, although 
accepting of the traditional moral values and the impact of Polish history, used civic 
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rather than ethnic frameworks to describe modern Polish society. References to 
Poland under the Jagiellons rather than the Piasts, used by the PO leadership, created 
an impression of unity in society and of the interpersonal trust required to aid the 
fragile civic society. Polishness, according to PO, was not constrained by historical 
factors. The PO also refused to introduce stringent moral codes upon the population 
(Bielasiak, 2010:51). The liberal option was a promise of a pro-European course, 
pluralism, and defence against nationalism and a confessional state (Sokołowski, 
2012:469-472; Szczerbiak, 2013:6-7). 
PO praised the role of the EU as binding element which would strengthen 
interpersonal trust among Polish citizens and towards the European institutions. PO 
was able to redefine patriotism using Europe as its framework. Through the appeal to 
western morality, PO did not resort to juxtaposition of Catholicism and ethno 
symbolism, instead referring to the Biblical Decalogue (Ten Commandments) as a 
widely accepted set of ethical and moral norms in Western Europe. In their 
programmes PiS appealed to Poles as a collective of citizens dedicated to the state 
through common history and familial ties, PO, on the other hand, presented its model 
citizen as a “free individual responsible for his/her fate and that of their family” 
Platforma Obywatelska, 2007).  
 The liberal forces within the Civic Platform and SLD perceived Poland as an 
integral element of the European Union. Following the costly transition period Polish 
society remained divided about the future direction of the state.  
“We know that the democracy and laws of citizens in the EU and a guarantee 
of justice for people. The idea of citizenship should be open, based on liberties 
and responsibilities. It should be an element of building shared future in 
Europe. We want everyone who lives in Europe to have a right to take decision 
about its future. (…). We believe in active social debates and the idea of civic 
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community. For us, mixture of cultures, languages, and religions is one of the 
greatest European tresures” (SLD, 2009:30-31). 
 
Poland following the accession to the European Union has experienced the 
most successful period in its history (Baczynski, Paradowska, 2014). Since joining the 
European Union Poland developed a more inclusive model of citizenship which could 
be evidenced by the support for the ethnic and national minorities officially accepted 
by the state authorities. According to the state authorities, Poland was no longer 
facing threats to state integrity. Although politicians of PiS and the radical-right fear 
that the traditional national values are becoming less influential in the post-national 
Europe, ethnocultural traditions remain influential. PO opposed the national 
programme proposed by PiS. According to the ruling party, the EU allowed Polish 
people to become a more organised society, developing interpersonal trust, 
necessary for strengthening the democratic process. PO argued that the government’s 
impact on culture, rather than strengthening ethnic ties, should “strengthen the social 
capital, through supporting creativity, interpersonal ties, and bolstering the sense of 
community, and self-worth among Polish women and men” (PO, 2011:57). 
Furthermore, since joining the EU Polish nation became less of an ethnic 
definition and rather a territorial identification (Galla, interview, 2012; Hutsch, 
interview, 2012). According to Ryszard Galla (German Minority Electoral Committee 
and Polish Sejm), following the accession to the supranational institutions Polish 
national identity became widely perceived as inclusive and more accepting of 
alternative definitions of Polishness (Galla, interview, 2012). Tomasz Szyszlak, 
lecturer at Wroclaw University analysing the situation of ethnic and national 
minorities in Poland, claims that positive campaigns presenting Polish people as 
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more than a linguistic or religious group were increasingly widening the confines of 
Polish nation. In his research Kwestia romska w polityce państw Europy Środkowej i 
Wschodniej (2012), Szyszlak outlines the progress of the local and regional 
institutions in widening identification of the Polish minorities with the state 
institutions (Szyszlak ed., 2012). Although both Szyszlak and Galla agree that in the 
field of education Polish authorities have been supportive, more work was required 
in order to strengthen the civic-territorial model in Poland. Through outlining 
common goals for the entire society and the programmes promoting the cultural 
exchange and heterogeneity, expanding in the contemporary Poland, the state 
authorities became involved in widening the appeal of the state institutions among 
the entire body of Polish citizens (Muzeum Historii Polski, 2012). 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Liberal-democracy influenced the creation of a wide range of political forces pursuing 
their idealised Poland and models for Polish citizens. The persisting divisions within 
Poland identified by the Nationalists and the Socialists in the interwar Poland 
resurfaced in the modern Polish society: the “Liberals” and the “Solidarists”. Although 
the cleveages on the two-dimensional political spectrum did not resemble the 
economic or social issues64 present in interwar Poland, competition between the 
state constructed along the civic-territorial/ Western model of nation clashed with 
the organic definition of Polish nation which identified ethnic roots of the Polish 
nation as central to construction of a modern national identity in the post-Communist 
Poland.   
                                                          
64 Ethnic Poles following the collapse of Communism constituted 97.6 per cent (1992) of the 
population inhabiting Poland (Eberhardt, 1996:146) 
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 Throughout the transition period and following accession to the EU, the 
competition concerning the nature of modern national identity was shaped both in 
the present and on the historical platform. The right-wing parties supported the 
construction of a Poland “pure” in character with elements identified as “traditional” 
underpinning the definition of the national community. Accusations aimed at the 
domestic liberal competition and supranational organisations bolstered concerns 
within the population over the sovereignty of their state. The national-conservatives 
identified secularisation and the strengthening of ties with the European Union as 
detrimental to a particular view of the nature of Polish national identity described in 
through the prism of primordialism. In the rhetoric of the right-wing parties the 
increasing globalisation resembles the situation of Poland during periods of limited 
sovereignty. PiS politicians remained defiant in their support of Roman Catholic 
values and the preservation of the organic national community similarly to the 
National Democrats at the turn of the twentieth century. The national-conservatives 
and the nationalist organisations to their own degree became involved in shaping 
national identity in Poland in opposition to the international community. In order to 
achieve this goal the elements derived from different periods of Polish history 
created a platform for contemporary competition in Poland. Furthermore, through 
the ethnicist lens this chapter demonstrated the relevance of elements existing in 
different periods of history in shaping the modern national identity.  
(…) we find hierarchical and covenantal elements often intertwined with republican 
nationalism to this day. This is not only true in Britain and Japan, Israel and the 
United States but also seen in national states ranging from Ireland and Poland (…), 
where the Church retains a strong following. Here, the covenantal elements of ethnic 
election and mission continue to animate segments of their population, and thereby 
to offer alternatives to the secular national destinies charted by liberal and socialist 
elites (…) (Smith, 2008:181) 
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Although the frontiers of Poland remained unchanged since the Second World 
War, similarly to the struggle of the nineteenth century national agitators, the 
competition for widening the definition of Polishness remained one of the leading 
concerns shared by the political parties in the Third Republic. Even though the ethnic 
structure of Poland changed dramatically the models national models proposed by 
ethnosymbolism were absorbed by the Polish society after 1989. The constitution of 
1997 and the Act on National Minorities of 2005 were ground-breaking for Poland 
and the Polish people. Although the population and the territory of Poland were 
altered greatly under the authoritarian regime leading to the formation of a nation 
state it was the heterogeneity of the ideas which effectively led to the shaping of a 
state where the community could identify with a wide variety of organisations and 
institutions rather than through kinship.   
“Nationalists might claim that although currently backward, their nation had once 
been a teacher of the nations, so that borrowing from the advanced was no more than 
reclaiming their patrimony. This undermined an ethnocentric resistance to change 
and enormously expanded the repertoire of options available to modernising elites. 
At the same time, it rejected an uncritical adoption of external models: such 
borrowing must work to enhance nations, not to efface them within a single 
conception of development” (Hutchinson, 2005:50) 
The European Union also influenced the strengthening of civic ties between 
Poles but the low level of interpersonal trust required to form a civic society 
remained an obstacle in contemporary Poland. The political parties which presented 
the benefits of a civic community were discredited and they are still to regain trust of 
the voters. The Civic Platform (PO) supported the strengthening of interpersonal ties 
and the wider association of the Polish citizenry with the institutions of the state.  
The two competing visions of national identity remained essential to the 
political parties in the post-Communist and post-transition periods of Poland’s 
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history. These strands presenting Poland as either exclusive or inclusive continued to 
play a crucial role. Despite the growing ties with the international community and 
progressing secularisation, the linguistic, religious and cultural affiliations remained 
important for the definition of the Polish society and this is evidenced by the party 
programmes of the organisations which have played a decisive role in the Polish 
parliament since the elections of 1991. The constitution of 1997 and the Act on 
National and Ethnic Minorities (2005) are among some of the main achievements of 
the liberalism in Poland.  
European integration was perceived by the liberal parties in Poland as an 
opportunity for strengthening of the core values in Poland. The leading parties 
identified the EU with regeneration of Polish culture and strengthening of the 
territorial model national community. Membership in the European and global 
institutions launched the process of overcoming the ethnic traditionalism supported 
by the Christian-national and National-democratic parties following the collapse of 
Communism. Through the 1990s and the 2000s, the competition between the 
traditional definition of the national community and the identification beyond the 
confines of a nation-state remained an important element in the leading parties’ 
political programmes. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
Following the collapse of Communism in Poland a wide range of political parties 
proposed programmes for the future development of Poland and revitalisation of the 
national community. Although the majority of the post-Solidarity parties formed a 
firm opposition to the ex-Communists their programmes for the direction of Poland 
varied. The minor differences and personal animosities disallowed forging alliances 
which would expedite the process of transformation into a free-market economy.  
 Despite the competition in the socio-cultural sphere, which on numerous 
occasions overshadowed all other considerations, European integration and 
unification with other supranational institution remained an overriding goal of the 
successive administrations. The divisions between parties, presented by the two-
dimensional spectrum (figure 1.1), continued to deepen through the 1990s and the 
2000s. Although Europe remained, in the rhetoric of PiS, PO, SLD, crucial to 
strengthening Poland in East-Central Europe, parties could not agree on the cultural 
direction of the national community. Expansion of the EU guided Poland in 
strengthening of the  
The process of expansion of the national identity continued through the 
twentieth century and remained an essential element of every successive 
administration in post-Communist Poland. After 1989 political parties sourced 
heavily from Polish history to legitimise their particular political programme. 
Political programmes and the rhetoric of the politicians demonstrate two main 
currents in shaping post-Communist Poland. Although both these currents 
occasionally used elements of the opposition’s rhetoric, the first camp predominantly 
focused on the ethnocultural history of Poland, predominantly concentrating on the 
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primordialism in shaping modern Poland. The second camp identified modern Poland 
with the cultural heterogeneity.   
“Conceptually, the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and 
territorial, the other ethnic genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases. It 
is this very multidimensionality that has made national identity that has made 
national identity such a flexible and persistent force in modern life and politics; and 
allowed it to combine effectively with other powerful ideologies and movements, 
without losing its character” (Smith, 1991:15) 
 
The divisions’ observable on the political spectrum in the post-Communist 
Poland mirrored the main socio-cultural trends existing in modern Polish history. 
The competition between the organic definition and the polyethnic model of Poland 
persisted since the late nineteenth century. Anthony D. Smith (2008) argued that 
nationalisms equip “each generation of the community with alternative ethno-
histories and national destinies” (2008:15). Furthermore, according to Smith, the 
durability of the distinctive character of a nation requires cultivation through the 
rejuvenation of the ethnocultural elements which played a central role in the process 
of shaping modern nation-states in East-Central Europe. The “revival” of Poland in 
1918 and preservation of the particular national identity required “a number of 
interrelated components- ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic, and legal political 
(Smith, 1991:15). 
This research makes it apparent that the history of border shifts (Maps I, II, 
and III), migrations and expulsions has put a burden on the perception of the peoples 
inhabiting the region studied. The lack of clear-cut geographical frontiers and the 
process of cultural exchange shaped a wide range of divergent communities in East-
Central Europe.  Communities with multi-layered identities rarely shared the 
programmes of the nationalist agitators recognising them as detrimental to the shape 
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of their communities. The distinctive ethnic and cultural affiliations of the local 
populations were also recognised as obstacles to achieving the utopian homogeneity 
of the national community (Hutchinson, 2008:50).   
In order to understand the process of shaping the modern national identity in 
Poland, this study posed questions which were both chapter specific and 
comprehensive. Each of the chapters analysed: Firstly, whether the national identity 
in Poland was an effect of la longue duree or whether it was the product of the 
nineteenth century. Secondly, the study analysed, whether the successive 
governments and political parties in different periods, defined the nation as organic 
or territorial. And finally, the study inquired about the role of the ethnic cores in 
shaping modern Poland.  
This research posed three central questions which would allow the process of 
construction and the shaping of national identity in successive generations to be 
broken down and analysed.  
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
The aim of this study was to demonstrate the process of shaping modern national 
identity in Poland. Through the application of ethnosymbolism and locating ethnic 
cores in modern Polish history, it became possible to determine which pre-modern 
and early modern elements influenced shaping of the modern national character.  
The application of ethnosymbolism, as the conceptual framework of this research 
exposed the role of national institutions, social groups, and ethnic symbols in the 
safeguarding of the national character Through the analysis of the role of cultural 
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borrowing, religious reform, and popular participation, identified by Smith (1991) as 
central in shaping ethnic cores and effectively formation of modern nations, this 
study was able to demonstrate the dynamic leading to formulation of competing 
interpretations of national identity and citizenship in Poland (Smith, 1991:37). 
Through the location of ethnic cores in the history of Polish ethnie it became possible 
to analyse the political programmes proposed by the competing political strands in 
post-1918 Poland. Following the theoretical framework this research analysed the 
process of shaping modern Poland from the perspective of the perspective of the 
dominant, Polish ethnie. 
Furthermore, through acknowledging of the role of antiquity and the notion of 
la longue durée allowed this study to argue that the memory of independent 
statehood preserved by the elites and the Church, described by Smith as “ethnic 
cores” influenced the “revival” of Poland. Ethnic cores preserved the republican and 
religious traditions allowing populations enfranchised following The Spring of 
Nations (1848) to enter the body of citizens. Anderson (1983) argued that modern 
nations were formed through vernacular mobilisation and print language had a 
central role in the construction of modern national identity. This argument, however, 
does not fully explain the lingering appeal of pre-modern and early modern elements 
of national identity. 
Hans Kohn (1965) suggested two types of nationalism. The first category 
defined nation as construct formed upon common ancestry or as a “super-family” 
inherently tied through mystical blood ties. The second category described as civic 
nationalism saw the nation as heterogeneous in an ethnic sense while bound by 
shared territory and common culture (1965:40; 1991:11). The application of 
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ethnosymbolism to this study allowed discussion of the aspects of identity which 
existed prior to “national revival” (Hroch, 1985). Miroslav Hroch (1985, 2007) argued 
that the construction of nations in East-Central Europe required certain social 
preconditions or specific ethnic elements to in order to successfully gain popular 
support among the population. Ethnic groups which were unable to create a coherent 
message became dispersed and effectively incorporated into other nation states. 
Through their critique of modernism and ethnosymbolism Hroch’s theories offered a 
novel approach to historical research.  Comparative analysis examined the essential 
elements of national identity as defined by the ethnicists. These methodological 
approaches confirmed the applicability of this theoretical underpinning to the case-
study.  
 
7.2 Empirical Findings 
Analysis of the findings is chapter specific. Each of these chapters offers answers to 
the research questions both individually and in connection with other sections. The 
Shaping of National Identity (Chapter 4), Nation and nationality post-1918 
Poland (Chapter 5) and National Identity in Post-communist Poland (Chapter 6) 
discussed the role of ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial elements in the 
construction and moulding of national identity (Smith, 1991:123). Empirical findings 
demonstrate the role which the early-modern political and socio-cultural traditions 
played in shaping the national character in modern Poland. Each of the contextual 
chapters analysed the evidence for the persistence of the distinctive national 
character and discussed it in detail.   
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The Shaping of National Identity (Chapter 4) located elements central to 
national identity and discussed the role of these “ethnic cores” in shaping the 
character of the envisioned nation. Identification of the corresponding elements, 
linking the national community with the pre-modern and early modern realms led to 
exposure of what was described as la longue durée in Polish history. Determining the 
foundations of the modern nation required analysis of the preconditions of the 
population which became involved in the construction of Poland. The polyethnic past 
of the Commonwealth was identified as a mean of cementing the post-1918 
communities across the Second Republic of Poland. The polyethnic patchwork of 
communities which was developed through the cultural exchange in Poland-
Lithuania became perceived by the Socialists as the strength of Poland rather than its 
weakness. Poland in the Socialist rhetoric of the PPS ideologues became an identity in 
a political rather than ethno-cultural sense. Although this inclusive model of 
patriotism did not take root the tradition of heterogeneity became preserved in 
Polish history and culture.  
The destruction of the infrastructure and economies of the territories which 
would become incorporated into the Second Republic between 1918 and 1921 had an 
impact on the lengthy process of recovery and consolidation of the divergent 
territories and communities. The failed reconstruction of the Commonwealth and the 
construction of a diluted version of the polyethnic programme following a 
disappointing Treaty of Riga led to further polarisation of ethnic and religious 
communities inhabiting Poland.  
The levels of development across Poland in the interwar years varied greatly 
and the largely rural and illiterate population in critical areas such as Galicia, 
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formerly part of the Austrian Empire (Prazmowska, 2010:34) and areas of the former 
Russian Empire (Prazmowska, 2010:47) was unable to comprehend the idea of 
“national revival” and frequently unwilling to conform to the programmes initiated 
from Warsaw. The Polish government was aiming to change these inequalities after 
the end of the First World War, however two main factors stood in the way. First, the 
three partitions were developing (for 123 years) according to programmes initiated 
by the foreign powers and secondly, the Republic established in 1918 was unable to 
provide a programme both in the socio-cultural and economic sphere which would 
satisfy the divergent populations across Poland. Such was the case of the Ukrainian-
speaking population which became openly hostile to education in the Polish 
language. 
The role of this chapter was to identify the ethnic cores, essential to the 
distinctive national character. This section analysed impact of the Church, szlachta, 
and the literary tradition to safeguarding the national identity through the period of 
statelessness. It argued that in the early-modern era the Church remained the only 
salient indicator of identity and connection with the early-modern realm. It also 
analysed the impact of the ethnic cores on elevation of the lower strata to the status 
of Polish citizenry. This symbolic expansion of citizenship required dissemination of 
the ethnocultural elements, previously exclusive to the nobility. This popular 
participation in the envisioned nation was partially achieved through the 
juxtaposition of religious and national elements in order to revitalise the national 
project. Furthermore, the nationalist elites, stemming predominantly from the large 
aristocratic strata (szlachta), preserved the polyethnic character of Poland-Lithuania, 
political tradition, and the reforms brought in by the 1791 constitution.  
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Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the competing visions 
regarding citizenship in the envisioned Poland divided the nationalist agitators. The 
two strands, ethnic/exclusive and civic/inclusive, envisioning Poland as a state of all 
inhabitants rather than particular social classes were outlined at the end of the 
nineteenth century by the National Democrats. The nobility which was considered as 
the body of citizens in the former Commonwealth remained defiant until the 
pacification of the January Insurrection of 1863. The vision of the nation ruled by the 
upper strata as outlined by the former émigré intelligentsia in Paris proved 
unsustainable. The political programme of the Commonwealth and the social model 
became potent to the Socialists at the turn of the century. Expansion of Poland 
through the construction of the federal model was dedicated to building of a 
polyethnic state within the borders of Poland-Lithuania.  
Ethnic symbols played a crucial role for both of the inclusive and exclusive 
visions of Poland and were incorporated into the programmes of the leading political 
currents. For the nationalists, utilisation of primordialism was the main path to be 
followed in the creation of a dominant and potent national model. It created a reality 
in which “true” Poles were under constant threat from the competing nationalisms in 
Ukraine or Lithuania while at the same time it offered a programme of national 
rejuvenation through education and cooperation among ethnic Poles.  
Finally, this chapter demonstrated that although following the independence 
in 1918, the Socialists recognised the role of the Church in preservation of the 
distinctive national character and unification of ethnic Poles; more than 30 per cent 
of the population which constituted the independent Poland were of other than 
Roman Catholic religious affiliation. The construction of nation through the prism of 
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religion would (according to the PPS) led to alienation of divergent communities 
across the state. Instead, the Socialist authorities found it necessary to reframe the 
early modern past (1569-1795) and refer to the symbols which would allow various 
ethnic groups to identify with the state institutions.  
Nation and nationality in post-1918 Poland (Chapter 5) discussed the 
period between 1918 and 1989. The role of this particular section of the study was to 
demonstrate the role of the two leading models of Poland: organic and territorial. 
This lengthy chapter included the role of the early experience with democracy (1919-
1926), followed by the successive weakening of the parliamentary rule, and the 
subsequent authoritarian period. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
that authoritarianism in Poland predated the outbreak of the Second World War.  
Furthermore, this section of the study analysed two distinctive currents in 
Polish politics as proposed by the Socialists and the National Democrats. Although 
territorial patriotism and the ethnic-organic visions of Poland continued to compete 
for the dominant role in shaping contemporary national identity, with the 
deterioration of the economic situation and worsening relations with Poland’s 
neighbours, national egoism became seized the dominant position in Poland. The 
Socialist programme, built upon the early-modern traditions did not lead to 
consolidation and anticipated reconstruction of polyethnic Poland. Animosities 
between ethnic groups and the growing distrust towards the government in Warsaw 
isolated more than a quarter of the state’s population.  
  
The Second World War, which led to further decay of societal ties in East-
Central Europe, compounded the inherent inability to form a civic community and 
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caused an acceleration of the destruction of social ties and an escalation of inter-
ethnic animosities. These conflicts further inflamed the contestation between 
regional nationalisms. Implementation of programmes which would create a civic 
identity failed as evidenced by ethnic conflict between Polish and Ukrainian 
populations continuing until 1948.  
This de facto civil war gave the Soviet sponsored regime an opportunity to 
construct an ethnically homogenous Poland. Through the rhetoric promoting ethnic 
superiority and the idea of the return to the “original” Polish frontiers, the border 
shifts and expulsions across East-Central Europe were justified by the authoritarian 
regime. Furthermore, such shifts and movements were supported by the works of 
organisations such as the Western Institute. Through the pseudo-research of 
anthropology, linguistics and folk culture in the lands attached to Poland, the 
researchers were able to further support the rhetoric of “return” to the traditional 
shape of Poland. Moreover, measures such as initial cooperation with the Church 
were applied in order to maintain the  appearance of continuity and the consent of 
the population to the construction of an ethnically homogeneous state.  
This attempt to forge the nation through the utilisation of the primordial past 
was recognised as fraudulent and proved ineffective. Endeavours seeking to 
undermine and effectively eradicate the memory of the struggle for sovereignty 
preserved by the Church and the Polish culture proved unsustainable. The cultural 
past was preserved by the domestic and the émigré intellectual circles, especially 
Kultura. The distinctive political and literary tradition remained central to the 
reconstruction of modern Poland and the shaping of the Polish population. The 
Church, and to a lesser extent cultural organisations, retained the role of pillars of 
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national identity through formation of a platform for the unification of the social 
groups dispersed by the authoritarian regime. Solidarność became the largest such 
movement across Communist Europe and its role was to provide the entire 
population including the previously disjoined strata with a platform of debate and 
protest against the alienated regime. The nucleus of the civic-territorial nationalism 
stood in stark contrast to the ethnic nationalism implemented in by the Communist 
authorities following the Second World War. Through the widening of the network of 
associations, and the spiritual support of the Church, the nation was able to confront 
the dominant role of the PZPR and outline the new Polish society as a community 
which was shaped using the foundations of various cultural institutions and elements 
of national identity which were shaped in different periods of Polish history.  
National Identity in Post-Communist Poland (Chapter 6) discussed Poland 
following the Communist period. The central argument of this section further refers 
to the role of the two leading currents in shaping post-Communist Poland. The ethnic-
organic programme clashed with the civic-territorial state model. Although the 
leading political parties identified accession to European and global institutions as 
the only viable direction of development, contestation in the socio-cultural dimension 
remained evident in the rhetoric of the political parties.  
The continuing debate regarding the modern shape of Poland and the 
definition of Polish citizens became central on numerous occasions. Some of the more 
controversial events which led to heated discussion included the constitutional 
debate of 1997, the Jedwabne controversy of 2001 and the presidential plane crash of 
2010. The character of the nation was also challenged by the national-conservatives 
with the introduction of the National Minorities Act (2005) and accession to the 
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European Union (2004). These milestones and other controversies crystallised in 
events such as the Auschwitz Cross Affair and the Pope’s (John Paul II) death in 2005 
and became a platform of competition between the liberals and the solidarists. These 
forces (discussed further in chaprer 6) assumed some of the main characteristics of 
interwar political currents and defined national identity. National identity in 
contemporary Poland was shaped through both the prism of the modern and ancient 
elements. Although the relationship with supranational institutions was reinforced 
over the course of the twenty-first century there are elements of ethnic identity 
which remain central to the identification of a significant proportion of the Polish 
population. This was evidenced by the surge of parties defending the traditional 
definition of the Polish population through the vehicle of Roman Catholicism or 
familial ties rather than polyethnic traditions and identification with official state 
institutions. National history was identified by contemporary by the Right-wing 
parties exclusively as an essential  element in patriotic education, necessary for 
rejuvenating the Polish nation. In the rhetoric of PiS the nation was presented as 
either a martyr or a victor in order to preserve the ethnocultural foundations of 
Poland.  
The liberals remained defiant in shaping of the contemporary Polish citizens 
through strengthening ties with Western Europe and Poland’s neighbours. Cultural 
exchange and borrowing identified by the proponents of ethnosymbolism as essential 
in shaping modern nations remained, in the rhetoric of the liberal parties, crucial to 
rejuvenating Polish citizens. Identification with the institutions of the state, European 
institutions, strengthening interpersonal trust were identified as crucial in the 
process of developing Polish democracy.  The liberals propagated shaping of modern 
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Poland upon the platform of polyethnic traditions derived from the early-modern and 
interwar periods.  
The continuity of the two currents shaping the distinctive perceptions of 
Poland and its citizens could be viewed as a template of democratisation in East-
Central Europe. It also furthers an understanding of the competition for national 
identity in other post-Communist communities. Broadening relations with the 
international community in cultural, economic and the military spheres in the region 
rekindled the discussion on national identity and sovereignty.  
 
7.3 Contestation of National Identity in Poland and East-Central Europe 
Ideas pertaining to the contemporary national community in Poland remains divided 
between two main ideological blocs. There is the territorial model outlined by the 
liberals and the organic-traditional model outlined by the politicians of the Right. 
These two opposing visions strive for the dominant role in shaping contemporary 
national identity in Poland. Political parties supporting liberal cultural attitudes 
continue to source from Polish history and ethnocultural traditions in order to clarify 
the direction of the state in the twenty-first century.  
Modern Poland appears as a progressive European society which could be 
portrayed as a model for other post-Communist states. Internally, however, Poland 
remains a heterogeneous society divided into conflicting camps pulling the state in 
different directions, despite the state’s ethnic homogeneity. The crises which Poland 
faced following the collapse of Communism were echoed across East-Central Europe. 
Countries within the European Union such as Lithuania and Slovakia faced similar 
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issues of identity struggling between pro-Western orientations and the protection of 
the traditions which allowed these nation-states to mobilize the populations around 
shared traits and win independence With regards to the post-Soviet Ukraine the 
crisis of identity and the lack of a single ethnocultural past continued to tear the state 
between the east and the west. The culture codified by the ethnic cores in the pre-
modern and early modern past allowing the states to create an encompassing 
programme of national reinvigoration disallowed further development of Ukraine.  
Although the national forces in Poland continued compete for shaping Poland 
along the territorial and the organic trajectory, existence of a single Poland remained 
crucial to the authorities. After 1989 European model of development became a 
model for the mainstream political forces in Poland. Varying visions of Poland’s 
history and the trajectory of development remained interwoven with similar national 
myths and the heroes who emancipated the population or led to national liberation. 
These myths and histories which were preserved in the political traditions preserved 
a sense of one, independent state. The EU, aside from economic development, led 
Poland to socio-cultural advancement. This evolution, associated by the politicians of 
the Right with the negative trends of destruction of the family, weakening of the 
nation-state, or state-sponsored secularisation is fiercely opposed by the Church and 
the Conservative politicians. On the other hand, the liberals remain hopeful that 
closer ties with the EU will allow the Polish society to become stronger and more 
unified on the European platform.  
The Civic Platform (PO) has proven to be the most successful party since the 
collapse of Communism. Since coming to power in 2009, PO focused predominantly 
on the economic development of Poland. There are issues with the interpretation 
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concerning recent Polish history and the opposition continues to reopen some of its 
chapters, including the Second World War or the post-Communist transition, the 
ruling party was able to avoid lengthy conflicts with both PiS and SLD. Although 
Independence Day, celebrating reconstruction of Poland in 1918 (11 November), 
presents a picture of a society divided between organic definition of Poland and the 
polyethnic and supranational European community. Nationalist circles which for 
decades praised Dmowski’s achievements whilst undermining Piłsudski were able to 
create a synergy between these two contradicting figures. This consolidation further 
presents the durability and adaptability of nationalism in Poland. The adoption of 
Dmowski by the liberal Poland as a great Polish statesman is also an evidence of the 
role of national egoism in shaping Poland in successive generations and preservation 
of the national character.  
Contemporary identity in Poland is suffused with elements which support the 
idea of continuity aiding the legitimacy of the official state institutions. Twenty-five 
years of democratic rule in Poland have changed the face of the Polish society. The 
expanding ties with the international community and cooperation with Poland’s 
neighbours allowed, undisturbed by external forces, process of shaping national 
identity, undisturbed by external forces. The friction between the traditional and 
European form of socio-cultural development existing in Poland is necessary to 
ensure ideological heterogeneity in Poland. The long period of authoritarianism 
which corrupted one of the interpretations of national identity did the opposite by 
abolishing pluralism, necessary for revitalisation of the national values. The 
competition must include the widest body of citizens possible to allow legitimate 
process of shaping of national identity in the successive generation.  
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There are pressing matters such as further development of the relationship 
between wider ethnocultural history and the history of Polish peoples. Debates on 
complicated aspects of the most recent national past, including the relationship with 
other ethnic communities in interwar Poland and immediately after the Second 
World War require addressing in order to strengthen the core of Polish citizenship. 
Ethnosymbolism could be further applied to research pre-modern and early-modern 
identities in other nation-states in East-Central Europe. Research by Serhii Plokhy 
(2006) into the origins of modern Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus offers an insight 
into shaping of identities. Plokhy who has also adopted elements of ethnosymbolism 
claims “that the origins of modern nations are to be found in premodern national 
communities, or ethnicities, which I often call “nationalities” (in the tradition of East 
Slavic historiography) and to which Smith refers as ethnies” (Plokhy, 2006:2). This 
research and that of Serhii Plokhy argues that application of ethnosymbolist 
framework could offer a novel insight to the prevalence of ethno-nationalism in East-
Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Analysis of the pre-modern realms through the 
methods applied by the ethnosymbolists and the research into the construction of 
modern nations, proposed by modernists, could offer a novel approach to 
understanding the socio-political development across the region. Identification of 
ethnic cores, which led to the construction of independent states and preservation of 
distinctive character of the community, could offer insight into their contemporary 
structure. Myths and memories of nations played a great role in the preservation of 
the distinctive character of Poland and its population. A thorough analysis of the pre-
modern foundations of contemporary Poland, discussed by Karol Modzelewski 
(2004), could offer further explanations of the role of East-Central European 
antiquity in shaping modern Poland (Modzelewski, 2004:5). Similarly the analysis of 
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the pre-modern and early-modern identities in East-Central, Eastern, and South-East 
European national and regional identities could offer a wider understanding of the 
contemporary socio-political conflicts. Inquiry into the connections between the 
ethnies and their particular ethnic cores which were shaped prior to the French 
Revolution could offer a more detailed understanding of why particular ethnic groups 
prevailed, forming modern nations, while others remained either stateless or chose a 
path of nation building as in the case of Poland. Furthermore, such detailed research 
of ethnic cores could offer some additional information about the extent and 
durability of national identity in countries such as Ukraine where the competition 
between the opposing ethnocultural centres and ethnic cores continued to surface 
since the state’s independence in 1991. Research of the ethnic foundations of modem 
nation-states in the region remains controversial and even in the 2010s leads to 
international disputes between Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.  
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